Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 172 (Thursday, September 3, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 54885-54888]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-19387]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2019-1070; Product Identifier 2019-NM-178-AD; Amendment 
39-21218; AD 2020-17-13]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8 and 787-9 airplanes. This AD was 
prompted by reports that the cabin air compressor (CAC) outlet check 
valve failed due to fatigue of the aluminum flappers, and exposed the 
Y-duct to temperatures above its design limit. This AD requires 
installing new inboard and outboard CAC outlet check valves on the 
left-side and right-side cabin air conditioning and temperature control 
system (CACTCS) packs. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe 
condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective October 8, 2020.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of October 8, 
2020.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule, 
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data 
Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 
90740-5600; telephone 562-797-1717; internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may view this service information at the 
FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of 
this

[[Page 54886]]

material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available on the 
internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating 
Docket No. FAA-2019-1070.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2019-
1070; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains 
this final rule, any comments received, and other information. The 
address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott Craig, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin 
Safety and Environmental Systems Section, FAA, Seattle ACO Branch, 2200 
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone and fax: 206-231-3566; 
email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing 
Company Model 787-8 and 787-9 airplanes. The NPRM published in the 
Federal Register on January 10, 2020 (85 FR 1295). The NPRM was 
prompted by reports that the CAC outlet check valve failed due to 
fatigue of the aluminum flappers, and exposed the Y-duct to 
temperatures above its design limit. The NPRM proposed to require 
installing new inboard and outboard CAC outlet check valves on the 
left-side and right-side CACTCS packs.
    The FAA is issuing this AD to address failed CAC outlet check 
valves, which could expose the flight deck and passenger cabin to smoke 
and fumes, and lead to reduced crew performance or produce passenger 
discomfort. Off-gassed compounds could cause respiratory distress and 
could cause serious injury for an individual with a compromised 
respiratory system.

Comments

    The FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in 
developing this final rule. The following presents the comments 
received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.

Support for the NPRM

    The Air Line Pilots Association, International, stated that it 
supports the NPRM.

Request to Reference Part Number for Parts Installation Prohibition 
Within the AD

    All Nippon Airways (ANA) requested that the FAA reference CAC 
outlet check valve, part number (P/N) 7010105H01, directly in paragraph 
(i) of the proposed AD. ANA noted that paragraph (i) of the proposed AD 
stated that ``no person may install a CAC outlet check valve, with a 
part number listed in paragraph 1.B, `Spares Affected' of Boeing 
Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, dated October 15, 
2019, on any airplane.'' ANA pointed out that only CACTCS Pack P/Ns are 
listed in paragraph 1.B, ``Spares Affected'' of Boeing Service Bulletin 
B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, dated October 15, 2019 (``SB B787-
81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002''), and the part number of the CAC outlet 
check valve that is of concern is not listed.
    The FAA agrees with the request for the reasons provided. Although 
SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, does list CAC outlet check valves 
part numbers in paragraph 1.B of the service bulletin, the CAC outlet 
check valve part number that is of concern, P/N 7010105H01, is not 
listed in paragraph 1.B of the service bulletin. The CAC outlet check 
valve part number of concern, P/N 7010105H01, was intended to be a part 
prohibited from installation. The Accomplishment Instructions of SB 
B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, Note 9 of the General Information 
section states, among other things, that any CAC outlet check valve 
having P/N 7010105H01 cannot be installed again and must be made 
unserviceable. Additionally, supplier service information UTC Aerospace 
Systems Service Bulletin 7110097/098/188/189-21-4, dated May 3, 2018; 
and UTC Aerospace Systems Service Bulletin 7010097/098/188/189-21-9, 
dated May 3, 2018, which are referenced in SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, 
Issue 001; dated May 25, 2018 (``SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 
001''), and SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, also state that all 
replaced CAC outlet check valves having P/N 7010105H01 cannot be 
installed again and must be made unserviceable. The FAA has revised 
paragraph (i) of this AD to specify that no person may install a CAC 
outlet check valve with a part number listed in paragraph 1.B of SB 
B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, or P/N 7010105H01 on any airplane as 
of the effective date of this AD.

Request To Clarify Part Marking Requirements

    American Airlines (AA) and United Airlines (UA) requested that the 
FAA clarify the requirements for marking the MOD DOT number on the 
CACTCS pack identification plate. Both commenters noted that paragraphs 
2.A.(2), 2.A.(3), 2.B.(2), and 2.B.(3) of the Accomplishment 
Instructions of SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, are listed as 
``RC'' (Required for Compliance) and specify to replace the CAC outlet 
check valve and mark the MOD DOT number on the CACTCS pack 
identification plate. The commenters pointed out that paragraph (j) of 
the proposed AD provides credit for actions accomplished in accordance 
with Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 001, which 
does not have instructions for marking the MOD DOT number on the CACTCS 
pack identification plate. Because SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 
002, specifies to mark the MOD DOT number on the CACTCS pack 
identification plate, but SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 001, does 
not, the commenters requested clarification on this requirement.
    The FAA agrees to clarify. SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 001, 
specifies to do actions ``in accordance with'' the supplier service 
information, which included instructions for part marking. Therefore, 
operators that accomplished this issue of the service bulletin should 
have also marked the MOD DOT number on the CACTCS pack identification 
plate. However, the FAA acknowledges that SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, 
Issue 001 specified only replacing the parts, not marking them. If 
operators otherwise complied with SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 001, 
but did not mark the MOD DOT number on the CACTCS pack identification 
plate, they cannot claim credit for part marking and must mark the part 
as specified in SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002. The FAA has not 
changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify Part Marking of an ``X'' on the CACTCS Pack 
Identification Plate

    UA requested that the FAA clarify the requirement to part mark an 
``X'' on the CACTCS pack identification plate. UA pointed out that 
paragraphs 2.A.(2), 2.A.(3), 2.B.(2), and 2.B.(3) of the Work 
Instructions of SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, specify to mark 
the MOD DOT number on the CACTCS pack identification plate. In

[[Page 54887]]

the associated tables, footnote [1] specifies to ``also part mark an 
`X' on the applicable number in the MOD DOT area of the identification 
plate . . .'' UA stated that the result is that MOD DOT markings are 
required in two places, which UA maintains is redundant and not 
consistent.
    The FAA agrees to clarify. Footnote [1] of Tables 1 through 8 of 
the Work Instructions of SB B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, 
specifies to mark an ``X'' on the identification plate for the 
appropriate MOD DOT for CACTCS pack configuration H05 and H09 only, 
which is a separate action from marking the MOD DOT number on the 
CACTCS pack identification plate. The FAA has not changed this AD in 
this regard.

Requests To Update Supplier Warranty Information

    Boeing requested that the FAA update the Costs of Compliance 
section of the NPRM to reflect a name change for the supplier warranty 
information from UTC Aerospace Systems to Collins Aerospace. The FAA 
has revised the Costs of Compliance section of this AD accordingly.

Request To Clarify Discussion

    Boeing requested that the FAA modify portions of the Discussion of 
the NPRM to clarify the cause of failing CAC outlet check valves and 
more clearly explain the sequence of events leading to the unsafe 
condition. Whereas the NPRM described the cause of the flapper fatigue 
as ``increasing open/close cycles,'' Boeing stated that the flapper 
fatigue was due to ``open/close cycles exceeding design requirements.'' 
Boeing also requested that the FAA modify the Discussion of the NPRM to 
clarify that ``This [open/close cycles exceeding design requirements] 
can cause reverse flow through the broken check valve during times of 
single CAC operation. With repeated exposure to temperatures in excess 
of the Y-Duct design limit, the duct may degrade and this can lead to 
failure of the Y-Duct if not addressed. Dual CAC operation with a 
failed Y-Duct may lead to high temperatures that can result in off 
gassing from the duct material.''
    The FAA agrees that the description in the NPRM was inaccurate and 
is clarified in the previous paragraph. Since that section of the 
preamble does not reappear in the final rule, no change to the final 
rule is necessary.

Conclusion

    The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments 
received, and determined that air safety and the public interest 
require adopting this final rule with the changes described previously 
and minor editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these changes:
    <bullet> Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the 
NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and
    <bullet> Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was 
already proposed in the NPRM.
    The FAA also determined that these changes will not increase the 
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this final 
rule.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    The FAA reviewed Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB210108-00, 
Issue 002, dated October 15, 2019. The service information describes 
procedures for installing new inboard and outboard CAC outlet check 
valves on the left-side and right-side CACTCS packs. This service 
information is reasonably available because the interested parties have 
access to it through their normal course of business or by the means 
identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD affects 90 airplanes of U.S. 
registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                      Estimated Costs for Required Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                 Cost on U.S.
              Action                    Labor cost        Parts cost      Cost per product        operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Replace CAC outlet check valves..  3 work-hours x $85               $0  $255 per check       $22,950 per check
                                    per hour = $255                      valve.               valve.
                                    per check valve.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    According to the manufacturer, some or all of the costs of this AD 
may be covered under warranty by Collins Aerospace, thereby reducing 
the cost impact on affected individuals. The FAA does not control 
warranty coverage for affected individuals. As a result, the FAA has 
included all known costs in the cost estimate.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. 
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight 
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for 
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary 
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that 
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to 
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

[[Page 54888]]

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2020-17-13 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-21218; Docket No. FAA-
2019-1070; Product Identifier 2019-NM-178-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective October 8, 2020.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 787-8 and 787-9 
airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing 
Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, dated October 
15, 2019.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 21, Air 
conditioning.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by reports that the cabin air compressor 
(CAC) outlet check valve failed due to fatigue of the aluminum 
flappers, and exposed the Y-duct to temperatures above its design 
limit. The FAA is issuing this AD to address this condition, which 
could expose the flight deck and passenger cabin to smoke and fumes, 
and lead to reduced crew performance or produce passenger 
discomfort. Off-gassed compounds could cause respiratory distress 
and could cause serious injury for an individual with a compromised 
respiratory system.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Required Actions

    Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: At the 
applicable times specified in paragraph 5., ``Compliance,'' of 
Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, dated 
October 15, 2019, do all applicable actions identified as ``RC'' 
(required for compliance) in, and in accordance with, the 
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-
SB210108-00, Issue 002, dated October 15, 2019.

(h) Exceptions to Service Information Specifications

    Where Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, 
dated October 15, 2019, uses the phrase ``the Issue 002 date of this 
service bulletin,'' this AD requires using ``the effective date of 
this AD.''

(i) Parts Installation Prohibition

    As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install a CAC 
outlet check valve, with a part number listed in paragraph 1.B, 
``Spares Affected'' of Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB210108-
00, Issue 002, dated October 15, 2019, or CAC outlet check valve P/N 
7010105H01, on any airplane.

(j) Credit for Previous Actions

    This paragraph provides credit for the actions specified in 
paragraph (g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the 
effective date of this AD using Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-
SB210108-00, Issue 001, dated May 25, 2018.

(k) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Seattle ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to 
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found 
in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request 
to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District 
Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the 
manager of the certification office, send it to the attention of the 
person identified in paragraph (l) of this AD. Information may be 
emailed to: [email protected].
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.
    (3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be 
used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD 
if it is approved by The Boeing Company Organization Designation 
Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle 
ACO Branch, FAA, to make those findings. To be approved, the repair 
method, modification deviation, or alteration deviation must meet 
the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must 
specifically refer to this AD.
    (4) For service information that contains steps that are labeled 
as Required for Compliance (RC), the provisions of paragraphs 
(k)(4)(i) and (ii) of this AD apply.
    (i) The steps labeled as RC, including substeps under an RC step 
and any figures identified in an RC step, must be done to comply 
with the AD. If a step or substep is labeled ``RC Exempt,'' then the 
RC requirement is removed from that step or substep. An AMOC is 
required for any deviations to RC steps, including substeps and 
identified figures.
    (ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be deviated from using accepted 
methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection 
program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the RC 
steps, including substeps and identified figures, can still be done 
as specified, and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy 
condition.

(l) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Scott Craig, 
Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety and Environmental Systems Section, 
FAA, Seattle ACO Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; 
phone and fax: 206-231-3566; email: [email protected].

(m) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed 
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do 
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) Boeing Service Bulletin B787-81205-SB210108-00, Issue 002, 
dated October 15, 2019.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services 
(C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740-
5600; telephone 562-797-1717; internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
    (4) You may view this service information at the FAA, 
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability 
of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195.
    (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated 
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at 
NARA, email [email protected], or go to: https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued on August 13, 2020.
Lance T. Gant,
Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2020-19387 Filed 9-2-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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