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Published 2011-03-10 · Federal Register document 2011-5115

Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model ATP Airplanes; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model HS 748 Airplanes

Publication summary

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * Recently, during a walk round check, an operator found an aileron trim tab hinge pin that had migrated sufficiently to cause a rubbing foul on the flap. Other reports indicate that, for the purposes of expediency, it has become common practice during maintenance when replacing a control tab, instead of unbolting the forward part of the piano hinge from the primary control surface, the hinge pins are punched out of the hinges. Investigations have concluded that, after reinserting the pins after maintenance, the ends of the hinges may not have been pinched, which is likely to have been the cause of the detected hinge pin migration. This condition [non-pinched hinge pin ends], if not detected and corrected, could lead to further incidents of migration of a tab hinge pin out of the hinge, likely resulting in restricted movement of the tab control and consequent reduced control of the aeroplane.

Why this record is shown

Source: Federal Register annual FAA metadata. Acquired 2026-09-03T22:23:36.067984+00:00. The title, summary and date are source facts.

Source revision
federal_register_ad_metadata_2011-e3661fa6ab35b428
Source row
results[74]
Raw source SHA-256
e3661fa6ab35b428e6e5ee3716d50c22e985c092328ad8ce2f0f440b962ae0cd

Final-rule publication

Recorded publication clauses

AD identifier printed in this edition
2011-05-10
Effective date printed in this edition
2011-03-25
Read 10 complete recorded clauses
Effective Date
Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective March 
25, 2011.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11461–11555, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: a3fa9c37c4ccf61b3be010bbf5528cdafe1042d50d7ace3a3e7e8cc21869e10b

Affected ADs
Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11555–11584, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 027fbc44617399472b6ac4741da3aee18448654374228bcf4fe3f01df6b1539b

Applicability wording · Applicability
Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited 
Model ATP airplanes and BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model HS 
748 series 2A and series 2B airplanes; certificated in any category.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11584–11801, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 4a67f4341b45ee638633144cb957695ef3158d09d63b58efc9e1051541c79ae2

Subject
Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight 
Controls.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11801–11889, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: d29f5e77c66db57f379ad3a762bbdef9a68916cd8c50d49f42e7346c3ec647e7

Reason
Reason

    (e) The mandatory continued airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:
* * * * *
    Recently, during a walk round check, an operator found an 
aileron trim tab hinge pin that had migrated sufficiently to cause a 
rubbing foul on the flap. Other reports indicate that, for the 
purposes of expediency, it has become common practice during 
maintenance when replacing a control tab, instead of unbolting the 
forward part of the piano hinge from the primary control surface, 
the hinge pins are punched out of the hinges. Investigations have 
concluded that, after reinserting the pins after maintenance, the 
ends of the hinges may not have been pinched, which is likely to 
have been the cause of the detected hinge pin migration.
    This condition [non-pinched hinge pin ends], if not detected and 
corrected, could lead to further incidents of migration of a tab 
hinge pin out of the hinge, likely resulting in restricted movement 
of the tab control and consequent reduced control of the aeroplane.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11889–12906, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: cc2a9de10399bd0af0ae686f32c8747ce4a01a45127d5e23a0b6c3bd5061230e

Compliance
Compliance

    (f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12906–13084, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 5877df455dd9912059102bd623ca0638c7e2180c9518aac695b1c2010d0559d2

Inspection and Corrective Action
Inspection and Corrective Action

    (g) Within 90 days after the effective date of this AD: Do a 
detailed inspection of the aileron and rudder tab piano hinge pins 
to determine that each piano hinge pin is 0.120 inch (3.00 mm) 
shorter than the piano hinge at each end; and that the piano hinge 
ends have been pinched sufficiently to prevent the piano hinge 
migrating from the piano hinge, in accordance with the 
Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited 
Service Bulletin ATP-27-090, dated April 14, 2009; or BAE Systems 
(Operations) Limited Service Bulletin HS748-27-136, dated April 14, 
2009, as applicable.
    (1) If any piano hinge pin is not 0.120 inch (3.00 mm) shorter 
than the piano hinge at each end, before further flight, cut to 
size, in accordance with Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems 
(Operations) Limited Service Bulletin ATP-27-090, dated April 14, 
2009; or BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin HS748-27-
136, dated April 14, 2009; as applicable.
    (2) If any piano hinge pin is not pinched sufficiently to 
prevent the piano hinge migrating from the piano hinge, before 
further flight, pinch the hinge, in accordance with Accomplishment 
Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin 
ATP-27-090, dated April 14, 2009; or BAE Systems (Operations) 
Limited Service Bulletin HS748-27-136, dated April 14, 2009; as 
applicable.

FAA AD Differences

    Note 1:  This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service 
information as follows: No differences

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13084–14628, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 05b9078b57f9eccd2e9bee462c2f31956e63d555c041e73d3c467802c00bb2db

Other FAA AD Provisions
Other FAA AD Provisions

    (h) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using 
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to Attn: Todd 
Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington 98057-3356; phone: 425-227-1175; fax: 425-227-1149. 
Information may be e-mailed to: [email protected]. 
Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal 
inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the 
local flight standards district office/certificate holding district 
office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this 
AD.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these 
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered 
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority 
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product 
is airworthy before it is returned to service.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 14628–15889, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: e80effbc238971040f7fd4e50f913ec3ed60f98341cb948cb6f82d8e66eca060

Related Information
Related Information

    (i) Refer to Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information 
(MCAI) EASA Airworthiness Directive 2010-0035, dated March 04, 2010; 
BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin ATP-27-090, dated 
April 14, 2009; and BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service 
Bulletin HS748-27-136, dated April 14, 2009; for related 
information.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15889–16248, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 75b787430e73a67b2ddedb42307ead7f9538a4b0e402701d8dc454f7e86a9882

Material Incorporated by Reference
Material Incorporated by Reference

    (j) You must use BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service 
Bulletin ATP-27-090, dated April 14, 2009; or BAE Systems 
(Operations) Limited Service Bulletin HS748-27-136, dated April 14, 
2009; as applicable; to do the actions required by this AD, unless 
the AD specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact BAE 
Systems (Operations) Limited, Customer Information Department, 
Prestwick International Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 2RW, Scotland, United 
Kingdom; telephone +44 1292 675207; fax +44 1292

[[Page 13072]]

675704; e-mail [email protected]; Internet http://www.baesystems.com/Businesses/RegionalAircraft/index.htm.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at 
the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information that 
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this 
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 16248–17673, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 2ff8d4d415a3cc2c36d5f0459966ff373a690dcc21f793ee2bfe5f724f09f1a3

No replacement link has been established from this edition. The complete historical rule chain and current legal effect remain unknown.

Find all recorded historical references to AD 2011-05-10 · 0 printed reference observations in this pinned collection.

These are observations from one dated publication. Current legal status is unknown; aircraft applicability, installed configuration, compliance and burden require separate evidence. Missing or unparsed conditions remain unknown.

Why these observations are shown

They were extracted offline from the same immutable official HTML source as the complete recorded text. The dated source wording, original text coordinates and exact quote digests are retained. PDF/text agreement and current regulatory effect have not been qualified.

Observation revision: whole-ad-publication-clause-observations-1.0.1. Text SHA-256: 959de674c3b0520002fe2a40116c11e6ae5cc4537c6870310d4914ac3f14d148. Source manifest: bd9b09a5e61bd6451d3a54f1071c9db68e04a7bd96690754691d0d76706e626f.

Official source · 2011-03-10

Publication text

This is the complete recorded text of this dated publication.

Current legal effect is unknown. Aircraft applicability, installed configuration and compliance require separate evidence. PDF/text agreement has not been evaluated.

Read the complete official publication text
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 47 (Thursday, March 10, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 13069-13072]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-5115]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2011-0150; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-100-AD; 
Amendment 39-16619; AD 2011-05-10]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model 
ATP Airplanes; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model HS 748 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the 
products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing 
airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of 
another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an 
aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:
* * * * *
    Recently, during a walk round check, an operator found an 
aileron trim tab hinge pin that had migrated sufficiently to cause a 
rubbing foul on the flap. Other reports indicate that, for the 
purposes of expediency, it has become common practice during 
maintenance when replacing a control tab, instead of unbolting the 
forward part of the piano hinge from the primary control surface, 
the hinge pins are punched out of the hinges. Investigations have 
concluded that, after reinserting the pins after maintenance, the 
ends of the hinges may not have been pinched, which is likely to 
have been the cause of the detected hinge pin migration.
    This condition [non-pinched hinge pin ends], if not detected and 
corrected, could lead to further incidents of migration of a tab

[[Page 13070]]

hinge pin out of the hinge, likely resulting in restricted movement 
of the tab control and consequent reduced control of the aeroplane.

    This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe 
condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: This AD becomes effective March 25, 2011.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of March 25, 
2011.
    We must receive comments on this AD by April 25, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
    <bullet> Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
    <bullet> Fax: (202) 493-2251.
    <bullet> Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    <bullet> Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The street address for 
the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the 
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly 
after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; phone: 425-227-
1175; fax: 425-227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion

    The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical 
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA 
Airworthiness Directive 2010-0035, dated March 4, 2010 (referred to 
after this as ``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for the 
specified products. The MCAI states:

    Early in the life of the ATP (circa 1989), a report was received 
that a control surface hinge pin had migrated out of position, 
causing a rubbing contact. BAE Systems responded by issuing SB ATP-
27-11, describing a one-time inspection of the hinge pins, which was 
classified mandatory by UK CAA AD 006-06-89. Both SB and AD were 
subsequently cancelled in 1990. The HS.748 and the ATP secondary 
controls are similar in these areas, although no action was taken on 
the HS.748 fleet at that time.
    Recently, during a walk round check, an operator found an 
aileron trim tab hinge pin that had migrated sufficiently to cause a 
rubbing foul on the flap. Other reports indicate that, for the 
purposes of expediency, it has become common practice during 
maintenance when replacing a control tab, instead of unbolting the 
forward part of the piano hinge from the primary control surface, 
the hinge pins are punched out of the hinges.
    Investigations have concluded that, after reinserting the pins 
after maintenance, the ends of the hinges may not have been pinched, 
which is likely to have been the cause of the detected hinge pin 
migration.
    This condition [non-pinched hinge pin ends], if not detected and 
corrected, could lead to further incidents of migration of a tab 
hinge pin out of the hinge, likely resulting in restricted movement 
of the tab control and consequent reduced control of the aeroplane.
    For the reasons described above, this AD requires the [detailed] 
inspection of aileron and rudder tab piano hinge pins [for length 
and end pinching] and, depending on findings, the necessary 
corrective actions.

Corrective actions include cutting the hinge pin to specified size, and 
pinching the piano hinge ends sufficient to prevent the piano hinge pin 
from migrating from the piano hinge. You may obtain further information 
by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

Relevant Service Information

    BAE Systems (Operations) Limited has issued Service Bulletin ATP-
27-090, dated April 14, 2009; and Service Bulletin HS748-27-136, dated 
April 14, 2009. The actions described in this service information are 
intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This AD

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another 
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant 
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have 
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service 
information referenced above. We are issuing this AD because we 
evaluated all pertinent information and determined the unsafe condition 
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same 
type design.
    There are no products of this type currently registered in the 
United States. However, this rule is necessary to ensure that the 
described unsafe condition is addressed if any of these products are 
placed on the U.S. Register in the future.

Differences Between the AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in 
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it 
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the 
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these 
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information 
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have required different actions in this AD from those 
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are 
highlighted in a Note within the AD.

FAA's Determination of the Effective Date

    Since there are currently no domestic operators of this product, 
notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are 
unnecessary.

Comments Invited

    This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight 
safety, and we did not precede it by notice and opportunity for public 
comment. We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under 
the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2011-0150; Directorate 
Identifier 2010-NM-100-AD'' at the beginning of your comments. We 
specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, 
environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all 
comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of 
those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We 
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we 
receive about this AD.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.

[[Page 13071]]

    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications 
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct 
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

2011-05-10 BAE Systems (Operations) Limited: Amendment 39-16619. 
Docket No. FAA-2011-0150; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-100-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective March 
25, 2011.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited 
Model ATP airplanes and BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model HS 
748 series 2A and series 2B airplanes; certificated in any category.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight 
Controls.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continued airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:
* * * * *
    Recently, during a walk round check, an operator found an 
aileron trim tab hinge pin that had migrated sufficiently to cause a 
rubbing foul on the flap. Other reports indicate that, for the 
purposes of expediency, it has become common practice during 
maintenance when replacing a control tab, instead of unbolting the 
forward part of the piano hinge from the primary control surface, 
the hinge pins are punched out of the hinges. Investigations have 
concluded that, after reinserting the pins after maintenance, the 
ends of the hinges may not have been pinched, which is likely to 
have been the cause of the detected hinge pin migration.
    This condition [non-pinched hinge pin ends], if not detected and 
corrected, could lead to further incidents of migration of a tab 
hinge pin out of the hinge, likely resulting in restricted movement 
of the tab control and consequent reduced control of the aeroplane.

Compliance

    (f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

Inspection and Corrective Action

    (g) Within 90 days after the effective date of this AD: Do a 
detailed inspection of the aileron and rudder tab piano hinge pins 
to determine that each piano hinge pin is 0.120 inch (3.00 mm) 
shorter than the piano hinge at each end; and that the piano hinge 
ends have been pinched sufficiently to prevent the piano hinge 
migrating from the piano hinge, in accordance with the 
Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited 
Service Bulletin ATP-27-090, dated April 14, 2009; or BAE Systems 
(Operations) Limited Service Bulletin HS748-27-136, dated April 14, 
2009, as applicable.
    (1) If any piano hinge pin is not 0.120 inch (3.00 mm) shorter 
than the piano hinge at each end, before further flight, cut to 
size, in accordance with Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems 
(Operations) Limited Service Bulletin ATP-27-090, dated April 14, 
2009; or BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin HS748-27-
136, dated April 14, 2009; as applicable.
    (2) If any piano hinge pin is not pinched sufficiently to 
prevent the piano hinge migrating from the piano hinge, before 
further flight, pinch the hinge, in accordance with Accomplishment 
Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin 
ATP-27-090, dated April 14, 2009; or BAE Systems (Operations) 
Limited Service Bulletin HS748-27-136, dated April 14, 2009; as 
applicable.

FAA AD Differences

    Note 1:  This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service 
information as follows: No differences

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (h) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using 
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to Attn: Todd 
Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington 98057-3356; phone: 425-227-1175; fax: 425-227-1149. 
Information may be e-mailed to: [email protected]. 
Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal 
inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the 
local flight standards district office/certificate holding district 
office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this 
AD.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these 
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered 
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority 
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product 
is airworthy before it is returned to service.

Related Information

    (i) Refer to Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information 
(MCAI) EASA Airworthiness Directive 2010-0035, dated March 04, 2010; 
BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service Bulletin ATP-27-090, dated 
April 14, 2009; and BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service 
Bulletin HS748-27-136, dated April 14, 2009; for related 
information.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (j) You must use BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Service 
Bulletin ATP-27-090, dated April 14, 2009; or BAE Systems 
(Operations) Limited Service Bulletin HS748-27-136, dated April 14, 
2009; as applicable; to do the actions required by this AD, unless 
the AD specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact BAE 
Systems (Operations) Limited, Customer Information Department, 
Prestwick International Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 2RW, Scotland, United 
Kingdom; telephone +44 1292 675207; fax +44 1292

[[Page 13072]]

675704; e-mail [email protected]; Internet http://www.baesystems.com/Businesses/RegionalAircraft/index.htm.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at 
the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information that 
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this 
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 22, 2011.
Kalene C. Yanamura,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2011-5115 Filed 3-9-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


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