Published 2015-09-29 · Federal Register document 2015-24146
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
Publication summary
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that six fasteners may not have been installed in the left and right stringer 37 (S-37) between body stations (BS) 428 and 431 lap splices on certain airplanes. This AD requires a general visual inspection of S-37 lap splices for missing fasteners, and all applicable related investigative and corrective actions. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct missing fasteners, which could result in cracks in the fuselage skin that could adversely affect the structural integrity of the airplane.
Why this record is shown
Source: Federal Register annual FAA metadata. Acquired 2026-09-03T22:23:48.517946+00:00. The title, summary and date are source facts.
- Source revision
- federal_register_ad_metadata_2015-3bb842c840a7e6e6
- Source row
- results[220]
- Raw source SHA-256
- 3bb842c840a7e6e6e43779ca68008e1e63ad8287ad840c3a981d1f66a934b14b
Final-rule publication
Recorded publication clauses
- AD identifier printed in this edition
- 2015-19-12
- Effective date printed in this edition
- 2015-11-03
Read 11 complete recorded clauses
Effective Date
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective November 3, 2015.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15018–15082, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 51e2304c0f41cc9bbe0061a1a6e7a6e584dd9f4452f5c73e0a6b40b690d0c54e
Affected ADs
(b) Affected ADs
None.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15082–15111, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 871a4afc60ceeae06e8010585055188633d616078500c45937092bfe892239c0
Applicability wording · Applicability
(c) Applicability
(1) This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, -
300F, and -400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category, as
identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated
August 7, 2013.
(2) Installation of Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)
[ST01920SE (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgstc.nsf/0/59027f43b9a7486e86257b1d00659v1ee/$FILE/ST01920SE.pdf)
does not affect the ability to accomplish the actions required by
this AD. Therefore, for airplanes on which STC ST01920SE is
installed, a ``change in product'' alternative method of compliance
(AMOC) approval
[[Page 58349]]
request is not necessary to comply with the requirements of 14 CFR
39.17.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15111–15847, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 44e966d913349e9f1394e05e7c5542d29f5afdc24811cbb1cd54826a9befa6a3
Subject
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 53, Fuselage.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15847–15927, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 297e69b8a6e159f28612e8bd82a91daa2fd8fd1d9d38af67161f67738908fa6c
Unsafe Condition
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports that six fasteners may not have
been installed in the left and right stringer 37 (S-37) between body
stations (BS) 428 and 431 lap splices on certain airplanes. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct missing fasteners, which could
result in cracks in the fuselage skin that could adversely affect
the structural integrity of the airplane.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15927–16336, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 988ab0a05b9f0ec3543734604e118f7de087bc17010e9aeab2cb086c7b51faa2
Compliance
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 16336–16438, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 00fbfa31932483f627d0ce0a11cbd2e35e15d9231842b91ac85623ce533912d3
Inspections, Related Investigative Actions, and Corrective Actions
(g) Inspections, Related Investigative Actions, and Corrective Actions
Except as provided by paragraph (h)(2) of this AD, at the
applicable time specified in paragraph 1.E., ``Compliance,'' of
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August 7, 2013: Do
an external general visual inspection of the S-37 lap splice for
missing fasteners, and do all applicable related investigative and
corrective actions, in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated
August 7, 2013, except as provided by paragraph (h)(1) of this AD.
Do all applicable related investigative and corrective actions
before further flight.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 16438–17122, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: fc10086205189b14bd7e578d387a7e78969d24038b2a2ee1180a1e61b873fa1e
Exceptions to Service Information Specifications
(h) Exceptions to Service Information Specifications
(1) Although Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated
August 7, 2013, specifies to contact Boeing for repair instructions,
and specifies that action as ``RC'' (Required for Compliance), this
AD requires repair before further flight using a method approved in
accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this
AD.
(2) Where Paragraph 1.E., ``Compliance,'' of Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August 7, 2013, specifies a
compliance time ``after the original issue date of this service
bulletin,'' this AD requires compliance within the specified
compliance time after the effective date of this AD.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 17122–17834, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: a0f634d493468faf702b287a1f6c300433385662eab42f215dfdff59e446f0fe
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair required by this AD if it is approved by the
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization Designation Authorization
(ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to make
those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair must
meet the certification basis of the airplane and the approval must
specifically refer to this AD.
(4) Except as required by paragraph (h)(1) of this AD: For
service information that contains steps that are labeled as Required
for Compliance (RC), the provisions of paragraphs (i)(4)(i) and
(i)(4)(ii) of this AD apply.
(i) The steps labeled as RC, including substeps under an RC step
and any figures identified in an RC step, must be done to comply
with the AD. An AMOC is required for any deviations to RC steps,
including substeps and identified figures.
(ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be deviated from using accepted
methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection
program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the RC
steps, including substeps and identified figures, can still be done
as specified, and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy
condition.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 17834–19867, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: b66b54338b1a5cd1966d7345099eb89d22f457fefc93f89e86fe67f568df3a9c
Related Information
(j) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Wayne Lockett,
Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120S, FAA, Seattle ACO,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6447;
fax: 425-917-6590; email: [email protected].
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 19867–20135, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: b3f22e36d107a4e754f8b96c7c7fb2c9fe10b9c305178301c7ea5d833797d7f5
Material Incorporated by Reference
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August 7,
2013.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Boeing service information identified in this AD,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services
Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207;
telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet
https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
(4) You may view this service information at FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 20135–21382, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 40f48155c70ae2bbf6b9e21c5462fd5c5ff415e3eb32db262dc3b458b1b6ca4c
No replacement link has been established from this edition. The complete historical rule chain and current legal effect remain unknown.
Find all recorded historical references to AD 2015-19-12 · 1 printed reference observations in this pinned collection.
These are observations from one dated publication. Current legal status is unknown; aircraft applicability, installed configuration, compliance and burden require separate evidence. Missing or unparsed conditions remain unknown.
Why these observations are shown
They were extracted offline from the same immutable official HTML source as the complete recorded text. The dated source wording, original text coordinates and exact quote digests are retained. PDF/text agreement and current regulatory effect have not been qualified.
Observation revision: whole-ad-publication-clause-observations-1.0.1. Text SHA-256: 8eb2d8e6acab322d16ab31d0c19be7fbe9010e7cbe491751300044846727057c. Source manifest: 3471ce8194a94288690708c5e86a197ba9d33315c2edd015a7242d4621c807e3.
Official source · 2015-09-29
Publication text
This is the complete recorded text of this dated publication.
Current legal effect is unknown. Aircraft applicability, installed configuration and compliance require separate evidence. PDF/text agreement has not been evaluated.
Read the complete official publication text
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 188 (Tuesday, September 29, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 58346-58349]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-24146]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2014-0929; Directorate Identifier 2014-NM-118-AD;
Amendment 39-18274; AD 2015-19-12]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports
that six fasteners may not have been installed in the left and right
stringer 37 (S-37) between body stations (BS) 428 and 431 lap splices
on certain airplanes. This AD requires a general visual inspection of
S-37 lap splices for missing fasteners, and all applicable related
investigative and corrective actions. We are issuing this AD to detect
and correct missing fasteners, which could result in cracks in the
fuselage skin that could adversely affect the structural integrity of
the airplane.
DATES: This AD is effective November 3, 2015.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of November 3,
2015.
ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management,
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-
5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may view this referenced service information
at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 425-227-1221. It is also available on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0929.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0929; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
[[Page 58347]]
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wayne Lockett, Aerospace Engineer,
Airframe Branch, ANM-120S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6447; fax: 425-917-6590; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing Company
Model 767 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on
December 29, 2014 (79 FR 77970). The NPRM was prompted by reports that
six fasteners may not have been installed in the left and right S-37
between BS 428 and 431 lap splices on certain airplanes. The NPRM
proposed to require a general visual inspection of S-37 lap splices for
missing fasteners, and all applicable related investigative and
corrective actions. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct
missing fasteners, which could result in cracks in the fuselage skin
that could adversely affect the structural integrity of the airplane.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79
FR 77970, December 29, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.
Support for the NPRM (79 FR 77970, December 29, 2014)
Boeing and Debra Abdou supported the NPRM (79 FR 77970, December
29, 2014). FedEx Express explained that the NPRM will not impact them.
United Airlines stated that it has no comment on the NPRM.
Request for Credit for Previous Actions
United Parcel Service (UPS) requested that we revise the NPRM (79
FR 77970, December 29, 2014), to clarify that no further actions are
required for airplanes that have previously accomplished inspections
and corrective actions as specified in Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-
01B (Service Request 1-2412169241), dated February 1, 2013.
UPS explained that, prior to the release of Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August 7, 2013, Boeing had released Boeing
Fleet Team Digest article 767-FTD-53-12003, dated September 21, 2012;
and Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-01B (Service Request 1-2412169241),
dated February 1, 2013; to address the discrepant condition and provide
applicable corrective actions. UPS stated that it has previously
accomplished inspections and corrective actions on all affected UPS
Model 767-300F series airplanes in accordance with Boeing Fleet Team
Digest article 767-FTD-53-12003 dated September 21, 2012, and Boeing
Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-01B (Service Request 1-2412169241), dated
February 1, 2013. Per Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-01B (Service
Request 1-2412169241), dated February 1, 2013, the following corrective
actions are to be accomplished prior to further flight if the affected
fasteners are found missing:
<bullet> Remove the center row and adjacent fasteners around the
missing fastener locations.
<bullet> Perform open-hole high frequency eddy current (HFEC)
inspection for damages.
<bullet> If no damage is found, install BACR15FV6KE* rivets per the
Boeing installation drawing.
<bullet> If damage is found, repair per the service repair manual
section defined in the future service bulletin.
UPS reasoned that, as indicated in Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-
01B (Service Request 1-2412169241), dated February 1, 2013, the
additional detailed inspection shown in Figure 2, Step 1, of Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August 7, 2013, is not
required to detect damages resulting from the discrepant condition. UPS
expressed that, as supported by Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-01B
(Service Request 1-2412169241), dated February 1, 2013, the open-hole
HFEC inspection is sufficient for detecting and eliminating damage
resulting from the identified unsafe condition. UPS pointed out that
standard maintenance procedures ensure that the external and internal
areas accessed and disturbed during accomplishment of the repair are
restored to normal configuration. Furthermore, UPS explained that
supplemental internal and external inspections of the affected area are
accomplished per UPS maintenance program as specified in Boeing
Maintenance Planning Document Items 53-460-00, 53-648-00, 53-800-00,
and 53-820-00.
We disagree to provide credit for certain actions required by this
AD if those actions were performed before the effective date of this AD
using Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-01B (Service Request 1-2412169241)
dated February 1, 2013. It is possible that individual instructions
provided to the specific operator via Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-
01B (Service Request 1-2412169241), dated February 1, 2013, may have
different instructions than those specified in the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August
7, 2013. However, under the provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD, we
will consider requests for approval of credit for certain actions if
sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that the change would
provide an acceptable level of safety. We have made no changes to this
AD in this regard.
Effect of Winglets on AD
Aviation Partners Boeing stated that accomplishing the supplemental
type certificate (STC) ST01920SE (http://rgl.faa.gov/
Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgstc.nsf/0/
59027f43b9a7486e86257b1d006591ee/$FILE/ST01920SE.pdf) does not affect
the actions specified in the NPRM (79 FR 77970, December 29, 2014). We
concur with the commenter. We have redesignated paragraph (c) of the
proposed AD as paragraph (c)(1) and added new paragraph (c)(2) to this
AD to state that installation of STC ST01920SE does not affect the
ability to accomplish the actions required by this final rule.
Therefore, for airplanes on which STC ST01920SE is installed, a
``change in product'' alternative method of compliance (AMOC) approval
request is not necessary to comply with the requirements of 14 CFR
39.17.
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
Boeing has issued Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated
August 7, 2013. The service information describes procedures for an
external general visual inspection of the S-37 lap splice for missing
fasteners, detailed and open-hole inspections of the skin for any
crack, corrosion, or other discrepancy; determining if the crack,
corrosion, or other discrepancy is within the repair limits, and
repairing. This service information is reasonably available because the
interested parties have access to it through their normal course of
business or by the means
[[Page 58348]]
identified in the ADDRESSES section of this AD.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
<bullet> Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM (79 FR 77970, December 29, 2014) for correcting the unsafe
condition; and
<bullet> Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 77970, December 29, 2014).
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 23 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
General visual inspection........... 1 work-hour x $85 per $0 $85 $1,955
hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We estimate the following costs to do any necessary inspections/
installations that would be required based on the results of the
required inspection. We have no way of determining the number of
aircraft that might need these inspections/installations:
On-Condition Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per
Action Labor cost Parts cost product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Detailed and HFEC inspections and fastener 13 work-hours x $85 per hour = * $1,105
installation. $1,105.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* All parts that are required are supplied by the operator. This cost is minimal, and we have no way to
determine what the operators would pay for these parts.
We have received no definitive data that would enable us to provide
cost estimates for the repairs specified in this AD.
According to the manufacturer, some of the costs of this AD may be
covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected
individuals. We do not control warranty coverage for affected
individuals. As a result, we have included all costs in our cost
estimate.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2015-19-12 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18274; Docket No. FAA-
2014-0929; Directorate Identifier 2014-NM-118-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective November 3, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
(1) This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, -
300F, and -400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category, as
identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated
August 7, 2013.
(2) Installation of Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)
[ST01920SE (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgstc.nsf/0/59027f43b9a7486e86257b1d00659v1ee/$FILE/ST01920SE.pdf)
does not affect the ability to accomplish the actions required by
this AD. Therefore, for airplanes on which STC ST01920SE is
installed, a ``change in product'' alternative method of compliance
(AMOC) approval
[[Page 58349]]
request is not necessary to comply with the requirements of 14 CFR
39.17.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 53, Fuselage.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports that six fasteners may not have
been installed in the left and right stringer 37 (S-37) between body
stations (BS) 428 and 431 lap splices on certain airplanes. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct missing fasteners, which could
result in cracks in the fuselage skin that could adversely affect
the structural integrity of the airplane.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Inspections, Related Investigative Actions, and Corrective Actions
Except as provided by paragraph (h)(2) of this AD, at the
applicable time specified in paragraph 1.E., ``Compliance,'' of
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August 7, 2013: Do
an external general visual inspection of the S-37 lap splice for
missing fasteners, and do all applicable related investigative and
corrective actions, in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated
August 7, 2013, except as provided by paragraph (h)(1) of this AD.
Do all applicable related investigative and corrective actions
before further flight.
(h) Exceptions to Service Information Specifications
(1) Although Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated
August 7, 2013, specifies to contact Boeing for repair instructions,
and specifies that action as ``RC'' (Required for Compliance), this
AD requires repair before further flight using a method approved in
accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this
AD.
(2) Where Paragraph 1.E., ``Compliance,'' of Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August 7, 2013, specifies a
compliance time ``after the original issue date of this service
bulletin,'' this AD requires compliance within the specified
compliance time after the effective date of this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair required by this AD if it is approved by the
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization Designation Authorization
(ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to make
those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair must
meet the certification basis of the airplane and the approval must
specifically refer to this AD.
(4) Except as required by paragraph (h)(1) of this AD: For
service information that contains steps that are labeled as Required
for Compliance (RC), the provisions of paragraphs (i)(4)(i) and
(i)(4)(ii) of this AD apply.
(i) The steps labeled as RC, including substeps under an RC step
and any figures identified in an RC step, must be done to comply
with the AD. An AMOC is required for any deviations to RC steps,
including substeps and identified figures.
(ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be deviated from using accepted
methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection
program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the RC
steps, including substeps and identified figures, can still be done
as specified, and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy
condition.
(j) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Wayne Lockett,
Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120S, FAA, Seattle ACO,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6447;
fax: 425-917-6590; email: [email protected].
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August 7,
2013.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Boeing service information identified in this AD,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services
Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207;
telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet
https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
(4) You may view this service information at FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 11, 2015.
Michael Kaszycki,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-24146 Filed 9-28-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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