Published 2016-03-11 · Federal Register document 2016-05258
Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
Publication summary
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A helicopters. This AD requires certain inspections of the main rotor and tail rotor control pushrods (pushrods). This AD is prompted by a Sikorsky investigation that indicated that some pushrods may have incorrectly installed locking mechanisms. These AD actions are intended to detect an incorrectly installed locking mechanism, which if not corrected, could result in a loose jam nut, failure of the pushrod, loss of main rotor or tail rotor flight control, and consequent loss of helicopter control.
Why this record is shown
Source: Federal Register annual FAA metadata. Acquired 2026-09-03T22:23:51.853224+00:00. The title, summary and date are source facts.
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- federal_register_ad_metadata_2016-48fe8cb6c57c00b7
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- 48fe8cb6c57c00b74623eb2b71ad0abe73b95a424a8ac83fecd389da4d1e3a81
Final-rule publication
Recorded publication clauses
- AD identifier printed in this edition
- 2016-05-11
- Effective date printed in this edition
- 2016-03-28
Some source clauses remain unstructured. Read the complete publication for conditions that have not been interpreted here.
Read 8 complete recorded clauses
Applicability wording · Applicability
(a) Applicability
This AD applies to Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters, serial
numbers 920006 through 920291, with a main rotor or tail rotor servo
input pushrod with a part number (P/N) listed in Table 1 to
paragraph (a) of this AD, certificated in any category.
Table 1 to Paragraph (a)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name P/N Torque value
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yaw Boost Input Pushrod........................ 92400-04801-108 60-100 inch pounds.
Pitch Boost Input Pushrod...................... 92400-04801-107 43 inch pounds.
Collective Boost Input Pushrod................. 92400-04801-107 350 inch pounds.
Roll Boost Input Pushrod....................... 92400-04801-109 43 inch pounds.
Yaw Boost Out Pushrod.......................... 92400-04802-109 40-46 inch pounds.
Roll Boost Out Pushrod......................... 92400-04803-103 40-46 inch pounds.
Pitch Boost Out Pushrod........................ 92400-04803-102 40-46 inch pounds.
Collective Boost Out Pushrod................... 92400-04802-108 40-46 inch pounds.
Limiter Pushrod................................ 92400-04803-106 40-46 inch pounds.
Pitch to Roll Pushrod.......................... 92400-04803-107 40-46 inch pounds.
Left Hand Main Rotor Servo Pushrod............. 92400-04801-110 350 inch pounds.
Forward Main Rotor Servo Pushrod............... 92400-04801-111 350 inch pounds.
Right Hand Main Rotor Servo Pushrod............ 92400-04801-112 350 inch pounds.
Upper Deck Quadrant Pushrod.................... 92400-04802-105 60-100 inch pounds.
Tail Rotor Servo Input Pushrod................. 92400-04802-107 40-46 inch pounds.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13260–15331, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 2a6591cc9df9d103c0dc8aff4e74d872d48acc37c62c32ef10b837899dddfbc5
Unsafe Condition
(b) Unsafe Condition
This AD defines the unsafe condition as an incorrectly installed
locking mechanism resulting in a loose jam nut. This condition, if
not detected and corrected, could result in failure of the main
rotor or tail rotor control pushrod, loss of main rotor or tail
rotor flight control and consequent loss of helicopter control.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15331–15686, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 45f84888502ef6354065494ed5219a5710514567c27d640ec646936ce82a17ac
Effective Date
(c) Effective Date
This AD becomes effective March 28, 2016.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15686–15753, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: e556e614fd5ae2f86e234d5decfa478e29e5afc3432b2ceb91d7c459c8bd806e
Compliance
(d) Compliance
You are responsible for performing each action required by this
AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been
accomplished prior to that time.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15753–15941, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 8becc2137cc245a558fa549a86ceaa9084f1653b0bdc340c620a8c8161fd5b10
Required Actions
(e) Required Actions
Within 5 hours time-in-service:
(1) For each control input pushrod (pushrod) adjustable end,
except for the upper deck quadrant pushrod:
(i) Remove the safety cable and using finger pressure, inspect
each jam nut for movement. If a jam nut moves with finger pressure,
remove the pushrod assembly from service.
(ii) Inspect to determine whether a 0.02 inch diameter safety
wire can pass through the inspection hole. If the safety wire passes
through the inspection hole, repair the pushrod in accordance with
the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs C.(2)(b) through
C.(2)(l) of Sikorsky S-92 Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB 92-
67-006, Revision A, dated February 19, 2016 (ASB), which is
terminating action for that adjustable end.
(iii) Where locking devices are used, inspect for correct
engagement of serrations and keys of the locking device as shown in
Figure 4 of the ASB. If a locking device is not correctly engaged,
repair the locking device in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions, paragraphs C.(3)(c) through C.(3)(f) of the ASB, which
is terminating action for that adjustable end.
(iv) Torque each jam nut using the torque values listed in Table
1 to paragraph (a) of this AD. Install the safety cable, making sure
the right-hand threads have safety cable routed as shown in Figure 2
of the ASB, and the left-hand threads have safety cable routed as
shown in Figure 3 of the ASB.
(2) For the upper deck quadrant pushrod, determine whether there
is any gap between the jam nut, locking device, and adjustable end.
(i) If there is a gap, gain access to the pushrod, remove the
safety cable, and using finger pressure, inspect the jam nut for
movement. If the jam nut moves with finger pressure, remove the
pushrod assembly from service. If the jam nut does not move, perform
the actions in paragraphs (e)(1)(ii) through (e)(1)(iv) of this AD.
(ii) If there is no gap, visually inspect the adjustable end for
correct safety cable routing as shown in Figure 2 of the ASB,
correct engagement of serrations and keys of the locking device as
shown in Figure 4 of the ASB, and to determine whether any thread is
visible in the inspection hole. If the safety cable is routed
incorrectly, if the locking device is not correctly engaged, or if
there is no thread in the inspection hole, gain access to the
pushrod. Using finger pressure, inspect the jam nut for movement. If
the jam nut moves with finger pressure, remove the pushrod assembly
from service. If the jam nut does not move with finger pressure,
perform the actions in paragraphs (e)(1)(ii) through (e)(1)(iv) of
this AD.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15941–18640, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: b99dec861d344a3ed2e19592cc24dee98166765f95c2182ac8179a5188cba027
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, may
approve AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: Blaine Williams,
Aerospace Engineer, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine &
Propeller Directorate, 1200 District Avenue, Burlington,
Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781) 238-7161; email
[email protected].
(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating
certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you
notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector,
the manager of the local flight standards district office or
certificate holding district office before operating any aircraft
complying with this AD through an AMOC.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 18640–19399, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 59431459dbc8d5c2749b6d4fb9b1c25d09bff3e70af596c952ad714587db851c
Subject
(g) Subject
Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 6700, Rotorcraft
Flight Control.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 19399–19498, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 52e61ad81e52b632def7248543508527753969bfb22c95a125e4019051673bd7
Material Incorporated by Reference
(h) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Sikorsky S-92 Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB 92-67-
006, Revision A, dated February 19, 2016.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Sikorsky service information identified in this final
rule, contact Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Customer Service
Engineering, 124 Quarry Road, Trumbull, CT 06611; telephone 1-800-
Winged-S or 203-416-4299; email [email protected].
(4) You may view this service information at FAA, Office of the
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N-
321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call
[[Page 12802]]
(202) 741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 19498–20799, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: b0df2a9608ed2515ec407ec72972f725765a1e9d8db7c6134c39d64545283b74
No replacement link has been established from this edition. The complete historical rule chain and current legal effect remain unknown.
Find all recorded historical references to AD 2016-05-11 · 0 printed reference observations in this pinned collection.
These are observations from one dated publication. Current legal status is unknown; aircraft applicability, installed configuration, compliance and burden require separate evidence. Missing or unparsed conditions remain unknown.
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They were extracted offline from the same immutable official HTML source as the complete recorded text. The dated source wording, original text coordinates and exact quote digests are retained. PDF/text agreement and current regulatory effect have not been qualified.
Observation revision: whole-ad-publication-clause-observations-1.0.1. Text SHA-256: 320eebd32aa5b776dae20f890f029ba348580b6e0891b7eae966ccc2c9f28b74. Source manifest: c51753332a7dce020d5b1ff16851531f681739eb57c5a35f18aa29fe9793102a.
Official source · 2016-03-11
Publication text
This is the complete recorded text of this dated publication.
Current legal effect is unknown. Aircraft applicability, installed configuration and compliance require separate evidence. PDF/text agreement has not been evaluated.
Read the complete official publication text
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 48 (Friday, March 11, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 12799-12802]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-05258]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2016-4280; Directorate Identifier 2016-SW-008-AD;
Amendment 39-18429; AD 2016-05-11]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A helicopters. This
AD requires certain inspections of the main rotor and tail rotor
control pushrods (pushrods). This AD is prompted by a Sikorsky
investigation that indicated that some pushrods may have incorrectly
installed locking mechanisms. These AD actions are intended to detect
an incorrectly installed locking mechanism, which if not corrected,
could result in a loose jam nut, failure of the pushrod, loss of main
rotor or tail rotor flight control, and consequent loss of helicopter
control.
DATES: This AD becomes effective March 28, 2016.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain document listed in this AD as of March 28, 2016.
We must receive comments on this AD by May 10, 2016.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
<bullet> Federal eRulemaking Docket: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
<bullet> Fax: 202-493-2251.
<bullet> Mail: Send comments to the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.
<bullet> Hand Delivery: Deliver to the ``Mail'' address between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-
4280; or in person at the Docket Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, any incorporated by reference service information,
the economic evaluation, any comments received, and other information.
The street address for the Docket Operations Office (telephone 800-647-
5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD
docket shortly after receipt.
For service information identified in this final rule, contact
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Customer Service Engineering, 124 Quarry
Road, Trumbull, CT 06611; telephone 1-800-Winged-S or 203-416-4299;
email [email protected]. You may review the referenced service
information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest
Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. It is
also available on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-4280.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Blaine Williams, Aerospace Engineer,
Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine & Propeller Directorate,
1200 District Avenue, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781)
238-7161; email [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight
safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to
provide your comments prior to it becoming effective. However, we
invite you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written
comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to the
economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that resulted
from adopting this AD. The most helpful comments reference a specific
portion of the AD, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain
duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written
comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should
submit them only one time. We will file in the docket all comments that
we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public
contact with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking during the
comment period. We will consider all the comments we receive and may
conduct additional rulemaking based on those comments.
Discussion
We propose to adopt a new AD for Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters
with certain main rotor or tail rotor control pushrods installed. After
a review of a failed pushrod, Sikorsky investigated the airworthiness
of pushrods installed on its helicopters. The investigation indicates
that the pushrods installed on Model S-92A helicopters may have
incorrect safety cable routing, incorrect jam nut torque, and/or
incorrect locking device serrations and key engagement. This AD
consequently requires inspecting the pushrods for safety cable routing,
engagement of serrations of the locking device, engagement of keys on
the locking device, thread engagement, and jam nut torque. This AD
requires either repairing or replacing the pushrod assembly, depending
on the inspection's outcome. These AD actions are intended to detect
and correct an incorrectly installed locking mechanism resulting in a
loose jam nut, failure of the pushrods, loss of main rotor or tail
rotor flight control, and consequent loss of helicopter control.
FAA's Determination
We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant
information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is
likely to exist or develop in other products of these same type
designs.
[[Page 12800]]
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
We reviewed Sikorsky S-92 Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB 92-
67-006, Revision A, dated February 19, 2016 (ASB), which specifies a
one-time inspection of the pushrod assemblies for safety cable routing,
engagement of serrations of the locking device, engagement of keys on
the locking device, thread engagement, and torque of the jam nuts. The
ASB also specifies documenting any non-compliant inspection results
and, if any discrepancies are found during the inspection, removing,
reworking, and reinstalling or replacing the pushrod. The ASB specifies
performing a rig check as required.
This service information is reasonably available because the
interested parties have access to it through their normal course of
business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.
AD Requirements
This AD requires within 5 hours time-in-service (TIS):
<bullet> For each pushrod adjustable end, except for the upper deck
quadrant pushrod, removing the safety cable and using finger pressure,
inspecting each jam nut for movement. If a jam nut moves with finger
pressure, removing the pushrod assembly from service.
[cir] Inspecting to determine whether a 0.02 inch diameter safety
wire can pass through the inspection hole. If the safety wire passes
through the inspection hole, repairing the pushrod, which is
terminating action for that adjustable end.
[cir] Inspecting for correct engagement of serrations and keys of
the locking device. If a locking device is not correctly engaged,
repairing the locking device, which is terminating action for that
adjustable end.
[cir] Torqueing each jam nut and installing the safety cable,
making sure the right-hand threads have safety cable correctly routed,
and the left-hand threads have safety cable correctly routed.
<bullet> For the upper deck quadrant pushrod, this AD requires
determining whether there is any gap between the jam nut, locking
device, and the adjustable end. It also requires:
[cir] If there is a gap, gaining access to the pushrod, removing
the safety cable and using finger pressure, inspecting the jam nut for
movement. If the jam nut moves with finger pressure, removing the
pushrod assembly from service. If the jam nut does not move, performing
corrective actions.
[cir] If there is no gap, visually inspecting the adjustable end
for correct safety cable routing, correct engagement of serrations and
keys of the locking device, and determining whether any thread is
visible in the inspection hole. If the safety cable is routed
incorrectly, if the locking device is not correctly engaged, or if
there is no thread in the inspection hole, gaining access to the
pushrod. Using finger pressure, inspecting the jam nut for movement. If
the jam nut moves with finger pressure, removing the pushrod assembly
from service. If the jam nut does not move with finger pressure,
performing corrective actions.
Differences Between This AD and the Service Information
Sikorsky specifies compliance by May 16, 2016. We require
compliance within 5 hours TIS. We also do not require you to contact
Sikorsky or record information on the Pushrod Data Sheet.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect 80 helicopters of U.S.
Registry and labor costs average $85 per work-hour. Based on these
estimates, we expect the following costs:
<bullet> Inspecting all pushrod assemblies requires 2 work-hours
for a labor cost of $170. No parts are needed for a total fleet cost of
$13,600.
<bullet> Replacing a pushrod requires 2 work-hours for a labor cost
$170. Parts cost an average of $2,500 for a total cost of $2,670 per
pushrod.
<bullet> Repairing a pushrod requires an average 2 work-hours per
helicopter for a labor cost of $170 and minimal part costs.
FAA's Justification and Determination of the Effective Date
Providing an opportunity for public comments prior to adopting
these AD requirements would delay implementing the safety actions
needed to correct this known unsafe condition. Therefore, we find that
the risk to the flying public justifies waiving notice and comment
prior to the adoption of this rule because the required corrective
actions must be accomplished within 5 hours TIS.
Since an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate
adoption of this AD, we determined that notice and opportunity for
prior public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable and
contrary to the public interest and that good cause exists to make this
AD effective in less than 30 days.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed, I certify that this AD:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent that
it justifies making a regulatory distinction; and
4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply
with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
[[Page 12801]]
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2016-05-11 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky): Amendment 39-
18429; Docket No. FAA-2016-4280; Directorate Identifier 2016-SW-008-
AD.
(a) Applicability
This AD applies to Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters, serial
numbers 920006 through 920291, with a main rotor or tail rotor servo
input pushrod with a part number (P/N) listed in Table 1 to
paragraph (a) of this AD, certificated in any category.
Table 1 to Paragraph (a)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name P/N Torque value
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yaw Boost Input Pushrod........................ 92400-04801-108 60-100 inch pounds.
Pitch Boost Input Pushrod...................... 92400-04801-107 43 inch pounds.
Collective Boost Input Pushrod................. 92400-04801-107 350 inch pounds.
Roll Boost Input Pushrod....................... 92400-04801-109 43 inch pounds.
Yaw Boost Out Pushrod.......................... 92400-04802-109 40-46 inch pounds.
Roll Boost Out Pushrod......................... 92400-04803-103 40-46 inch pounds.
Pitch Boost Out Pushrod........................ 92400-04803-102 40-46 inch pounds.
Collective Boost Out Pushrod................... 92400-04802-108 40-46 inch pounds.
Limiter Pushrod................................ 92400-04803-106 40-46 inch pounds.
Pitch to Roll Pushrod.......................... 92400-04803-107 40-46 inch pounds.
Left Hand Main Rotor Servo Pushrod............. 92400-04801-110 350 inch pounds.
Forward Main Rotor Servo Pushrod............... 92400-04801-111 350 inch pounds.
Right Hand Main Rotor Servo Pushrod............ 92400-04801-112 350 inch pounds.
Upper Deck Quadrant Pushrod.................... 92400-04802-105 60-100 inch pounds.
Tail Rotor Servo Input Pushrod................. 92400-04802-107 40-46 inch pounds.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Unsafe Condition
This AD defines the unsafe condition as an incorrectly installed
locking mechanism resulting in a loose jam nut. This condition, if
not detected and corrected, could result in failure of the main
rotor or tail rotor control pushrod, loss of main rotor or tail
rotor flight control and consequent loss of helicopter control.
(c) Effective Date
This AD becomes effective March 28, 2016.
(d) Compliance
You are responsible for performing each action required by this
AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been
accomplished prior to that time.
(e) Required Actions
Within 5 hours time-in-service:
(1) For each control input pushrod (pushrod) adjustable end,
except for the upper deck quadrant pushrod:
(i) Remove the safety cable and using finger pressure, inspect
each jam nut for movement. If a jam nut moves with finger pressure,
remove the pushrod assembly from service.
(ii) Inspect to determine whether a 0.02 inch diameter safety
wire can pass through the inspection hole. If the safety wire passes
through the inspection hole, repair the pushrod in accordance with
the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs C.(2)(b) through
C.(2)(l) of Sikorsky S-92 Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB 92-
67-006, Revision A, dated February 19, 2016 (ASB), which is
terminating action for that adjustable end.
(iii) Where locking devices are used, inspect for correct
engagement of serrations and keys of the locking device as shown in
Figure 4 of the ASB. If a locking device is not correctly engaged,
repair the locking device in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions, paragraphs C.(3)(c) through C.(3)(f) of the ASB, which
is terminating action for that adjustable end.
(iv) Torque each jam nut using the torque values listed in Table
1 to paragraph (a) of this AD. Install the safety cable, making sure
the right-hand threads have safety cable routed as shown in Figure 2
of the ASB, and the left-hand threads have safety cable routed as
shown in Figure 3 of the ASB.
(2) For the upper deck quadrant pushrod, determine whether there
is any gap between the jam nut, locking device, and adjustable end.
(i) If there is a gap, gain access to the pushrod, remove the
safety cable, and using finger pressure, inspect the jam nut for
movement. If the jam nut moves with finger pressure, remove the
pushrod assembly from service. If the jam nut does not move, perform
the actions in paragraphs (e)(1)(ii) through (e)(1)(iv) of this AD.
(ii) If there is no gap, visually inspect the adjustable end for
correct safety cable routing as shown in Figure 2 of the ASB,
correct engagement of serrations and keys of the locking device as
shown in Figure 4 of the ASB, and to determine whether any thread is
visible in the inspection hole. If the safety cable is routed
incorrectly, if the locking device is not correctly engaged, or if
there is no thread in the inspection hole, gain access to the
pushrod. Using finger pressure, inspect the jam nut for movement. If
the jam nut moves with finger pressure, remove the pushrod assembly
from service. If the jam nut does not move with finger pressure,
perform the actions in paragraphs (e)(1)(ii) through (e)(1)(iv) of
this AD.
(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, may
approve AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: Blaine Williams,
Aerospace Engineer, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine &
Propeller Directorate, 1200 District Avenue, Burlington,
Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781) 238-7161; email
[email protected].
(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating
certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you
notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector,
the manager of the local flight standards district office or
certificate holding district office before operating any aircraft
complying with this AD through an AMOC.
(g) Subject
Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 6700, Rotorcraft
Flight Control.
(h) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Sikorsky S-92 Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB 92-67-
006, Revision A, dated February 19, 2016.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Sikorsky service information identified in this final
rule, contact Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Customer Service
Engineering, 124 Quarry Road, Trumbull, CT 06611; telephone 1-800-
Winged-S or 203-416-4299; email [email protected].
(4) You may view this service information at FAA, Office of the
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N-
321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call
[[Page 12802]]
(202) 741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 2, 2016.
Scott A. Horn,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2016-05258 Filed 3-10-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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