Published 2021-06-01 · Federal Register document 2021-11391
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Helicopters
Publication summary
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Model MBB-BK117 D-2 helicopters. This AD was prompted by reports that collective lever switch units having certain part numbers did not have retaining rings installed in the cable cut switch guard. This AD requires inspecting certain collective lever switch units for discrepancies (missing retaining rings, incorrectly installed retaining rings, and a missing axis in the cable cut switch guard), doing all applicable corrective actions, and marking affected parts, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
Why this record is shown
Source: Federal Register annual FAA metadata. Acquired 2026-09-03T22:24:08.106391+00:00. The title, summary and date are source facts.
- Source revision
- federal_register_ad_metadata_2021-9c919420683447c6
- Source row
- results[172]
- Raw source SHA-256
- 9c919420683447c683ad0c877cb886e341c11862be32b47c536a001b1d76dcb5
Final-rule publication
Recorded publication clauses
- AD identifier printed in this edition
- 2021-10-18
- Effective date printed in this edition
- 2021-07-06
Read 12 complete recorded clauses
Effective Date
(a) Effective Date
This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective July 6, 2021.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 10617–10703, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 391d28c292c2480b02a5fa61271d6baf04b97d8ebaa8e1b6c8e33d117555b4f1
Affected ADs
(b) Affected ADs
None.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 10703–10732, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 871a4afc60ceeae06e8010585055188633d616078500c45937092bfe892239c0
Applicability wording · Applicability
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Model
MBB-BK117 D-2 helicopters, certificated in any category, all serial
numbers, having an affected part defined in European Union Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020-0084, dated April 3, 2020 (EASA AD
2020-0084).
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 10732–11033, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: c8c1332a3ea8bd0388783a12bca3ec354bb7aff15bed02ce8b6638a09a93ff35
Subject
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 2700, Flight Control
System.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11033–11125, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: f4128249204df7be17e8a71c31e7b327f03fe565bd557accf081a830b535f2e7
Reason
(e) Reason
This AD was prompted by reports that collective lever switch
units having certain part numbers did not have retaining rings
installed in the cable cut switch guard. The cable cut switch guard
has an axis that holds, and allows the guard to turn over, the cable
cut switch. This axis is secured with two retaining rings and if
both retaining rings are missing, the axis can move out. The FAA is
issuing this AD to address this condition, which could cause
inadvertent activation of the rescue hoist cable cut function,
resulting in personal injury.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11125–11698, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 41c4d6305a61aebdaff1433a8ca05d2a675c9e1b1513a8e5e73be05a2b3e1333
Compliance
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11698–11800, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 00fbfa31932483f627d0ce0a11cbd2e35e15d9231842b91ac85623ce533912d3
Requirements
(g) Requirements
Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified
in, and in accordance with, EASA AD 2020-0084.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11800–11935, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: e84f6be5d0bc0e1f14c260154993893ab18af9bc10f25ec9f29e2a6279cd9490
Exceptions to EASA AD 2020-0084
(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2020-0084
(1) Where EASA AD 2020-0084 refers to its effective date, this
AD requires using the effective date of this AD.
(2) The ``Remarks'' section of EASA AD 2020-0084 does not apply
to this AD.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11935–12171, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 6fdbfc28c42ab7ae49152b79fd0ea4674e472ccceff726b2807a3982a0b78b20
Special Flight Permit
(i) Special Flight Permit
Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 14 CFR
21.197 and 21.199 to operate the helicopter to a location where the
helicopter can be modified (if the operator elects to do so),
provided the helicopter is not used for hoist operations.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12171–12457, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: f06a806f4e7c11b4ea6b21939bab87e13094715a1ac283b404d2f0b8b7a0e921
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information
directly to the manager of the International Validation Branch, send
it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (k) of
this AD. Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12457–13247, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 6506316eb9121fcd60dbdf5525a4a2fb0c7b2a53a9347426cef04d27bf1e0d1a
Related Information
(k) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Hal Jensen,
Aerospace Engineer, Operational Safety Branch, FAA, 950 L'Enfant
Plaza SW, Washington, DC 20024; telephone 202-267-9167; email
[email protected].
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13247–13482, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: f828e9145c75872f1517f7c3967cce4689c29974d4cb0d54a865bfe70ef07b91
Material Incorporated by Reference
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
(i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020-0084,
dated April 3, 2020.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For EASA AD 2020-0084, contact the EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-
Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email
[email protected]; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this
EASA AD on the EASA website at https://ad.easa.europa.eu.
(4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Office of
the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room
6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call 817-222-5110. This material may be
found in the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-
2021-0104.
(5) You may view this material that is incorporated by reference
at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this material at NARA, email
[email protected], or go to https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13482–14907, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: a6766484f0da907b0b97c96bd295482ff83c6a6284ca6f3f23087c4e22f3e276
No replacement link has been established from this edition. The complete historical rule chain and current legal effect remain unknown.
Find all recorded historical references to AD 2021-10-18 · 0 printed reference observations in this pinned collection.
These are observations from one dated publication. Current legal status is unknown; aircraft applicability, installed configuration, compliance and burden require separate evidence. Missing or unparsed conditions remain unknown.
Why these observations are shown
They were extracted offline from the same immutable official HTML source as the complete recorded text. The dated source wording, original text coordinates and exact quote digests are retained. PDF/text agreement and current regulatory effect have not been qualified.
Observation revision: whole-ad-publication-clause-observations-1.0.1. Text SHA-256: ea27cd9bcf3990c1ad17e51b57e91841e394e93f4eaea85b466700f957e42a13. Source manifest: c32df2fc90409f7704a61949972f0370661ddff3b2d1bda7608c376ee0747b19.
Official source · 2021-06-01
Publication text
This is the complete recorded text of this dated publication.
Current legal effect is unknown. Aircraft applicability, installed configuration and compliance require separate evidence. PDF/text agreement has not been evaluated.
Read the complete official publication text
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 103 (Tuesday, June 1, 2021)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 29187-29189]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-11391]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2021-0104; Project Identifier MCAI-2020-00477-R;
Amendment 39-21551; AD 2021-10-18]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH
Helicopters
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Model MBB-BK117 D-2
helicopters. This AD was prompted by reports that collective lever
switch units having certain part numbers did not have retaining rings
installed in the cable cut switch guard. This AD requires inspecting
certain collective lever switch units for discrepancies (missing
retaining rings, incorrectly installed retaining rings, and a missing
axis in the cable cut switch guard), doing all applicable corrective
actions, and marking affected parts, as specified in a European Union
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference.
The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these
products.
DATES: This AD is effective July 6, 2021.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of July 6,
2021.
ADDRESSES: For material incorporated by reference (IBR) in this AD,
contact the EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany;
telephone +49 221 8999 000; email [email protected]; internet
www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this material on the EASA website at
https://ad.easa.europa.eu. You may view this material at the FAA,
Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy.,
Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability
of this material at the FAA, call 817-222-5110. It is also available in
the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2021-0104.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for
[[Page 29188]]
and locating Docket No. FAA-2021-0104; or in person at Docket
Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, any comments
received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations is
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Hal Jensen, Aerospace Engineer,
Operational Safety Branch, FAA, 950 L'Enfant Plaza SW, Washington, DC
20024; telephone 202-267-9167; email [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the
European Union, has issued EASA AD 2020-0084, dated April 3, 2020 (EASA
AD 2020-0084) (also referred to as the Mandatory Continuing
Airworthiness Information, or the MCAI), to correct an unsafe condition
for all Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Model MBB-BK117 D-2
helicopters. Although EASA AD 2020-0084 applies to all Model MBB-BK117
D-2 helicopters, this AD applies to helicopters with an affected part
installed instead.
The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Model MBB-BK117
D-2 helicopters. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on March 8,
2021 (86 FR 13234). The NPRM was prompted by reports that collective
lever switch units having certain part numbers did not have retaining
rings installed in the cable cut switch guard. The NPRM proposed to
require inspecting certain collective lever switch units for
discrepancies (missing retaining rings, incorrectly installed retaining
rings, and a missing axis in the cable cut switch guard), doing all
applicable corrective actions, and marking affected parts.
The cable cut switch guard has an axis that holds, and allows the
guard to turn over, the cable cut switch. This axis is secured with two
retaining rings and if both retaining rings are missing, the axis can
move out. The FAA is issuing this AD to address this condition, which
could cause inadvertent activation of the rescue hoist cable cut
function, resulting in personal injury. See the MCAI for additional
background information.
Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive
Comments
The FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in
developing this final rule. The FAA received no comments on the NPRM or
on the determination of the cost to the public.
Conclusion
The FAA reviewed the relevant data and determined that air safety
and the public interest require adopting this final rule as proposed,
except for minor editorial changes and an update to paragraph (j)(1) of
this AD. The FAA has determined that these minor changes:
<bullet> Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and
<bullet> Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM.
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
EASA AD 2020-0084 specifies procedures for inspecting collective
lever switch units having certain part numbers for discrepancies,
applicable corrective actions, and marking affected parts.
Discrepancies include missing retaining rings, incorrectly installed
retaining rings, and a missing axis in the cable cut switch guard.
Corrective actions include installing missing retaining rings,
adjusting retaining rings that are installed incorrectly, and
installing an axis in the cable cut switch guard. EASA AD 2020-0084
also specifies that an affected part can be installed on any
helicopter, provided it has been marked. This material is reasonably
available because the interested parties have access to it through
their normal course of business or by the means identified in the
ADDRESSES section.
Costs of Compliance
The FAA estimates that this AD affects 30 helicopters of U.S.
registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs for Required Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.50 work-hour x $85 per hour = $42.50....................... $0 $42.50 $1,275
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary on-
condition actions that would be required based on the results of any
required actions. The FAA has no way of determining the number of
helicopters that might need these on-condition actions:
Estimated Costs of On-Condition Actions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per
Labor cost Parts cost product
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 work-hours x $85 per hour = $170.... $56 $226
------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the manufacturer, some or all of the costs of this AD
may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on
affected operators. The FAA does not control warranty coverage for
affected operators. As a result, the FAA has included all known costs
in the cost estimate.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
[[Page 29189]]
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
The Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:
2021-10-18 Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH: Amendment 39-1551;
Docket No. FAA-2021-0104; Project Identifier MCAI-2020-00477-R.
(a) Effective Date
This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective July 6, 2021.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Model
MBB-BK117 D-2 helicopters, certificated in any category, all serial
numbers, having an affected part defined in European Union Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020-0084, dated April 3, 2020 (EASA AD
2020-0084).
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 2700, Flight Control
System.
(e) Reason
This AD was prompted by reports that collective lever switch
units having certain part numbers did not have retaining rings
installed in the cable cut switch guard. The cable cut switch guard
has an axis that holds, and allows the guard to turn over, the cable
cut switch. This axis is secured with two retaining rings and if
both retaining rings are missing, the axis can move out. The FAA is
issuing this AD to address this condition, which could cause
inadvertent activation of the rescue hoist cable cut function,
resulting in personal injury.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Requirements
Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified
in, and in accordance with, EASA AD 2020-0084.
(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2020-0084
(1) Where EASA AD 2020-0084 refers to its effective date, this
AD requires using the effective date of this AD.
(2) The ``Remarks'' section of EASA AD 2020-0084 does not apply
to this AD.
(i) Special Flight Permit
Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 14 CFR
21.197 and 21.199 to operate the helicopter to a location where the
helicopter can be modified (if the operator elects to do so),
provided the helicopter is not used for hoist operations.
(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information
directly to the manager of the International Validation Branch, send
it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (k) of
this AD. Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(k) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Hal Jensen,
Aerospace Engineer, Operational Safety Branch, FAA, 950 L'Enfant
Plaza SW, Washington, DC 20024; telephone 202-267-9167; email
[email protected].
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
(i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020-0084,
dated April 3, 2020.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For EASA AD 2020-0084, contact the EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-
Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email
[email protected]; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this
EASA AD on the EASA website at https://ad.easa.europa.eu.
(4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Office of
the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room
6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call 817-222-5110. This material may be
found in the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-
2021-0104.
(5) You may view this material that is incorporated by reference
at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this material at NARA, email
[email protected], or go to https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Issued on May 5, 2021.
Lance T. Gant,
Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2021-11391 Filed 5-28-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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These are dated publication metadata, recorded clauses and literal source observations. Word, model-label, header and reference matches do not establish current legal effect, manufacturer/model identity, aircraft applicability, installed configuration or compliance.
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