Published 2013-04-24 · Federal Register document 2013-09432
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
Publication summary
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, MD-10-30F, MD-11, and MD-11F airplanes. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. This AD requires adding design features to detect electrical faults and to detect a pump running in an empty fuel tank. We are issuing this AD to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
Why this record is shown
Source: Federal Register annual FAA metadata. Acquired 2026-09-03T22:23:42.577882+00:00. The title, summary and date are source facts.
- Source revision
- federal_register_ad_metadata_2013-a7b684f4a1b4614e
- Source row
- results[133]
- Raw source SHA-256
- a7b684f4a1b4614eef5ec9064d04a70a4701b45b0acd50058e29f235c625e705
Final-rule publication
Recorded publication clauses
- AD identifier printed in this edition
- 2013-08-23
- Effective date printed in this edition
- 2013-05-29
Read 11 complete recorded clauses
Effective Date
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective May 29, 2013.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 16347–16407, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: cfe9bb1770ad55200ba8f4aa9f0508ba3c0b782d9bde2b626f861e7f4bd034d5
Affected ADs
(b) Affected ADs
Accomplishment of the requirements of this AD terminates certain
requirements of AD 2002-13-10, Amendment 39-12798 (67 FR 45053, July
8, 2002), and AD 2011-11-05, Amendment 39-16704 (76 FR 31462, June
1, 2011).
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 16407–16644, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: f62369bf9041496e302be7f403ca87702ce3993234c9fdb24cb05d612a7f93c8
Applicability wording · Applicability
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model DC-10-10, DC-10-
10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40,
DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, MD-10-30F, MD-11, and MD-11F airplanes;
certificated in any category.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 16644–16893, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: b045edf3dc44178bf02802288525ee86f691044afdc1cd36b399683047e5a621
Subject
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/Air Transport Association
(ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 16893–17009, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 577e1fbb512727a3aef6f375ee998c2b3a8374a67d5d3688b469f865d5f1e4e0
Unsafe Condition
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the
manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to reduce the potential of
ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with
flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and
consequent loss of the airplane.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 17009–17325, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 852634fc13dae3aa429b1f7dc7a8cb5b0176ba3ef670dacc20e760c50795135b
Compliance
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
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Criteria for Operation
(g) Criteria for Operation
As of 60 months after the effective date of this AD, no person
may operate any airplane affected by this AD unless an amended type
certificate or supplemental type certificate that incorporates the
design features and requirements described in paragraphs (g)(1)
through (g)(4) of this AD has been approved by the Manager, Los
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, and those design
features are installed on the airplane to meet the criteria
specified in 14 CFR Section 25.981(a) and (d), at amendment level
25-125. For airplanes on which Boeing-installed auxiliary fuel tanks
are removed, the actions specified in this AD are not required.
(1) For all airplanes: Each electrically powered alternate
current (AC) fuel pump installed in any fuel tank that normally
empties during flight--such as center wing tanks, auxiliary fuel
tanks installed by the airplane manufacturer, and tail tanks--must
have a protective device installed to detect electrical faults that
can cause arcing and burn through of the fuel pump housing and pump
electrical connector. The same device must shut off the pump by
automatically removing electrical power from the pump when such
faults are detected. When a fuel pump is shut off resulting from
detection of an electrical fault, the device must stay latched off,
until the fault is cleared through maintenance action and the pump
is verified safe for operation.
(2) For airplanes with a 2-person flight crew: Additional design
features, if not originally installed by the airplane manufacturer,
must be installed to meet 3 criteria: To detect a running fuel pump
in a tank that is normally emptied during flight, to provide an
indication to the flight crew that the tank is empty, and to
automatically shut off that fuel pump. The prospective pump
indication and shutoff system must automatically shut off each pump
in case the flight crew does not shut off a pump running dry in an
empty tank within 60 seconds after each fuel tank is emptied. An
airplane flight manual supplement (AFMS) that includes flight crew
manual pump shutoff procedures in the Limitations Section of the
AFMS must be submitted to the Los Angeles ACO, FAA, for approval.
(3) For airplanes with a 3-person flight crew: Additional design
features, if not originally installed by the airplane manufacturer,
must be installed to detect when a fuel pump in a tank that is
normally emptied during flight is running in an empty fuel tank, and
provide an indication to the flight crew that the tank is empty. The
flight engineer must manually shut off each pump running dry in an
empty tank within 60 seconds after the tank is emptied. The AFMS
Limitations section must be revised to specify that this pump
shutoff must be done by the flight engineer.
(4) For all airplanes with tanks that normally empty during
flight: Separate means must be provided to detect and shut off a
pump that was previously commanded to be shut off automatically or
manually but remained running in an empty tank during flight.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 17427–20532, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 3111f4aef7fe3bec207301ab26f9eb00655c46914e3e3c5982835cc84ebf3d5d
Terminating Action in Related ADs
(h) Terminating Action in Related ADs
Accomplishment of the actions required by paragraph (g)(1) of
this AD terminates the 18-month repetitive inspections and tests
required by paragraph (a) of AD 2002-13-10, Amendment 39-12798 (67
FR 45053, July 8, 2002), and the 18-month repetitive inspections
required by paragraph (j) of AD 2011-11-05, Amendment 39-16704 (76
FR 31462, June 1, 2011), for pumps affected by those ADs, regardless
whether the pump is installed in a tank that normally empties,
provided the remaining actions required by those two ADs have been
accomplished.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 20532–21123, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 707f7ec0e81688dc4635ffcaff88acddb1a968d93ccde322c141d9b201b13bd1
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance
with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or
local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in the Related Information
section of this AD.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 21123–21869, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 7a4dd793e1adc2073c929af660df70c29050b156717bbebabd7059c5814daf3f
Related Information
(j) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Serj Harutunian,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles
ACO, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137;
phone: 562-627-5254; fax: 562-627-5210; email:
[email protected].
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 21869–22160, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 72d88c41e0aec93fae0cd0e6badc875b3c4bae7b944d6d0c6944f49a485be3dd
Material Incorporated by Reference
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
None.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 22160–22211, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 3cd458e4139c18aa2b217c588b225868252e2c1201e03a6c776e06e2cf7b2987
No replacement link has been established from this edition. The complete historical rule chain and current legal effect remain unknown.
Find all recorded historical references to AD 2013-08-23 · 0 printed reference observations in this pinned collection.
These are observations from one dated publication. Current legal status is unknown; aircraft applicability, installed configuration, compliance and burden require separate evidence. Missing or unparsed conditions remain unknown.
Why these observations are shown
They were extracted offline from the same immutable official HTML source as the complete recorded text. The dated source wording, original text coordinates and exact quote digests are retained. PDF/text agreement and current regulatory effect have not been qualified.
Observation revision: whole-ad-publication-clause-observations-1.0.1. Text SHA-256: 67128022a6a513a38614d214f37d83a378c79f914126faf28f833bb7b1f53395. Source manifest: fc60554d90d8063e3de82b8ceb530a60e08f4751a0d1f362fbbbb89754df997e.
Official source · 2013-04-24
Publication text
This is the complete recorded text of this dated publication.
Current legal effect is unknown. Aircraft applicability, installed configuration and compliance require separate evidence. PDF/text agreement has not been evaluated.
Read the complete official publication text
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 79 (Wednesday, April 24, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 24037-24040]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-09432]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2012-0413; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-257-AD;
Amendment 39-17441; AD 2013-08-23]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F
(KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, MD-10-30F, MD-11,
and MD-11F airplanes. This
[[Page 24038]]
AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer.
This AD requires adding design features to detect electrical faults and
to detect a pump running in an empty fuel tank. We are issuing this AD
to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which,
in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank
explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
DATES: This AD is effective May 29, 2013.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The address for the
Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is Document Management Facility,
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Serj Harutunian, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office (ACO), 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-
4137; phone: 562-627-5254; fax: 562-627-5210; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products.
That NPRM published in the Federal Register on April 18, 2012 (77 FR
23166). That NPRM proposed to require adding design features to detect
electrical faults, to detect a pump running in an empty fuel tank, and
to ensure that a fuel pump's operation is not affected by certain
conditions.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal
(77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) and the FAA's response to each comment.
Support for NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012)
Airline Pilots Association International (ALPA) supports the
language and intent of the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012), and
agreed that the proposed actions will enhance safety.
Request To Delay AD Pending Release of Service Information
Two commenters requested that we delay issuing the AD until Boeing
has released service information. (Specific modifications and solutions
were not included in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012).)
Noting that Boeing had planned to issue several service bulletins
to prevent the identified unsafe condition, FedEx requested that we
delay issuing the AD until Boeing has released relevant service
information. FedEx recommended that we coordinate with Boeing on
recommendations to address the unsafe condition.
UPS requested that we extend the comment period until a minimum of
45 days after publication of all associated service bulletins to
provide operators sufficient information to make the design changes.
We do not agree to delay issuance of this AD. We have identified a
potential unsafe condition that needs to be corrected; however, Boeing
has not finalized service information to address that condition. In
light of the unsafe condition, we have determined that we cannot delay
issuance of this AD, and must proceed without service information. We
find that the 60-month time frame specified in paragraph (g) of this AD
will provide adequate time for issuance and implementation of service
information. We have not changed this final rule regarding this issue.
Request To Revise Applicability
FedEx and Boeing requested that we revise the applicability to
specifically exclude airplanes on which the auxiliary fuel tanks have
been removed. FedEx reported that it has modified several MD-11s and
MD-10s by removing the forward auxiliary tanks or center auxiliary
tanks, as well as the fuel pumps and related hardware.
We agree that removal of the auxiliary fuel tank eliminates the
identified unsafe condition. We have changed paragraph (g) in this
final rule to exclude airplanes when Boeing-installed auxiliary fuel
tanks are removed.
Request To Clarify Intent of Proposed Actions
FedEx stated that certain language in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April
18, 2012) may be too broad. By way of example, FedEx cited the
requirement to add design features ``to detect electrical faults.''
Inferring that this required detecting all electrical faults, FedEx
asserted that, even if a device could detect all electrical faults, the
cost of its installation would be prohibitive. FedEx recommended
limiting the requirement to specify detecting ``certain'' electrical
faults.
We disagree that it is necessary to change the AD. The NPRM (77 FR
23166, April 18, 2012) intentionally described certain failure
conditions in broad terms. The intent was to provide operators
unrestricted options to define design changes based on individual
safety assessments. Certain electrical faults may be single failures or
a combination of failures such as phase-to-phase shorts, phase-to-
ground shorts, and over-voltage or over-current electrical failure
conditions.
Request To Revise Cost Estimate
FedEx questioned how the FAA determined the estimated cost of the
modification, since the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) provided no
information about specific proposed modifications or required parts.
FedEx suggested that the estimated cost would be different for each
fleet type. UPS questioned the accuracy of the cost estimates in the
NPRM, given the lack of technical data.
Based on current efforts developing service information, Boeing
estimated that modification labor costs could vary from 111 to 280
hours depending on the number of pumps on an airplane. Boeing also
reported that the AD affects about 341 U.S.-registered airplanes (not
180 airplanes, as stated in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012)).
Boeing requested that we revise the costs of compliance accordingly.
The estimated costs in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) were
based on recent design change solutions installed on similar center
wing tanks on transport category airplanes. We have revised the cost
estimate in this final rule to reflect Boeing's updated figures,
including increased work hours (152 hours) and parts costs ($137,500),
based on an average of 10 pumps per airplane. No single cost figure
will be accurate for all operators, however, since labor and parts
costs will vary depending on the type of certified design change
solutions provided by the operators.
Request for Terminating Action
UPS stated that overall safety would be better met if protective
devices (fault current detectors) were installed for all 17 pumps on
its Model MD-11 airplanes--regardless of tank location. UPS requested
that we revise the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) to specify that
installing fault current detectors
[[Page 24039]]
terminates the 18-month repetitive inspection requirement on the
``epocast'' fuel pump connector, part number (P/N) 60-84351, as
mandated by AD 2002-13-10, Amendment 39-12798 (67 FR 45053, July 8,
2002), or AD 2011-11-05, Amendment 39-16704 (76 FR 31462, June 1,
2011). (Those ADs address the same unsafe condition identified in this
AD, on the same affected airplanes.)
We agree that compliance with the requirements of this AD is
considered terminating action for the two referenced ADs. Physical
inspection of all pumps every 18 months would be labor intensive and
time consuming. Further, Boeing has not provided service information to
otherwise preclude use of any other pumps during flight. We have
changed paragraph (g)(1) in this final rule to require protective
devices on electrically powered alternate current (AC) fuel pumps
installed in fuel tanks that normally empty during flight. (This
proposed requirement in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) extended
to any electrically powered fuel pump in those tanks.) We have added
new paragraph (h) in this final rule to terminate the 18-month
repetitive inspections for all pumps, regardless whether they are
installed in a tank that normally empties, affected by AD 2002-13-10,
Amendment 39-12798 (67 FR 45053, July 8, 2002), or AD 2011-11-05,
Amendment 39-16704 (76 FR 31462, June 1, 2011), after accomplishment of
paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.
Request To Expand or Remove Automatic Shutoff Limits
Paragraph (g)(2) of the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) would
require additional design features that will automatically shut off a
dry-running pump in an empty tank within 60 seconds if the flight crew
does not shut it off. FedEx and UPS stated that their Model MD-11 and
MD-10 airplanes already have design features installed by the original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) that shut off the affected pumps
automatically, but will not meet the prescribed 60-second time limit.
The commenters asserted that a system design change is not necessary.
We agree. Model MD-11 and MD-10 airplanes with two-person flight
crews already have OEM-installed equipment designed to shut off the
fuel pumps automatically. We agree that the automatic shut-off time for
two-person flight-crew airplanes, which have design features that were
originally installed by the airplane manufacturer, may exceed 60
seconds. But for airplanes with three-person flight crews, such as
Model DC-10 airplanes that do not have OEM-installed equipment, any
fuel pump running in an empty tank must be manually shut off by a
flight crew within 60 seconds. In either case, regardless of the number
of flight crew, all airplanes must be in compliance with the
requirements of paragraph (g)(4) of this AD.
Request To Require Airworthiness Limitations
Boeing commented that the proposed rule does not mandate any
airworthiness limitations instructions (ALIs) or critical design
configuration control limitations (CDCCLs) regarding repetitive
inspections or functional checks applicable to the proposed changes.
Boeing recommended that we add a requirement to ``incorporate and
comply with any related Airworthiness Limitations.''
We agree to provide clarification. Paragraph (g) in this final rule
requires that the design changes be compliant with 14 CFR Section
25.981(a) and (b) at amendment level 25-125. These design changes
including any associated ALIs or CDCCLs must be approved by the Manager
of the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office.
Additional Changes to NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012)
In response to requests by Boeing, we have revised paragraphs
(g)(2) and (g)(3) in this final rule to clarify the requirements
associated with the airplane flight manual supplement (AFMS), and we
have revised paragraph (g)(4) in this final rule to clarify that the
requirement is limited to airplanes with tanks that normally empty
during flight.
We have revised the description of the required actions in the
preamble of this final rule to remove the requirement to ``ensure that
a fuel pump's operation is not affected by certain conditions,''
because those requirements will be incorporated by compliance to 14 CFR
Section 25.981(a) and (b) at amendment level 25-125. We disagree with
the request to define certain conditions because the AD must allow for
a broader interpretation for all airplanes affected by this AD. We have
not changed the final rule regarding this issue.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
the AD with the changes described previously. We also determined that
these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or
increase the scope of the AD.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 341 airplanes of U.S. registry. We
estimate the following costs to comply with this AD, based on the costs
of similar supplemental type certificate (STC) installations, and
considering an average of 10 pumps per airplane:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Installing design features.......... 152 work-hours x $85 $137,500 $150,420 $51,293,220
per hour = $12,920.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for this Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national
[[Page 24040]]
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2013-08-23 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-17441; Docket No. FAA-
2012-0413; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-257-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective May 29, 2013.
(b) Affected ADs
Accomplishment of the requirements of this AD terminates certain
requirements of AD 2002-13-10, Amendment 39-12798 (67 FR 45053, July
8, 2002), and AD 2011-11-05, Amendment 39-16704 (76 FR 31462, June
1, 2011).
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model DC-10-10, DC-10-
10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40,
DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, MD-10-30F, MD-11, and MD-11F airplanes;
certificated in any category.
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/Air Transport Association
(ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the
manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to reduce the potential of
ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with
flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and
consequent loss of the airplane.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Criteria for Operation
As of 60 months after the effective date of this AD, no person
may operate any airplane affected by this AD unless an amended type
certificate or supplemental type certificate that incorporates the
design features and requirements described in paragraphs (g)(1)
through (g)(4) of this AD has been approved by the Manager, Los
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, and those design
features are installed on the airplane to meet the criteria
specified in 14 CFR Section 25.981(a) and (d), at amendment level
25-125. For airplanes on which Boeing-installed auxiliary fuel tanks
are removed, the actions specified in this AD are not required.
(1) For all airplanes: Each electrically powered alternate
current (AC) fuel pump installed in any fuel tank that normally
empties during flight--such as center wing tanks, auxiliary fuel
tanks installed by the airplane manufacturer, and tail tanks--must
have a protective device installed to detect electrical faults that
can cause arcing and burn through of the fuel pump housing and pump
electrical connector. The same device must shut off the pump by
automatically removing electrical power from the pump when such
faults are detected. When a fuel pump is shut off resulting from
detection of an electrical fault, the device must stay latched off,
until the fault is cleared through maintenance action and the pump
is verified safe for operation.
(2) For airplanes with a 2-person flight crew: Additional design
features, if not originally installed by the airplane manufacturer,
must be installed to meet 3 criteria: To detect a running fuel pump
in a tank that is normally emptied during flight, to provide an
indication to the flight crew that the tank is empty, and to
automatically shut off that fuel pump. The prospective pump
indication and shutoff system must automatically shut off each pump
in case the flight crew does not shut off a pump running dry in an
empty tank within 60 seconds after each fuel tank is emptied. An
airplane flight manual supplement (AFMS) that includes flight crew
manual pump shutoff procedures in the Limitations Section of the
AFMS must be submitted to the Los Angeles ACO, FAA, for approval.
(3) For airplanes with a 3-person flight crew: Additional design
features, if not originally installed by the airplane manufacturer,
must be installed to detect when a fuel pump in a tank that is
normally emptied during flight is running in an empty fuel tank, and
provide an indication to the flight crew that the tank is empty. The
flight engineer must manually shut off each pump running dry in an
empty tank within 60 seconds after the tank is emptied. The AFMS
Limitations section must be revised to specify that this pump
shutoff must be done by the flight engineer.
(4) For all airplanes with tanks that normally empty during
flight: Separate means must be provided to detect and shut off a
pump that was previously commanded to be shut off automatically or
manually but remained running in an empty tank during flight.
(h) Terminating Action in Related ADs
Accomplishment of the actions required by paragraph (g)(1) of
this AD terminates the 18-month repetitive inspections and tests
required by paragraph (a) of AD 2002-13-10, Amendment 39-12798 (67
FR 45053, July 8, 2002), and the 18-month repetitive inspections
required by paragraph (j) of AD 2011-11-05, Amendment 39-16704 (76
FR 31462, June 1, 2011), for pumps affected by those ADs, regardless
whether the pump is installed in a tank that normally empties,
provided the remaining actions required by those two ADs have been
accomplished.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance
with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or
local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in the Related Information
section of this AD.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(j) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Serj Harutunian,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles
ACO, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137;
phone: 562-627-5254; fax: 562-627-5210; email:
[email protected].
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
None.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 10, 2013.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2013-09432 Filed 4-23-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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