Published 2011-10-12 · Federal Register document 2011-25754
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, and -300ER Series Airplanes
Publication summary
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires installing foreign object debris (FOD) rubber shields over the primary and secondary external power connectors for certain airplanes, and wrapping silicone tape around the hydraulic tube for certain other airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a fire in the main equipment center due to failure of an external power connector, which caused high-temperature arcing and subsequent splatter of molten copper on an adjacent hydraulic tube, creating a hole in the tube and spraying hydraulic fluid into the power connector, resulting in a fire. In addition there were several reports of overheating or arcing of external power connectors, and one report of a fire due to arcing caused by FOD. We are issuing this AD to prevent FOD from entering the primary and secondary external power connectors, which could result in overheating or arcing and consequent fire in the main equipment center.
Why this record is shown
Source: Federal Register annual FAA metadata. Acquired 2026-09-03T22:23:36.067984+00:00. The title, summary and date are source facts.
- Source revision
- federal_register_ad_metadata_2011-e3661fa6ab35b428
- Source row
- results[277]
- Raw source SHA-256
- e3661fa6ab35b428e6e5ee3716d50c22e985c092328ad8ce2f0f440b962ae0cd
Final-rule publication
Recorded publication clauses
- AD identifier printed in this edition
- 2011-21-03
- Effective date printed in this edition
- 2011-11-16
Read 11 complete recorded clauses
Effective Date
Effective Date
(a) This AD is effective November 16, 2011.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 18057–18122, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: baf1c7b0bb595dc5ad901da6b15406a1dfc00b0f844a4f5a6701099fba1268a5
Affected ADs
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 18122–18151, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 027fbc44617399472b6ac4741da3aee18448654374228bcf4fe3f01df6b1539b
Applicability wording · Applicability
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -200LR,
-300, and -300ER series airplanes; certificated in any category; as
identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 777-24-0102, Revision 1, dated
June 17, 2010; and Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-
0032, dated August 9, 2007.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 18151–18473, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: e15c07bf36076169ceb01669f113b1fd91576d915254a5cba678c04187cf8d49
Subject
Subject
(d) Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/Air Transport
Association (ATA) of America Codes 29: Hydraulic power; and 24:
Electrical power.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 18473–18628, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 2a0c41ba977e1e9de6dab9e87017c830d2b18cabf048834215bcd149ebcae51c
Unsafe Condition
Unsafe Condition
(e) This AD was prompted by a report of a fire in the main
equipment center due to failure of an external power connector,
which caused high-temperature arcing and subsequent splatter of
molten copper on an adjacent hydraulic tube, creating a hole in the
tube and spraying hydraulic fluid into the power connector,
resulting in a fire. In addition there were several reports of
overheating or arcing of external power connectors, and one report
of a fire due to arcing caused by foreign object debris (FOD). We
are issuing this AD to prevent FOD from entering the primary and
secondary external power connectors, which could result in
overheating or arcing and consequent fire in the main equipment
center.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 18628–19369, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 27703263ab8492d42e49e28bfc389b4436b0e60cf3d24cc0cd42d921f44ce97f
Compliance
Compliance
(f) Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 19369–19471, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 76a8ec0548389ac4eaa60ddcc67a7a3de5aedefd320c767b7cf621baa6140ea8
Modification
Modification
(g) Within 36 months after the effective date of this AD, do the
actions required by paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this AD.
(1) For airplanes identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 777-24-
0102, Revision 1, dated June 17, 2010: Install FOD rubber shields
over the primary and secondary external power connectors, in
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service
Bulletin 777-24-0102, Revision 1, dated June 17, 2010.
(2) For airplanes identified in Boeing Special Attention Service
Bulletin 777-29-0032, dated August 9, 2007: Wrap silicone tape
around the hydraulic tube, in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-
0032, dated August 9, 2007.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 19471–20230, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 5ba96382126eca73b94a5af4d8d6b95921cf704df6a92052d547925d011f3341
Exception to Service Information
Exception to Service Information
(h) Figure 1 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing
Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-0032, dated August 9,
2007, does not identify the units of the dimensions of the silicone
tape installed on the hydraulic tube; those dimensions are
identified in inches.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 20230–20544, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 2d6823e980fcfea8adcc3ddd3ce94c433fedc20908559118506db5286b4881c1
Credit for Actions Accomplished in Accordance With Previous Service Information
Credit for Actions Accomplished in Accordance With Previous Service
Information
(i) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 777-24-0102, dated July 12,
2007, are acceptable for compliance with the corresponding
requirements of paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(j)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in the Related Information
section of this AD. Information may be e-mailed to: [email protected].
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your Principal
Maintenance Inspector or Principal Avionics Inspector, as
appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight
Standards District Office.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 20544–21653, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 62ac668b9d22b53b5dd818a16ff582a1e6f85d468be59eef64d62f11be3469e6
Related Information
Related Information
(k) For more information about this AD, contact Georgios
Roussos, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S,
FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,
Renton, Washington 98057-3356; phone: (425) 917-6482; fax: (425)
917-6590; e-mail: [email protected].
(l) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial
[[Page 63167]]
Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC
2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000,
extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; e-mail [email protected]; Internet
https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may review copies of the
referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 21653–22543, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: c50aa35c32dd0958a63c76d178c7a09438d916022dfee7468a9281e290379b29
Material Incorporated by Reference
Material Incorporated by Reference
(m) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin 777-24-0102, Revision
1, dated June 17, 2010; or Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin
777-29-0032, dated August 9, 2007; as applicable; to do the actions
required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the service information contained
under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management,
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-
5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; e-mail [email protected];
Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
(3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at
the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
(4) You may also review copies of the service information that
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this
material at an NARA facility, call 202-741-6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 22543–23894, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: ad001e42abb37c9f7ccee94b558506adde6a0e62c93e30353667a6117a0339fa
No replacement link has been established from this edition. The complete historical rule chain and current legal effect remain unknown.
Find all recorded historical references to AD 2011-21-03 · 0 printed reference observations in this pinned collection.
These are observations from one dated publication. Current legal status is unknown; aircraft applicability, installed configuration, compliance and burden require separate evidence. Missing or unparsed conditions remain unknown.
Why these observations are shown
They were extracted offline from the same immutable official HTML source as the complete recorded text. The dated source wording, original text coordinates and exact quote digests are retained. PDF/text agreement and current regulatory effect have not been qualified.
Observation revision: whole-ad-publication-clause-observations-1.0.1. Text SHA-256: e39dcf0b024796c75d5fb0279c4dd8fc445ba361cfee42c138775fdc2cd27a5c. Source manifest: e78ff9c107a787401a56c665dd5cb472c17d4bb18e36c700d4cd175c8683fe89.
Official source · 2011-10-12
Publication text
This is the complete recorded text of this dated publication.
Current legal effect is unknown. Aircraft applicability, installed configuration and compliance require separate evidence. PDF/text agreement has not been evaluated.
Read the complete official publication text
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 197 (Wednesday, October 12, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 63163-63167]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-25754]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2010-1312; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-220-AD;
Amendment 39-16826; AD 2011-21-03]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -
200LR, -300, and -300ER Series Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD requires installing foreign object
debris (FOD) rubber shields over the primary and secondary external
power connectors for certain airplanes, and wrapping silicone tape
around the hydraulic tube for certain other airplanes. This AD was
prompted by a report of a fire in the main equipment center due to
failure of an external power connector, which
[[Page 63164]]
caused high-temperature arcing and subsequent splatter of molten copper
on an adjacent hydraulic tube, creating a hole in the tube and spraying
hydraulic fluid into the power connector, resulting in a fire. In
addition there were several reports of overheating or arcing of
external power connectors, and one report of a fire due to arcing
caused by FOD. We are issuing this AD to prevent FOD from entering the
primary and secondary external power connectors, which could result in
overheating or arcing and consequent fire in the main equipment center.
DATES: This AD is effective November 16, 2011.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of November 16,
2011.
ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management,
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-
544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; e-mail [email protected];
Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may review copies of the
referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information
on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The address for the
Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is Document Management Facility,
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Georgios Roussos, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-
3356; phone: (425) 917-6482; fax: (425) 917-6590; e-mail:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to
the specified products. That NPRM published in the Federal Register on
January 18, 2011 (76 FR 2846). That NPRM proposed to require installing
foreign object debris (FOD) rubber shields over the primary and
secondary external power connectors for certain airplanes, and wrapping
fire-resistant silicone tape around the hydraulic tube for certain
other airplanes.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal
and the FAA's response to each comment.
Support for the NPRM
American Airlines has accomplished the modifications on the
majority of its fleet, and has no objection to the actions and
compliance times in the NPRM (76 FR 2846, January 18, 2011). The
National Transportation Safety Board supports the NPRM.
Request To Use Latest Production Hydraulic Tube
Japan Airlines (JAL), Continental Airlines, and All Nippon Airways
(ANA) asked that operators be allowed to use the latest production
hydraulic tube having part number (P/N) 272W4190-192, which already has
the silicone tape pre-wrapped, in lieu of modifying the existing
hydraulic tube assembly by installing the silicone tape in accordance
with Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-0032, dated
August 9, 2007. JAL also noted a concern about procuring the hydraulic
tube.
We do not agree with the request to use the latest production
hydraulic tube as an acceptable alternative to installing the silicone
tape. Based on the latest information received from Boeing engineering,
the following applies to any possible hydraulic tube replacement: Any
hydraulic tube having P/N 272W4190-192 (as specified in Boeing Special
Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-0032, dated August 9, 2007), cannot
be a direct replacement for the existing part. Hydraulic tubes having
P/Ns 272W4190-93, -168, and -192 for production installation require
the use of permaswage fittings on either side of the tube. Removal of
the tube for its replacement requires that the tube be physically cut
past the permaswage fitting, thus making it longer than the original
production part. We have made no change to the AD in this regard.
Request To Include Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
Continental and ANA also noted that the service information does
not contain proper instructions for continued airworthiness (ICAs) to
install the tape on the new line, or inclusion of the equivalent
production part number in the Boeing 777 illustrated parts catalog
(IPC). Continental added that a pre- and post-service bulletin
configuration should be included to provide instructions to use a newer
part or to accomplish the actions specified in the service information
again.
We acknowledge the commenters' concern, but we do not agree. The
Boeing ICAs do include a statement indicating that the production tubes
are reworked by using the procedures in Boeing Special Attention
Service Bulletin 777-29-0032, dated August 9, 2007. Since there is not
direct replacement with a production tube, we are working with Boeing
to identify additional information necessary in support of replacing
the hydraulic tube. We have made no change to the AD in this regard.
Request To Include Information Notices
United Airlines asked that we revise the NPRM (76 FR 2846, January
18, 2011) to refer to Boeing Service Bulletin Information Notices 777-
29-0032 IN 01, dated November 29, 2007, and 777-29-0032 IN 02, dated
December 11, 2008, which include clarifications to the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-0032,
dated August 9, 2007.
We acknowledge that these information notices may be useful to
operators to clarify certain instructions specified in Boeing Special
Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-0032, dated August 9, 2007. However,
Boeing has provided these notices to operators. We do not reference
information notices in ADs because those documents are not FAA-
reviewed. In addition, the information notices do not contain technical
information and are not necessary to accomplish the actions required by
the AD. We have made no change to the AD in this regard.
Request To Change the Applicability
Boeing requested that the applicability section in the NPRM (76 FR
2846, January 18, 2011) be changed. Boeing stated that the
applicability should be limited to the airplanes identified in the
referenced service information, which include only those airplanes on
which the modifications required by the AD have not been accomplished
in production.
[[Page 63165]]
We agree with the commenter for the reason provided and have
limited the applicability section in this AD accordingly, in lieu of
specifying ``all'' airplanes of the affected model.
Request To Clarify Tape Qualities
Boeing asked that we delete the term ``fire-resistant,'' which
describes ``silicone tape,'' as specified in the Summary section,
Relevant Service Information section, and paragraph (g)(2) of the NPRM
(76 FR 2846, January 18, 2011). Boeing stated that the product data
sheet identifies the tape as ``high temperature arc- and track-
resistant tape,'' but not ``fire-resistant.''
We agree with the commenter for the reason provided. However, the
term ``fire-resistant'' was used in the NPRM (76 FR 2846, January 18,
2011) because it is specified as such in the referenced service
information. We have removed it from the Summary section and paragraph
(g)(2) of this AD. The Relevant Service Information section of the
preamble does not reappear in the final rule.
Request To Clarify Terminology of Tape Dimensions
Boeing asked that we change the language in the ``Exception to
Service Information'' section in paragraph (h) of the NPRM (76 FR 2846,
January 18, 2011) as follows: ``Figure 1 of the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-0032,
dated August 9, 2007, does not identify the units of the dimensions of
the silicone tape installed on the hydraulic tube; those dimensions are
identified in inches.'' Boeing noted that the dimensions of the tape
are identified, but the units of the dimensions are missing. Boeing
added that, although the tape can be used as ``electrical'' tape, for
this application it is more appropriate to identify it as ``silicone''
tape.
We agree with the commenter for the reasons provided. The word
``electrical'' was used in the NPRM (76 FR 2846, January 18, 2011)
because it is specified as such in the referenced service information.
We have changed paragraph (h) of this AD to reiterate the commenter's
suggested language.
Request To Provide Additional Credit
Boeing asked that the service information specified in paragraph
(i) of the NPRM (76 FR 2846, January 18, 2011) under ``Credit for
Actions Accomplished in Accordance with Previous Service Information''
be changed to include Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-
0032, dated August 9, 2007 (referred to in the NPRM as the service
information to use for installing the silicone tape). Boeing stated
that the modification accomplished by this service bulletin before the
effective date of the AD is identical to the modification accomplished
by this service bulletin after the effective date of the AD.
We do not agree that the subject service bulletin should be added
to paragraph (i) of this AD. Operators are already given credit for
previously accomplished actions as allowed by the phrase in paragraph
(f) of this AD which states the following: ``Comply with this AD within
the compliance times specified, unless already done.'' We have made no
change to the AD in this regard.
Request To Exclude Certain Proposed Actions
Delta Airlines asked that Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin
777-29-0032, dated August 9, 2007, be excluded from the NPRM (76 FR
2846, January 18, 2011). Delta stated that since the root cause of the
external power connector fires and overheating was related to foreign
object debris (FOD) shorting out the external power connector inside
the airplane, once the FOD shields are installed per Boeing Service
Bulletin 777-24-0102, Revision 1, dated June 17, 2010, the protective
tape identified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-
0032, dated August 9, 2007, serves no purpose. Delta added that if
damage to the hydraulic tubing is still a concern even after
accomplishment of this service bulletin, a routing change to the
hydraulic tubing would be a better solution to protecting the tubing
from a fire/overheat condition. Delta noted that the tape being
installed is not fireproof, only fire-resistant. Delta also stated that
the instructions for installing the tape specified in Boeing Special
Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-0032, dated August 9, 2007, would be
difficult to comply with. Subsequent inspections of the tape
installation to ensure compliance with the NPRM would also be difficult
when judging the overlap and number of tape wraps, since the tape
installation is based on the amount of stretch and a percentage of
overlap.
We do not agree to remove Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin
777-29-0032, dated August 9, 2007, from this AD. Installation of the
FOD shields is not the only action necessary to address the identified
unsafe condition. FOD shields alone do not resolve the potential for
overheating and arcing of the electrical connectors. Based on our
evaluation, we have determined that the connector design, lack of
proper connector maintenance actions, and the proximity of the
hydraulic tubing to the connectors can result in a fire; therefore,
accomplishing the actions required by this AD will minimize the threat
of fire on the airplane.
Additionally, although the silicone tape is not fireproof,
installing the tape provides an acceptable level of protection to the
hydraulic tubing in the event of overheating or arcing of the
connectors. The procedures for installing the tape are not difficult
for compliance and include easy access and liberal application of the
tape; several operators have already done this modification and did not
encounter any problems. Further, it is the responsibility of operators
to maintain the AD-mandated configuration, and this can be done using
the procedures specified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin
777-29-0032, dated August 9, 2007. In light of these factors, we have
made no change to the AD.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
the AD with the changes described previously. We have determined that
these changes will neither increase the economic burden on any operator
nor increase the scope of the AD.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect 126 airplanes of U.S.
registry. We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per airplanes Fleet cost
product affected
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Install FOD rubber shields.......... 6 work-hour x $85 per $134 $644 124 $79,856
hour = $510.
[[Page 63166]]
Wrap silicone tape.................. 2 work-hour x $85 per 0 170 126 21,420
hour = $170.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2011-21-03 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-16826; Docket No. FAA-
2010-1312; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-220-AD.
Effective Date
(a) This AD is effective November 16, 2011.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -200LR,
-300, and -300ER series airplanes; certificated in any category; as
identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 777-24-0102, Revision 1, dated
June 17, 2010; and Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-
0032, dated August 9, 2007.
Subject
(d) Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/Air Transport
Association (ATA) of America Codes 29: Hydraulic power; and 24:
Electrical power.
Unsafe Condition
(e) This AD was prompted by a report of a fire in the main
equipment center due to failure of an external power connector,
which caused high-temperature arcing and subsequent splatter of
molten copper on an adjacent hydraulic tube, creating a hole in the
tube and spraying hydraulic fluid into the power connector,
resulting in a fire. In addition there were several reports of
overheating or arcing of external power connectors, and one report
of a fire due to arcing caused by foreign object debris (FOD). We
are issuing this AD to prevent FOD from entering the primary and
secondary external power connectors, which could result in
overheating or arcing and consequent fire in the main equipment
center.
Compliance
(f) Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
Modification
(g) Within 36 months after the effective date of this AD, do the
actions required by paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this AD.
(1) For airplanes identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 777-24-
0102, Revision 1, dated June 17, 2010: Install FOD rubber shields
over the primary and secondary external power connectors, in
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service
Bulletin 777-24-0102, Revision 1, dated June 17, 2010.
(2) For airplanes identified in Boeing Special Attention Service
Bulletin 777-29-0032, dated August 9, 2007: Wrap silicone tape
around the hydraulic tube, in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-
0032, dated August 9, 2007.
Exception to Service Information
(h) Figure 1 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing
Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-29-0032, dated August 9,
2007, does not identify the units of the dimensions of the silicone
tape installed on the hydraulic tube; those dimensions are
identified in inches.
Credit for Actions Accomplished in Accordance With Previous Service
Information
(i) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 777-24-0102, dated July 12,
2007, are acceptable for compliance with the corresponding
requirements of paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(j)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in the Related Information
section of this AD. Information may be e-mailed to: [email protected].
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your Principal
Maintenance Inspector or Principal Avionics Inspector, as
appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight
Standards District Office.
Related Information
(k) For more information about this AD, contact Georgios
Roussos, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S,
FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,
Renton, Washington 98057-3356; phone: (425) 917-6482; fax: (425)
917-6590; e-mail: [email protected].
(l) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial
[[Page 63167]]
Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC
2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000,
extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; e-mail [email protected]; Internet
https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may review copies of the
referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(m) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin 777-24-0102, Revision
1, dated June 17, 2010; or Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin
777-29-0032, dated August 9, 2007; as applicable; to do the actions
required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the service information contained
under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management,
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-
5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; e-mail [email protected];
Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
(3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at
the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
(4) You may also review copies of the service information that
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this
material at an NARA facility, call 202-741-6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 27, 2011.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2011-25754 Filed 10-11-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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