Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Airplanes

[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 237 (Monday, December 12, 2022)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 75911-75914]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-26971]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2022-1583; Project Identifier MCAI-2022-01486-T; 
Amendment 39-22282; AD 2022-25-51]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type 
Certificate Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership 
(CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all 
Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 
airplanes. The FAA previously sent this AD as an emergency AD to all 
known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. This AD was 
prompted by reports of the autopilot/autothrottle system design 
resulting in inadvertent engagement of the autopilot when the 
flightcrew was attempting to engage the autothrottle late into the 
take-off phase or when attempting to re-engage the autothrottle during 
takeoff after uncommanded disconnect. This AD requires revising the 
Limitations section of the existing airplane flight manual (AFM) by 
revising the title of the existing autopilot AFM limitation, include a 
new warning prior to the existing autopilot engagement limitations, and 
include a new limitation prohibiting selecting or reselecting 
autothrottle during takeoff after thrust levers are advanced to the 
takeoff setting after the existing autopilot engagement limitations. 
The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these 
products.

DATES: This AD is effective December 27, 2022. Emergency AD 2022-25-51, 
issued on November 22, 2022, which contained the requirements of this 
amendment, was effective with actual notice.
    The FAA must receive comments on this AD by January 26, 2023.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
    <bullet> Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to regulations.gov. Follow 
the instructions for submitting comments.
    <bullet> Fax: 202-493-2251.
    <bullet> Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-

[[Page 75912]]

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue 
SE, Washington, DC 20590.
    <bullet> Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under 
Docket No. FAA-2022-1583; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 
docket contains this final rule, the mandatory continuing airworthiness 
information (MCAI), any comments received, and other information. The 
street address for Docket Operations is listed above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Steven Dzierzynski, Aerospace 
Engineer, Avionics and Electrical Systems Section, FAA, New York ACO 
Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 
516-228-7367; email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to send any written data, views, or arguments 
about this final rule. Send your comments to an address listed under 
ADDRESSES. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2022-1583; Project Identifier MCAI-
2022-01486-T'' at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful 
comments reference a specific portion of the final rule, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA 
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend 
this final rule because of those comments.
    Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in 
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to 
regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The 
agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal 
contact received about this final rule.

Confidential Business Information

    CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily 
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public 
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this AD contain commercial 
or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that 
you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to 
this AD, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted 
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing 
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as 
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public 
docket of this AD. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to Steven 
Dzierzynski, Aerospace Engineer, Avionics and Electrical Systems 
Section, FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, 
Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 516-228-7367; email [email protected]. Any commentary that the FAA receives that is not 
specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for 
this rulemaking.

Background

    The FAA issued Emergency AD 2022-25-51, dated November 22, 2022 
(Emergency AD 2022-25-51), to address an unsafe condition on all Airbus 
Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. 
The FAA sent the emergency AD to all known U.S. owners and operators of 
these airplanes. Emergency AD 2022-25-51 requires revising the 
Limitations section of the existing AFM by revising the title of the 
existing autopilot AFM limitation, include a new warning prior to the 
existing autopilot engagement limitations, and include a new limitation 
prohibiting selecting or reselecting autothrottle during takeoff after 
thrust levers are advanced to the takeoff setting after the existing 
autopilot engagement limitations.
    Emergency AD 2022-25-51 was prompted by Emergency AD CF-2022-64, 
dated November 17, 2022 (referred to after this as the MCAI), issued by 
Transport Canada, which is the aviation authority for Canada, to 
correct an unsafe condition on all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership 
Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes.
    There have been 38 in-service events, including two nearly 
catastrophic events, whereby the flightcrew inadvertently engaged the 
autopilot while attempting to engage the autothrottle late into the 
take-off phase or when re-engaging the autothrottle. Engaging the 
autopilot below 400 feet (ft) above ground level (AGL) is prohibited by 
the existing AFM. However, the control panel for autothrottle and 
autopilot engagement is structured in such a way that it is possible 
for the flightcrew to mistakenly engage the autopilot when attempting 
to re-engage the autothrottle. The autothrottle system is prone to 
disconnect due to different sources for airspeed between the 
autothrottle and the flight control system monitor, which can occur 
during turbulence. The disconnect may also occur due to different 
sources for pressure altitude between autothrottle application and 
autothrottle monitor. Additionally, the autopilot engagement is not 
currently inhibited during takeoff and with sufficient speed will cause 
the airplane to command a pitch increase to capture the pitch target 
marker, which may cause premature rotation, including at speeds below 
V1 at the time of autopilot engagement. Premature airplane pitch up 
will require the flightcrew to intervene immediately, and depending on 
the speed, could lead to a tail strike. If the flightcrew does not 
reject the takeoff, premature rotation due to autopilot engagement 
below Vr may result in low-energy liftoff.
    In September 2022, there was an incident in which the autothrottle 
disengaged during takeoff, and when the flightcrew attempted to re-
engage the autothrottle, they mistakenly engaged the autopilot, which 
resulted in the aircraft rotating below the V1 speed. This resulted in 
a low-energy takeoff, which is hazardous as it could lead to the 
airplane stalling and/or impacting terrain.
    Existing procedures provide operational recommendations and 
procedures to follow for autothrottle selection and in the event of an 
autothrottle disconnect during takeoff. The autothrottle cannot be re-
engaged if it becomes disconnected on takeoff above 60 knots and below 
400 ft AGL. Therefore, the flightcrew should not attempt to re-engage 
the autothrottle if it becomes disconnected on takeoff. As previously 
mentioned, trying to re-engage autothrottle below 400 ft AGL may result 
in inadvertent engagement of the autopilot.
    This AD is intended to address inadvertent engagement of the 
autopilot below 400 ft AGL by adopting the autopilot engagement warning 
statement specified in Transport Canada Emergency AD CF-2022-64. The 
intended action is to incorporate the new warning statement within the 
existing Autopilot Engagement AFM limitation by placing the warning 
statement just prior to the two existing limitations, ``The minimum 
height for engagement of autopilot is 400 feet AGL,'' and ``The minimum 
height for use of autopilot is 80 feet AGL.'' This AD differs from the 
Transport Canada Emergency AD by also requiring revising the existing 
AFM to include an additional limitation (below the two existing 
limitations) that specifies, ``To avoid inadvertent engagement of 
autopilot, during takeoff, the

[[Page 75913]]

autothrottle must not be selected or re-selected after the thrust 
levers are advanced to the takeoff setting until the aircraft is at or 
above 400 feet AGL.'' Furthermore, this AD requires the title of the 
existing AFM limitation to be revised from ``Autopilot Engagement'' to 
``Autopilot and Autothrottle Engagement.'' Therefore, the AFM 
limitation specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, titled 
``Autopilot and Autothrottle Engagement,'' replaces the existing AFM 
limitation titled ``Autopilot Engagement.'' This condition, if not 
addressed, could result in premature rotation due to inadvertent 
autopilot engagement, possibly leading to tail-strike, inability to 
climb, and loss of control of the airplane.
    You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under 
Docket No. FAA-2022-1583.

FAA's Determination

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another 
country and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to 
the FAA's bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, it 
has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI 
described above. The FAA is issuing this AD after determining that the 
unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on 
other products of the same type design.

AD Requirements

    This AD requires revising the Limitations section of the existing 
AFM by revising the title of the existing AFM limitation titled 
``Autopilot Engagement'', include a new warning prior to the existing 
autopilot engagement limitations, and a new limitation prohibiting 
selecting or reselecting autothrottle during takeoff after thrust 
levers are advanced to the takeoff setting after the existing autopilot 
engagement limitations.

Interim Action

    The FAA considers that this AD is an interim action. If final 
action is later identified, the FAA might consider further rulemaking 
then.

Justification for Immediate Adoption and Determination of the Effective 
Date

    Section 553(b)(3)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 
U.S.C. 551 et seq.) authorizes agencies to dispense with notice and 
comment procedures for rules when the agency, for ``good cause,'' finds 
that those procedures are ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to 
the public interest.'' Under this section, an agency, upon finding good 
cause, may issue a final rule without providing notice and seeking 
comment prior to issuance. Further, section 553(d) of the APA 
authorizes agencies to make rules effective in less than thirty days, 
upon a finding of good cause.
    An unsafe condition exists that required the immediate adoption of 
Emergency AD 2022-25-51 issued on November 22, 2022, to all known U.S. 
owners and operators of these airplanes. Due to an autopilot/
autothrottle system design, the flightcrew has inadvertently engaged 
the autopilot while attempting to engage the autothrottle during a 
critical phase of flight. The most recent incident, in September 2022, 
resulted in a low-energy takeoff when the flightcrew attempted to re-
engage the autothrottle but mistakenly engaged the autopilot. Such a 
result is hazardous as it could lead to the aircraft stalling and/or 
impacting terrain. The FAA found that the risk to the flying public 
justified waiving notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule 
because inadvertent autopilot engagement below 400 ft AGL could result 
in premature rotation due to inadvertent autopilot engagement, possibly 
leading to tail-strike, inability to climb, and loss of control of the 
airplane. These conditions still exist, therefore, notice and 
opportunity for prior public comment are impracticable and contrary to 
the public interest pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B).
    In addition, the FAA finds that good cause exists pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. 553(d) for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days, 
for the same reasons the FAA found good cause to forgo notice and 
comment.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) do not 
apply when an agency finds good cause pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553 to adopt 
a rule without prior notice and comment. Because the FAA has determined 
that it has good cause to adopt this rule without notice and comment, 
RFA analysis is not required.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD affects 76 airplanes of U.S. 
registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                       Estimated Costs of Required Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                     Cost per      Cost on U.S.
               Action                         Labor cost            Parts cost        product        operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFM revision.......................  1 work-hour x $85 per hour               $0             $85          $6,460
                                      = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs'' 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. 
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight 
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for 
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary 
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that 
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to 
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866, and
    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

[[Page 75914]]

The Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive:

2022-25-51 Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate 
Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); 
Bombardier, Inc.): Amendment 39-22282; Docket No. FAA-2022-1583; 
Project Identifier MCAI-2022-01486-T.

(a) Effective Date

    The FAA issued Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2022-25-51 
on November 22, 2022, directly to affected owners and operators. As 
a result of such actual notice, the emergency AD was effective for 
those owners and operators on the date it was provided. This AD 
contains the same requirements as the emergency AD and, for those 
who did not receive actual notice, is effective on December 27, 
2022.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type 
Certificate previously held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership 
(CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 
airplanes, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 22, Autoflight.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by reports of the autopilot/autothrottle 
system design resulting in inadvertent engagement of the autopilot 
when the flightcrew was attempting to engage the autothrottle late 
into the take-off phase or when attempting to re-engage the 
autothrottle during takeoff after uncommanded disconnect. The FAA is 
issuing this AD to address inadvertent engagement of the autopilot 
below 400 feet above ground level (AGL) when the flightcrew attempts 
to engage autothrottle. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, 
could result in premature rotation due to inadvertent autopilot 
engagement, possibly leading to tail-strike, inability to climb, and 
loss of control of the airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Revision of Existing AFM

    Within 7 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the 
Limitations section of the existing airplane flight manual (AFM) to 
include the information specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of 
this AD. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of figure 1 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD into the existing AFM. Using an AFM 
revision that includes information identical to that in figure 1 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD is acceptable for compliance with the 
requirement of this paragraph.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR12DE22.001

(h) Additional AD Provisions

    The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, New 
York ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this 
AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In 
accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal 
inspector or local Flight Standards Office, as appropriate. If 
sending information directly to the manager of the certification 
office, send it to ATTN: Program Manager, Continuing Operational 
Safety, FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, 
Westbury, NY 11590; email: [email protected], telephone 516-
228-7300. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the responsible Flight Standards Office.
    (2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD 
to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be 
accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, New York ACO 
Branch, FAA; or Transport Canada; or Airbus Canada Limited 
Partnership's Transport Canada Design Approval Organization (DAO). 
If approved by the DAO, the approval must include the DAO-authorized 
signature.

(i) Additional Information

    (1) Refer to Transport Canada Emergency AD CF-2022-64, dated 
November 17, 2022, for related information. This Transport Canada 
Emergency AD may be found in the AD docket at regulations.gov under 
Docket No. FAA-2022-1583.
    (2) For more information about this AD, contact Steven 
Dzierzynski, Aerospace Engineer, Avionics and Electrical Systems 
Section, FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, 
Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 516-228-7367; email [email protected].

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference

    None.

    Issued on December 7, 2022.
Christina Underwood,
Acting Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft 
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2022-26971 Filed 12-8-22; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

The complete text was extracted from the official GovInfo HTML edition for this publication. Acquired 2026-10-09T01:38:37.272160+00:00. Text extraction preserves the recorded source wording; it does not determine current requirements.

Open the captured official edition

Source SHA-256

3bc86ab70449c47e86e38a58c87ba8218110d3680798d8af6f516bc42fa9ec00

Text SHA-256

e9c86bbbf35e26d161daaeadf248427e4792ae92f37921d14a331edec32f245a