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Published 2022-11-02 · Federal Register document 2022-23899

Airworthiness Directives; Viking Air Limited (Type Certificate Previously Held by Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.)

Publication summary

The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Viking Air Limited (Viking) (type certificate previously held by Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.) Model DHC-3 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a recent investigation of a Viking Model DHC-3 airplane where the lock ring of the stabilizer actuator was found missing. This AD requires a visual inspection of the stabilizer actuator to confirm that the stabilizer actuator lock ring is present, correctly seated in the groove in the upper housing, and engaged in the clamp nut, applicable corrective actions, and application of a torque seal. This AD also requires sending the inspection results to the FAA. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

Why this record is shown

Source: Federal Register annual FAA metadata. Acquired 2026-09-03T22:24:11.345539+00:00. The title, summary and date are source facts.

Source revision
federal_register_ad_metadata_2022-c0cc5a172b1306fa
Source row
results[339]
Raw source SHA-256
c0cc5a172b1306fa2cd8dc66863122ada13332e685d87687bd0becf2dab37a5e

Final-rule publication

Recorded publication clauses

AD identifier printed in this edition
2022-23-08
Effective date printed in this edition
2022-11-02
Read 12 complete recorded clauses
Effective Date
(a) Effective Date

    This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective November 2, 2022.
    None.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12989–13089, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 19807bfd2ac99292c0f109bd35ed7776100f2cae3d8b7ed7f202c3464c7766e7

Affected ADs
(b) Affected ADs

    None.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13089–13118, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 871a4afc60ceeae06e8010585055188633d616078500c45937092bfe892239c0

Applicability wording · Applicability
(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to Viking Air Limited (Viking) (type certificate 
previously held by Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.) Model 
DHC-3 airplanes, all serial numbers, certificated in any category.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13118–13341, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 0680c4c97c52b535b7835a206a90e0cf425797314692fbac363003dd90033625

Subject
(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 5520, Elevator 
Structure.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13341–13430, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 39fe74c9a80ca6d31395acc46eb9a2329bf11acdf9d146d44639be0084734fa2

Unsafe Condition
(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by a recent investigation of a Viking Model 
DHC-3 airplane where the lock ring of the stabilizer actuator was 
found missing. The investigation revealed that the clamp nut that 
attaches the top eye end and bearing

[[Page 66086]]

assembly of the horizontal stabilizer actuator to the actuator 
barrel had unscrewed from the barrel. The investigation also found 
that the circular wire lock ring, which was designed to prevent the 
clamp nut from unscrewing, was not present. This condition, if not 
detected and corrected, could result in a reduction or loss of pitch 
control during flight with consequent loss of control of the 
airplane.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13430–14122, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: f6d0a88e112bb5dbe0c8df1f48cbf5334e8978be3ba3aeb0105d8a736d82406e

Compliance
(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 14122–14224, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 00fbfa31932483f627d0ce0a11cbd2e35e15d9231842b91ac85623ce533912d3

Inspection
(g) Inspection

    Within 10 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date 
of this AD, perform a visual inspection of the stabilizer actuator 
to confirm that the stabilizer actuator lock ring is present, 
correctly seated in the groove in the upper housing, and engaged in 
the clamp nut. If the stabilizer actuator lock ring is missing or 
not correctly installed, before further flight, repair using a 
method approved by the Manager, New York ACO Branch, FAA, at the 
address in paragraph (k) of this AD.
    Note to paragraph (g): Viking Service Letter DHC3-SL-27-001, 
dated October 25, 2022, contains information related to this AD.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 14224–14874, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 3de61f5ec0bcf6ab2fdfab5c2f4c111707375e0734e5c1ccc907d89edc00d703

Torque Seal
(h) Torque Seal

    Before further flight after the inspection required by paragraph 
(g) of this AD, apply a torque seal to the clamp nut and lock ring.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 14874–15030, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: b6049f2a3348762b9df30b632fff151cbe9080bccae9b3686575c3b6048ee65c

Reporting Requirement
(i) Reporting Requirement

    Within 10 days after the inspection required by paragraph (g) of 
this AD or within 10 days after the effective date of this AD, 
whichever occurs later, report the results of the inspection to the 
FAA at [email protected]. Include the airplane serial number, 
airplane hours TIS, hours TIS since last actuator overhaul (if 
known), and whether the lock ring was present, missing, or 
incorrectly installed.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15030–15471, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 63225d53aed3a3f8f078782653d8c48afd809f9e4f17015ecbf9e580f71e524a

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, New York ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to 
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found 
in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request 
to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District 
Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the 
manager of the certification office, mail it to ATTN: Program 
Manager, Continuing Operational Safety, at the address identified in 
paragraph (k) of this AD or email to: [email protected]. If 
mailing information, also submit information by email.
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.
    (3) For service information identified in this AD that is not 
incorporated by reference, contact Viking Air Ltd., 1959 de 
Havilland Way, Sidney British Columbia, Canada V8L 5V5; phone: (800) 
663-8444; email: vikingair.com">continuing.airworthiness@vikingair.com; website: 
vikingair.com.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15471–16614, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: be4cbe4d8f41251629469e83a4904aa3e4d417136700eed58ec8d95bc53c7706

Related Information
(k) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Elizabeth Dowling, 
Aviation Safety Engineer, New York ACO Branch, FAA, 1600 Stewart 
Avenue, Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (516) 228-7300; email: [email protected].

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 16614–16851, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: c76efb9c1895be24c719092684786902426103394c9dd2040d9675b042a6067c

Material Incorporated by Reference
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

    None.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 16851–16902, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 33b5654a42b7710d6e34eeb5d6f69110405cc721191b2e466fa582ff6e507325

No replacement link has been established from this edition. The complete historical rule chain and current legal effect remain unknown.

Find all recorded historical references to AD 2022-23-08 · 0 printed reference observations in this pinned collection.

These are observations from one dated publication. Current legal status is unknown; aircraft applicability, installed configuration, compliance and burden require separate evidence. Missing or unparsed conditions remain unknown.

Why these observations are shown

They were extracted offline from the same immutable official HTML source as the complete recorded text. The dated source wording, original text coordinates and exact quote digests are retained. PDF/text agreement and current regulatory effect have not been qualified.

Observation revision: whole-ad-publication-clause-observations-1.0.1. Text SHA-256: 32887d5554e7c8c6b4e2493efe080245ede4f37352b5d42e8aa4e7e1d8fc7bd6. Source manifest: 157e76983e8596d3543a367887e2c331da5f3c29d7f693bafcac81183e1c3fe4.

Official source · 2022-11-02

Publication text

This is the complete recorded text of this dated publication.

Current legal effect is unknown. Aircraft applicability, installed configuration and compliance require separate evidence. PDF/text agreement has not been evaluated.

Read the complete official publication text
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 211 (Wednesday, November 2, 2022)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 66084-66086]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-23899]



[[Page 66084]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2022-1409; Project Identifier AD-2022-01396-A; 
Amendment 39-22235; AD 2022-23-08]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Viking Air Limited (Type Certificate 
Previously Held by Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all 
Viking Air Limited (Viking) (type certificate previously held by 
Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.) Model DHC-3 airplanes. This AD 
was prompted by a recent investigation of a Viking Model DHC-3 airplane 
where the lock ring of the stabilizer actuator was found missing. This 
AD requires a visual inspection of the stabilizer actuator to confirm 
that the stabilizer actuator lock ring is present, correctly seated in 
the groove in the upper housing, and engaged in the clamp nut, 
applicable corrective actions, and application of a torque seal. This 
AD also requires sending the inspection results to the FAA. The FAA is 
issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective November 2, 2022.
    The FAA must receive comments on this AD by December 19, 2022.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
    <bullet> Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to regulations.gov. Follow 
the instructions for submitting comments.
    <bullet> Fax: 202-493-2251.
    <bullet> Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
    <bullet> Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov by 
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2022-1409; or in person at 
Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, any 
comments received, and other information. The street address for Docket 
Operations is listed above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elizabeth Dowling, Aviation Safety 
Engineer, New York ACO Branch, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Westbury, NY 
11590; phone: (516) 228-7300; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On September 4, 2022, a fatal accident of a Viking Model DHC-3 
airplane in Mutiny Bay near Freeland, WA occurred. The National 
Transportation Safety Board investigation showed that the lock ring of 
the stabilizer actuator was found missing. The investigation revealed 
that the clamp nut that attaches the top eye end and bearing assembly 
of the horizontal stabilizer actuator to the actuator barrel had 
unscrewed from the barrel. The investigation also found that the 
circular wire lock ring, which was designed to prevent the clamp nut 
from unscrewing, was not present. This condition, if not detected and 
corrected, could result in a reduction or loss of pitch control during 
flight with consequent loss of control of the airplane. The FAA is 
issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

FAA's Determination

    The FAA is issuing this AD because the agency has determined the 
unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in 
other products of the same type design.

AD Requirements

    This AD requires a visual inspection of the stabilizer actuator to 
confirm that the stabilizer actuator lock ring is present, correctly 
seated in the groove in the upper housing, and engaged in the clamp 
nut, applicable corrective actions, and application of a torque seal. 
This AD also requires sending the inspection results to the FAA.

Interim Action

    The FAA considers this AD to be an interim action. If final action 
is later identified, the FAA might consider further rulemaking.

Justification for Immediate Adoption and Determination of the Effective 
Date

    Section 553(b)(3)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 
U.S.C. 551 et seq.) authorizes agencies to dispense with notice and 
comment procedures for rules when the agency, for ``good cause,'' finds 
that those procedures are ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to 
the public interest.'' Under this section, an agency, upon finding good 
cause, may issue a final rule without providing notice and seeking 
comment prior to issuance. Further, section 553(d) of the APA 
authorizes agencies to make rules effective in less than thirty days, 
upon a finding of good cause.
    An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of 
this AD without providing an opportunity for public comments prior to 
adoption. The FAA has found that the risk to the flying public 
justifies foregoing notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule 
because loss of pitch control during flight with consequent loss of 
control of the airplane could occur rapidly and without warning due to 
a missing or incorrectly seated lock ring in the stabilizer actuator. 
Given the significance of the risk presented by this unsafe condition, 
it must be immediately addressed. Thus, the FAA has determined that 
these airplanes must be inspected within 10 hours time-in-service. 
Accordingly, notice and opportunity for prior public comment are 
impracticable and contrary to the public interest pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 
553(b)(3)(B).
    In addition, the FAA finds that good cause exists pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. 553(d) for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days, 
for the same reasons the FAA found good cause to forego notice and 
comment.

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to send any written data, views, or arguments 
about this final rule. Send your comments to an address listed under 
ADDRESSES. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2022-1409 and Project Identifier 
AD-2022-01396-A'' at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful 
comments reference a specific portion of the final rule, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA 
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend 
this final rule because of those comments.
    Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in 
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to 
regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The 
agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal 
contact received about this final rule.

[[Page 66085]]

Confidential Business Information

    CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily 
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public 
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this AD contain commercial 
or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that 
you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to 
this AD, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted 
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing 
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as 
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public 
docket of this AD. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to 
Elizabeth Dowling, Aviation Safety Engineer, New York ACO Branch, FAA, 
1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590. Any commentary that 
the FAA receives which is not specifically designated as CBI will be 
placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) do not 
apply when an agency finds good cause pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553 to adopt 
a rule without prior notice and comment. Because FAA has determined 
that it has good cause to adopt this rule without prior notice and 
comment, RFA analysis is not required.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD affects 63 airplanes of U.S. 
registry.
    The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                     Cost per      Cost on U.S.
             Action                  Labor cost               Parts cost              product        operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspection and Torque Seal       1 work-hour x $85   Not Applicable.............             $85          $5,355
 Application.                     per hour = $85.
Reporting Requirement..........  1 work-hour x $85   Not Applicable.............              85           5,355
                                  per hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA has received no definitive data regarding the cost 
estimates for the on-condition corrective actions required by this AD.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not 
required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for 
failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the 
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of 
information displays a currently valid OMB Control Number. The OMB 
Control Number for this information collection is 2120-0056. Public 
reporting for this collection of information is estimated to be 
approximately 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and 
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the 
collection of information. All responses to this collection of 
information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate 
or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection 
Clearance Officer, Federal Aviation Administration, 10101 Hillwood 
Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177-1524.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. 
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight 
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for 
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary 
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that 
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to 
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866, and
    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive:

2022-23-08 Viking Air Limited (type certificate previously held by 
Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.): Amendment 39-22235; Docket 
No. FAA-2022-1409; Project Identifier AD-2022-01396-A.

(a) Effective Date

    This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective November 2, 2022.
    None.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to Viking Air Limited (Viking) (type certificate 
previously held by Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.) Model 
DHC-3 airplanes, all serial numbers, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 5520, Elevator 
Structure.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by a recent investigation of a Viking Model 
DHC-3 airplane where the lock ring of the stabilizer actuator was 
found missing. The investigation revealed that the clamp nut that 
attaches the top eye end and bearing

[[Page 66086]]

assembly of the horizontal stabilizer actuator to the actuator 
barrel had unscrewed from the barrel. The investigation also found 
that the circular wire lock ring, which was designed to prevent the 
clamp nut from unscrewing, was not present. This condition, if not 
detected and corrected, could result in a reduction or loss of pitch 
control during flight with consequent loss of control of the 
airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Inspection

    Within 10 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date 
of this AD, perform a visual inspection of the stabilizer actuator 
to confirm that the stabilizer actuator lock ring is present, 
correctly seated in the groove in the upper housing, and engaged in 
the clamp nut. If the stabilizer actuator lock ring is missing or 
not correctly installed, before further flight, repair using a 
method approved by the Manager, New York ACO Branch, FAA, at the 
address in paragraph (k) of this AD.
    Note to paragraph (g): Viking Service Letter DHC3-SL-27-001, 
dated October 25, 2022, contains information related to this AD.

(h) Torque Seal

    Before further flight after the inspection required by paragraph 
(g) of this AD, apply a torque seal to the clamp nut and lock ring.

(i) Reporting Requirement

    Within 10 days after the inspection required by paragraph (g) of 
this AD or within 10 days after the effective date of this AD, 
whichever occurs later, report the results of the inspection to the 
FAA at [email protected]. Include the airplane serial number, 
airplane hours TIS, hours TIS since last actuator overhaul (if 
known), and whether the lock ring was present, missing, or 
incorrectly installed.

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, New York ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to 
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found 
in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request 
to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District 
Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the 
manager of the certification office, mail it to ATTN: Program 
Manager, Continuing Operational Safety, at the address identified in 
paragraph (k) of this AD or email to: [email protected]. If 
mailing information, also submit information by email.
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.
    (3) For service information identified in this AD that is not 
incorporated by reference, contact Viking Air Ltd., 1959 de 
Havilland Way, Sidney British Columbia, Canada V8L 5V5; phone: (800) 
663-8444; email: vikingair.com">continuing.airworthiness@vikingair.com; website: 
vikingair.com.

(k) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Elizabeth Dowling, 
Aviation Safety Engineer, New York ACO Branch, FAA, 1600 Stewart 
Avenue, Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (516) 228-7300; email: [email protected].

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

    None.

    Issued on October 28, 2022.
Ross Landes,
Deputy Director for Regulatory Operations, Compliance & Airworthiness 
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2022-23899 Filed 10-31-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


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494acf83bbf4015eedc05bd5c3b6fd637afff790fb439c6ff49c68ac63fa90d8
Text SHA-256
32887d5554e7c8c6b4e2493efe080245ede4f37352b5d42e8aa4e7e1d8fc7bd6

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These are dated publication metadata, recorded clauses and literal source observations. Word, model-label, header and reference matches do not establish current legal effect, manufacturer/model identity, aircraft applicability, installed configuration or compliance.

The collection uses 33 explicit annual source snapshots. Source captures and operative-text qualifications have separate states. Missing information remains unknown.