Published 2016-06-07 · Federal Register document 2016-12842
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
Publication summary
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of wire chafing caused by a left wing spoiler actuator wire not having enough separation from a certain bracket when the spoiler is in the deployed position. This AD requires measuring the separation between a certain electro-mechanical actuator wire of the left wing, spoiler 4, and the support bracket of the flap variable camber trim unit; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct wire chafing. Such chafing could result in an electrical short and potential fire in a flammable fluid leakage zone and possible loss of several functions essential for safe flight.
Why this record is shown
Source: Federal Register annual FAA metadata. Acquired 2026-09-03T22:23:51.853224+00:00. The title, summary and date are source facts.
- Source revision
- federal_register_ad_metadata_2016-48fe8cb6c57c00b7
- Source row
- results[192]
- Raw source SHA-256
- 48fe8cb6c57c00b74623eb2b71ad0abe73b95a424a8ac83fecd389da4d1e3a81
Final-rule publication
Recorded publication clauses
- AD identifier printed in this edition
- 2016-11-17
- Effective date printed in this edition
- 2016-07-12
Read 10 complete recorded clauses
Effective Date
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective July 12, 2016.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11719–11780, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: d7957d354d78b957f16ee65417c5f6019aa21be953783bcb69394969de495318
Affected ADs
(b) Affected ADs
None.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11780–11809, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 871a4afc60ceeae06e8010585055188633d616078500c45937092bfe892239c0
Applicability wording · Applicability
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8
airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB270024-00, Issue 001, dated
September 24, 2014.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11809–12043, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 5c8c46bea46c31af9d8771d0f0698ab69eb2e3d0ef3c76350533cc68d91c6c7a
Subject
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 24, Electrical
power.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12043–12132, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 255ad8dea90f73c6c0904fcd7f65ac20d65a0da0af7ff85531f827e632a9c83d
Unsafe Condition
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by a report of wire chafing caused by a
left wing spoiler actuator wire not having enough separation from a
certain bracket when the spoiler is in the deployed position. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct wire chafing; such chafing
could result in an electrical short and potential fire in a
flammable fluid leakage zone and possible loss of several functions
essential for safe flight.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12132–12583, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: bc75c78fc1edb2a703659c7c8d5e08ccfa6ee53a818c81137430c638ccaceb86
Compliance
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12583–12685, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 00fbfa31932483f627d0ce0a11cbd2e35e15d9231842b91ac85623ce533912d3
Wire Separation Measurement, Related Investigative Actions, and Corrective Actions
(g) Wire Separation Measurement, Related Investigative Actions, and
Corrective Actions
Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD: Measure
the separation between the electro-mechanical actuator wire W801182
of the left wing, spoiler 4, and the support bracket of the flap
variable camber trim unit, and do all applicable related
investigative and corrective actions, in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin B787-
81205-SB270024-00, Issue 001, dated September 24, 2014. Do all
applicable related investigative and corrective actions before
further flight.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12685–13308, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: af9b30de2d36c0b93dd3b3a81fead966cade7c026c9efc59c8f8a18ed4a84988
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (i) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair required by this AD if it is approved by the
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization Designation Authorization
(ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to make
those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair must
meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must
specifically refer to this AD.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13308–14522, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: bc5f0db7381ebef721b7467c620dee3c686fd7308409850c1565b269d8fec781
Related Information
(i) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Sean J. Schauer,
Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA,
Seattle ACO, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone:
425-917-6479; fax: 425-917-6590; email: [email protected].
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 14522–14805, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: a641e5e33e0cbddb4386a25e8f215e0f32f39ea57d6f755280907a79282974f4
Material Incorporated by Reference
(j) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB270024-00, Issue
001, dated September 24, 2014.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Boeing service information identified in this AD,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services
Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207;
telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet
https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
(4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 14805–16082, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 73e8cdc48ee429db2c8f8f57d7f420629c655eb273791bb076007f9330cbd0a1
No replacement link has been established from this edition. The complete historical rule chain and current legal effect remain unknown.
Find all recorded historical references to AD 2016-11-17 · 0 printed reference observations in this pinned collection.
These are observations from one dated publication. Current legal status is unknown; aircraft applicability, installed configuration, compliance and burden require separate evidence. Missing or unparsed conditions remain unknown.
Why these observations are shown
They were extracted offline from the same immutable official HTML source as the complete recorded text. The dated source wording, original text coordinates and exact quote digests are retained. PDF/text agreement and current regulatory effect have not been qualified.
Observation revision: whole-ad-publication-clause-observations-1.0.1. Text SHA-256: 820006603b43a04fcff01e89dc15c7a75c328f7d7dd593c2786b51a08e2139d8. Source manifest: 3461778b7f6c1835082c741a17c8e34e4b84f1141aee6dca6839d0c5c04a524a.
Official source · 2016-06-07
Publication text
This is the complete recorded text of this dated publication.
Current legal effect is unknown. Aircraft applicability, installed configuration and compliance require separate evidence. PDF/text agreement has not been evaluated.
Read the complete official publication text
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 109 (Tuesday, June 7, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 36452-36454]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-12842]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2015-3987; Directorate Identifier 2015-NM-066-AD;
Amendment 39-18544; AD 2016-11-17]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a
report of wire chafing caused by a left wing spoiler actuator wire not
having enough separation from a certain bracket when the spoiler is in
the deployed position. This AD requires measuring the separation
between a certain electro-mechanical actuator wire of the left wing,
spoiler 4, and the support bracket of the flap variable camber trim
unit; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We
are issuing this AD to detect and correct wire chafing. Such chafing
could result in an electrical short and potential fire in a flammable
fluid leakage zone and possible loss of several functions essential for
safe flight.
DATES: This AD is effective July 12, 2016.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of July 12,
2016.
ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services
Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone
206-544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may view this referenced service information
at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 425-227-1221. It is also available on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2015-
3987.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2015-
3987; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sean J. Schauer, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-
3356; phone: 425-917-6479; fax: 425-917-6590; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing Company
Model 787-8 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on
October 19, 2015 (80 FR 63132) (``the NPRM''). The NPRM was prompted by
a report of insufficient clearance and wire chafing between the wiring
to the number 4 spoiler electro-mechanical actuator and a bracket of
the flap variable camber trim unit with the spoiler fully deployed. The
NPRM proposed to require measuring the separation between a certain
electro-mechanical actuator wire of the left wing, spoiler 4, and the
support bracket of the flap variable camber trim unit, and related
investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this
AD to detect and correct wire chafing. Such chafing could result in an
electrical short and potential fire in a flammable fluid leakage zone
and possible loss of several functions essential for safe flight.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and
the FAA's response to each comment.
Support for the NPRM
United Airlines stated that it agrees with the NPRM, has completed
the actions specified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin B787-81205-
SB270024-00, Issue 001, dated September 24, 2014, and has no technical
findings/issues to report.
[[Page 36453]]
We acknowledge United Airlines' comment.
An anonymous commenter stated that it is in the airplane
manufacturer's best interest to address the faulty wire as soon as
possible as this safety issue may have an impact on profits because of
the impact to the company's image.
We agree with the commenter in so much as the identified unsafe
condition needs to be addressed on the affected airplanes. No change to
this final rule was requested.
Request To Clarify the Issue That Prompted the NPRM
Boeing requested that we revise the Discussion section of the NPRM
to clarify that the safety issue was prompted by a report of wire
chafing caused by insufficient clearance between the wiring to the
number 4 spoiler electro-mechanical actuator and a bracket of the flap
variable camber trim unit with the spoiler fully deployed.
We agree with Boeing's statement regarding the action that prompted
this AD. We have revised the Discussion section of this final rule
accordingly.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD as proposed, except for minor editorial changes. We have
determined that these minor changes:
<bullet> Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM for correcting the unsafe condition; and
<bullet> Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM.
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
We reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB270024-00,
Issue 001, dated September 24, 2014. The service information describes
procedures for accomplishing the following actions.
<bullet> Measuring the separation between the electro-mechanical
actuator wire W801182 of the left wing, spoiler 4, and the support
bracket of the flap variable camber trim unit.
<bullet> Related investigative actions and corrective actions such
as doing a general visual inspection for chafing of the electro-
mechanical actuator wire W801182 of the left wing, spoiler 4; adjusting
the electro-mechanical actuator wire W801182 of the left wing, spoiler
4; and replacing the electro-mechanical actuator wire W801182 of the
left wing, spoiler 4.
This service information is reasonably available because the
interested parties have access to it through their normal course of
business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 12 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Measurement............................... 6 work-hours x $85 per hour = $510 $510 $6,120
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We estimate the following costs to do any necessary replacements
that would be required based on the results of the inspection. We have
no way of determining the number of aircraft that might need this
replacement:
On-Condition Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per
Action Labor cost Parts cost product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Related investigative and corrective 2 work-hours x $85 per hour = $170 $24 $194
actions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the manufacturer, all of the costs of this AD may be
covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected
individuals. We do not control warranty coverage for affected
individuals. As a result, we have included all the available costs in
our cost estimate.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
[[Page 36454]]
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2016-11-17 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18544 ; Docket No. FAA-
2015-3987; Directorate Identifier 2015-NM-066-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective July 12, 2016.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8
airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB270024-00, Issue 001, dated
September 24, 2014.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 24, Electrical
power.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by a report of wire chafing caused by a
left wing spoiler actuator wire not having enough separation from a
certain bracket when the spoiler is in the deployed position. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct wire chafing; such chafing
could result in an electrical short and potential fire in a
flammable fluid leakage zone and possible loss of several functions
essential for safe flight.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Wire Separation Measurement, Related Investigative Actions, and
Corrective Actions
Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD: Measure
the separation between the electro-mechanical actuator wire W801182
of the left wing, spoiler 4, and the support bracket of the flap
variable camber trim unit, and do all applicable related
investigative and corrective actions, in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin B787-
81205-SB270024-00, Issue 001, dated September 24, 2014. Do all
applicable related investigative and corrective actions before
further flight.
(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (i) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair required by this AD if it is approved by the
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization Designation Authorization
(ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to make
those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair must
meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must
specifically refer to this AD.
(i) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Sean J. Schauer,
Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA,
Seattle ACO, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone:
425-917-6479; fax: 425-917-6590; email: [email protected].
(j) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB270024-00, Issue
001, dated September 24, 2014.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Boeing service information identified in this AD,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services
Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207;
telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet
https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
(4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 20, 2016.
Victor Wicklund,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2016-12842 Filed 6-6-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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- Text SHA-256
- 820006603b43a04fcff01e89dc15c7a75c328f7d7dd593c2786b51a08e2139d8
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