Published 2000-08-25 · Federal Register document 00-21616
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -300F Series Airplanes
Publication summary
This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. This action requires a functional check of the shear rivets in all six elevator power control actuator (PCA) bellcrank assemblies to determine the condition of the shear rivets, and replacement or rework of the bellcrank assemblies, if necessary. This action is necessary to detect and correct any failed or partially yielded shear rivets of the elevator PCA bellcrank assemblies. Failure of two bellcrank assemblies on one side can result in that single elevator surface moving to a hardover position independent of pilot command resulting in a significant pitch upset recoverable by the crew. Failure of three bellcrank assemblies on one side may result in loss of controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
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Final-rule publication
Recorded publication clauses
- AD identifier printed in this edition
- 2000-17-05
- Effective date printed in this edition
- 2000-09-11
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Applicability wording · Applicability
Applicability: Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes,
with Line Numbers 1 through 800 inclusive; certificated in any
category.
Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified,
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to
address it.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11930–12821, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 7601347facbbf9be493e39cf985d18b7bd3d9dc8e091468a55b71b6e470e6de3
Compliance and requirements
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
To detect and correct any failed or partially yielded shear
rivets of the elevator power control actuator (PCA) bellcrank
assembly, which could result in (1) failure of two bellcrank
assemblies on one side of the airplane and consequent movement of
the single elevator to a hardover position independent of pilot
command, resulting in a significant pitch upset recoverable by the
crew; or (2) failure of three bellcrank assemblies on one side and
consequent loss of controllability of the airplane; accomplish the
following:
(a) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, perform
a functional check of one shear rivet in all six elevator PCA
bellcrank assemblies to determine the condition of the shear rivets;
in accordance with Paragraph 3, Accomplishment Instructions, of
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-27A0166, dated August 17, 2000.
(1) If all penetration depths when measured per Figure 2 of the
alert service bulletin are 0.50 inch or more, no further action is
required by this AD.
(2) If any penetration depth when measured per Figure 2 of the
alert service bulletin is 0.35 inch or more, but less than 0.50
inch, rework or replace the bellcrank assembly with a new or
serviceable bellcrank assembly within 400 flight hours after
accomplishing the functional check. After installation of a new or
serviceable bellcrank assembly, prior to further flight, repeat the
functional check of all the bellcrank assemblies to make sure the
rivets are still in good condition (as specified in the alert
service bulletin) after installation, in accordance with Figure 2 of
the alert service bulletin.
(3) If any penetration depth when measured per Figure 2 of the
alert service bulletin is less than 0.35 inch, prior to further
flight, rework or replace the bellcrank assembly with a new or
serviceable bellcrank assembly. After installation of a new or
serviceable bellcrank assembly, and prior to further flight, repeat
the functional check of all the bellcrank assemblies to make sure
the rivets are still in good (as specified in the alert service
bulletin) condition after installation, in accordance with Figure 2
of the alert service bulletin.
(b) If one or more bellcrank shear rivets have a measured
penetration depth of less than 0.50 inch, within 10 days after
performing the initial functional check required by paragraph (a) of
this AD: Submit a copy of the completed PCA Elevator Bellcrank Shear
Rivet Inspection Report, as provided in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 767-27A0166, dated August 17, 2000, to the following
address: Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98055-4056; fax (425) 227-1181.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. Operators shall submit
their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance
Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager,
Seattle ACO.
Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be
obtained from the Seattle ACO.
Special Flight Permits
(d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with
Secs. 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
21.197
[[Page 51757]]
and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the
requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
Incorporation by Reference
(e) Except as provided by paragraph (b) of this AD, the actions
shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-
27A0166, dated August 17, 2000. This incorporation by reference was
approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with
5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington
98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the
Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite
700, Washington, DC.
(f) This amendment becomes effective on September 11, 2000.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12821–17232, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 968c741e376a55985a2c13b33277fdc8ad12b64970ae040ea9252562f762d405
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Find all recorded historical references to AD 2000-17-05 · 0 printed reference observations in this pinned collection.
These are observations from one dated publication. Current legal status is unknown; aircraft applicability, installed configuration, compliance and burden require separate evidence. Missing or unparsed conditions remain unknown.
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Official source · 2000-08-25
Publication text
This is the complete recorded text of this dated publication.
Current legal effect is unknown. Aircraft applicability, installed configuration and compliance require separate evidence. PDF/text agreement has not been evaluated.
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[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 166 (Friday, August 25, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51754-51757]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-21616]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2000-NM-289-AD; Amendment 39-11879; AD 2000-17-05]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -300F
Series Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that
is applicable to certain Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series
airplanes. This action requires a functional check of the shear rivets
in all six elevator power control actuator (PCA) bellcrank assemblies
to determine the condition of the shear rivets, and replacement or
rework of the bellcrank assemblies, if
[[Page 51755]]
necessary. This action is necessary to detect and correct any failed or
partially yielded shear rivets of the elevator PCA bellcrank
assemblies. Failure of two bellcrank assemblies on one side can result
in that single elevator surface moving to a hardover position
independent of pilot command resulting in a significant pitch upset
recoverable by the crew. Failure of three bellcrank assemblies on one
side may result in loss of controllability of the airplane. This action
is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
DATES: Effective September 11, 2000.
The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in
the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as
of September 11, 2000.
Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or
before October 24, 2000.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114,
Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000 NM 289-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,
Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this
location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. Comments may be submitted via fax to (425) 227-1232.
Comments may also be sent via the Internet using the following address:
[email protected]. Comments sent via fax or the Internet must
contain ``Docket No. 2000-NM-289-AD'' in the subject line and need not
be submitted in triplicate. Comments sent via the Internet as attached
electronic files must be formatted in Microsoft Word 97 for Windows or
ASCII text.
The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington
98124-2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at
the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW.,
suite 700, Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth Fairhurst, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue,
SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-1118; fax (425)
227-1181.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has received reports that elevator
bellcrank assemblies with failed shear rivets have been found on three
Boeing Model 767 series airplanes. On one airplane, the failed shear
rivets were found in both the left inboard and left center power
control actuator (PCA) bellcrank assemblies. Investigation revealed
that the left center PCA had been replaced two weeks earlier. The
bellcrank shear rivets are designed to shear if a jam occurs and an
input of approximately 50 pounds above normal feel forces is applied to
the elevator system.
Further testing by the manufacturer revealed that the single system
hydraulic test of the elevator, which is mandated by a Certification
Maintenance Requirement, may not detect failed shear rivets in an
elevator bellcrank assembly. Failure of two bellcrank assemblies on one
side can result in that single elevator surface moving to a hardover
position independent of pilot command resulting in a significant pitch
upset recoverable by the crew. Failure of three bellcrank assemblies on
one side may result in loss of controllability of the airplane.
The FAA has received no factual information that indicates that
this incident is related to an accident that occurred off the coast of
Massachusetts involving a Boeing Model 767 series airplane. The cause
of that accident is still under investigation.
Explanation of Relevant Service Information
The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
767-27A0166, dated August 17, 2000. That alert service bulletin
describes procedures for a functional check of the shear rivets on all
six elevator PCA bellcrank assemblies to determine the condition of the
shear rivets. (The functional check entails, in part, inserting a pin
into the center of the shear rivets and measuring the penetration depth
of the pin.) The alert service bulletin also describes eventual
replacement of the bellcrank assemblies with new or serviceable
bellcrank assemblies if the penetration depth of the pin is 0.35 inch
or more, but less than 0.50 inch; and, prior to further flight, rework
or replacement of the bellcrank assemblies with new or serviceable
bellcrank assemblies if the penetration depth of the pin is less than
0.35 inch. The alert service bulletin specifies repeating the
functional check after any installation of a new or serviceable
bellcrank assembly to ensure that the reworked or new bellcrank
assembly is still in good condition after installation. Additionally,
the alert service bulletin specifies that, if one or more bellcrank
shear rivets have a penetration depth of the pin of less than 0.50
inch, the operator should send a report (provided in the alert service
bulletin) to the manufacturer.
Explanation of the Requirements of the Rule
Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to
exist or develop on other Boeing Model 767 series airplanes of the same
type design, this AD is being issued to detect and correct any failed
or partially yielded shear rivets of the PCA elevator bellcrank
assembly. Failure of two bellcrank assemblies on one side can result in
that single elevator surface moving to a hardover position independent
of pilot command resulting in a significant pitch upset recoverable by
the crew. Failure of three bellcrank assemblies on one side may result
in loss of controllability of the airplane, which could result in an
elevator hardover and consequent reduced controllability or loss of
controllability of the airplane. Except as described below, the actions
are required to be accomplished in accordance with the alert service
bulletin described previously.
Differences Between Proposed Rule and Service Bulletin
Operator should note that where requirements appear in this final
rule that are different from the Boeing alert service bulletin, this AD
prevails.
Operators should note that, although the alert service bulletin
requests that operators send the completed PCA Elevator Bellcrank
Assembly Shear Rivet Inspection Report (provided in the alert service
bulletin) to the manufacturer, this AD requires that the report be sent
to the FAA.
Interim Action
This is considered to be interim action until final action is
identified, at which time the FAA may consider further rulemaking.
Determination of Rule's Effective Date
Since a situation exists that requires the immediate adoption of
this regulation, it is found that notice and opportunity for prior
public comment hereon are impracticable, and that good cause exists for
making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.
Comments Invited
Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves
requirements affecting flight safety and, thus, was not preceded by
notice and an opportunity for public comment, comments are invited on
this rule. Interested persons are invited to comment on this rule by
submitting such written data, views, or
[[Page 51756]]
arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules
Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified
under the caption ADDRESSES. All communications received on or before
the closing date for comments will be considered, and this rule may be
amended in light of the comments received. Factual information that
supports the commenter's ideas and suggestions is extremely helpful in
evaluating the effectiveness of the AD action and determining whether
additional rulemaking action would be needed.
Submit comments using the following format:
<bullet> Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a
request to change the compliance time and a request to change the
service bulletin reference as two separate issues.
<bullet> For each issue, state what specific change to the AD is
being requested.
<bullet> Include justification (e.g., reasons or data) for each
request.
Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might
suggest a need to modify the rule. All comments submitted will be
available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the
Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that
summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this
AD will be filed in the Rules Docket.
Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments
submitted in response to this rule must submit a self-addressed,
stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ``Comments
to Docket Number 2000-NM-289-AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped
and returned to the commenter.
Regulatory Impact
The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it
is determined that this final rule does not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132.
The FAA has determined that this regulation is an emergency
regulation that must be issued immediately to correct an unsafe
condition in aircraft, and that it is not a ``significant regulatory
action'' under Executive Order 12866. It has been determined further
that this action involves an emergency regulation under DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is
determined that this emergency regulation otherwise would be
significant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, a final
regulatory evaluation will be prepared and placed in the Rules Docket.
A copy of it, if filed, may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the
location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new
airworthiness directive:
2000-17-05 Boeing: Amendment 39-11879. Docket 2000-NM-289-AD.
Applicability: Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes,
with Line Numbers 1 through 800 inclusive; certificated in any
category.
Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified,
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to
address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
To detect and correct any failed or partially yielded shear
rivets of the elevator power control actuator (PCA) bellcrank
assembly, which could result in (1) failure of two bellcrank
assemblies on one side of the airplane and consequent movement of
the single elevator to a hardover position independent of pilot
command, resulting in a significant pitch upset recoverable by the
crew; or (2) failure of three bellcrank assemblies on one side and
consequent loss of controllability of the airplane; accomplish the
following:
(a) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, perform
a functional check of one shear rivet in all six elevator PCA
bellcrank assemblies to determine the condition of the shear rivets;
in accordance with Paragraph 3, Accomplishment Instructions, of
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-27A0166, dated August 17, 2000.
(1) If all penetration depths when measured per Figure 2 of the
alert service bulletin are 0.50 inch or more, no further action is
required by this AD.
(2) If any penetration depth when measured per Figure 2 of the
alert service bulletin is 0.35 inch or more, but less than 0.50
inch, rework or replace the bellcrank assembly with a new or
serviceable bellcrank assembly within 400 flight hours after
accomplishing the functional check. After installation of a new or
serviceable bellcrank assembly, prior to further flight, repeat the
functional check of all the bellcrank assemblies to make sure the
rivets are still in good condition (as specified in the alert
service bulletin) after installation, in accordance with Figure 2 of
the alert service bulletin.
(3) If any penetration depth when measured per Figure 2 of the
alert service bulletin is less than 0.35 inch, prior to further
flight, rework or replace the bellcrank assembly with a new or
serviceable bellcrank assembly. After installation of a new or
serviceable bellcrank assembly, and prior to further flight, repeat
the functional check of all the bellcrank assemblies to make sure
the rivets are still in good (as specified in the alert service
bulletin) condition after installation, in accordance with Figure 2
of the alert service bulletin.
(b) If one or more bellcrank shear rivets have a measured
penetration depth of less than 0.50 inch, within 10 days after
performing the initial functional check required by paragraph (a) of
this AD: Submit a copy of the completed PCA Elevator Bellcrank Shear
Rivet Inspection Report, as provided in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 767-27A0166, dated August 17, 2000, to the following
address: Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98055-4056; fax (425) 227-1181.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. Operators shall submit
their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance
Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager,
Seattle ACO.
Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be
obtained from the Seattle ACO.
Special Flight Permits
(d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with
Secs. 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
21.197
[[Page 51757]]
and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the
requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
Incorporation by Reference
(e) Except as provided by paragraph (b) of this AD, the actions
shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-
27A0166, dated August 17, 2000. This incorporation by reference was
approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with
5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington
98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the
Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite
700, Washington, DC.
(f) This amendment becomes effective on September 11, 2000.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 18, 2000.
John J. Hickey,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 00-21616 Filed 8-24-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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