Published 2023-02-28 · Federal Register document 2023-04030
Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Airplanes
Publication summary
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model Avro 146-RJ series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that certain inertial reference units (IRUs) have out-of-date magnetic variation (MagVar) tables. This AD requires assessing the values between the MagVar tables of the affected IRUs and the most recently published MagVar data tables, and corrective actions if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
Why this record is shown
Source: Federal Register annual FAA metadata. Acquired 2026-09-03T22:24:14.395624+00:00. The title, summary and date are source facts.
- Source revision
- federal_register_ad_metadata_2023-81e907e5105d0f2c
- Source row
- results[53]
- Raw source SHA-256
- 81e907e5105d0f2c522e15b6fa8c7277117367b7f70b363862619549836b75e8
Final-rule publication
Recorded publication clauses
- AD identifier printed in this edition
- 2023-02-16
- Effective date printed in this edition
- 2023-04-04
Read 12 complete recorded clauses
Effective Date
(a) Effective Date
This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective April 4, 2023.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 10142–10229, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 440915fc7fa304bbbf3067673a3e52f03741439427d1e30c79d8fbea773a838f
Affected ADs
(b) Affected ADs
None.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 10229–10258, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 871a4afc60ceeae06e8010585055188633d616078500c45937092bfe892239c0
Applicability wording · Applicability
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model Avro
146-RJ70A, 146-RJ85A, and 146-RJ100A airplanes, certificated in any
category, equipped with Honeywell inertial reference unit (IRU) part
number (P/N) HG2001BC02 or P/N HG2001BC04.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 10258–10528, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: d678124b6843a318222c75a8e6731ba00d58ccf207d77a5edb54fc024f91bb59
Subject
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 34, Navigation.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 10528–10610, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 0542bcd80d4296f1663f9c1a9ee6733c7599b54c556ebcd2abd87a0d6015adff
Unsafe Condition
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by a report that certain IRUs have out-of-
date magnetic variation (MagVar) tables. The FAA is issuing this AD
to address IRUs having outdated MagVar lookup tables, which could
lead to inaccurate inertial reference system calculations, possibly
resulting in increased risk of controlled flight into terrain, or
collision with another airplane and injury to occupants.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 10610–11030, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: ea3ad998fcb704436d81234fb5d1aa5c515bfd00ee0006af79c0c1f288e1bc08
Compliance
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11030–11132, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 00fbfa31932483f627d0ce0a11cbd2e35e15d9231842b91ac85623ce533912d3
Definitions
(g) Definitions
For the purpose of this AD, the following definitions apply:
(1) Affected IRU: A Honeywell IRU having P/N HG2001BC02 using a
MagVar lookup table from 1990, or P/N HG2001BC04 using a MagVar
lookup table from 1995.
(2) WMM: World Magnetic Model, which is the standard model for
navigation, altitude, and heading referencing systems using the
geomagnetic field. The WMM is produced at 5-year intervals. The
existing WMM as of November 16, 2022 was released December 10, 2019.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11132–11640, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 56b139d1bbfd94c7cb175777e00ca4d8eed6045627ef7961a07fe8b8aa71112d
Magnetic Variation Assessment
(h) Magnetic Variation Assessment
Within 3 months after the effective date of this AD, and
thereafter at intervals not to exceed 5 years, assess the accuracy
of an affected IRU's MagVar data table, in accordance with the
Recommendations of BAE Systems All Operator Message 21-011V-1, Issue
1, dated September 27, 2021.
(1) If the difference between an affected IRU's MagVar data
table and the existing WMM MagVar data tables is less than or equal
to 2 degrees for the routes that the airplane may operate, no
further action is required until the assessment is repeated, as
required by the introductory text to paragraph (h) of this AD.
(2) If the difference between an affected IRU's MagVar data
table and the existing WMM MagVar data tables is greater than 2
degrees for the routes that the airplane may operate: Do the actions
required by paragraph (h)(2)(i) or (ii) of this AD.
(i) Within three months after the effective date of this AD or
before further flight after the assessment in the introductory text
to paragraph (h) of this AD, whichever occurs later: Update the
airplane's affected IRU MagVar data tables in accordance with the
Recommendations of BAE Systems All Operator Message 21-011V-1, Issue
1, dated September 27, 2021.
(ii) Comply with the provisions specified in, and at the times
specified in, paragraphs (h)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) of this AD.
(A) Further flight is prohibited in areas where the difference
between the installed and the existing MagVar values exceeds the 2
degree tolerance unless both terrain awareness warning system (TAWS)
and traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) are installed and
operative.
(B) Before further flight, revise the operator's existing FAA-
approved minimum equipment list (MEL) to prohibit dispatch unless
both TAWS and TCAS are installed and operative.
(3) If an affected IRU's MagVar data table cannot be determined,
follow the procedures specified in the Recommendations of BAE
Systems All Operator Message 21-011V-1, Issue 1, dated September 27,
2021.
(4) This AD does not require operators to provide flightcrews
with certain operating procedures as those actions are already
required by existing FAA operating regulations (see 14 CFR part 91).
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11640–13914, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 4fdee48ed242e4dfb1170d44c11c39091e4cc85e3c92324cdae8f91e7242d654
Terminating Action for MEL Prohibition
(i) Terminating Action for MEL Prohibition
Updating both affected IRUs, as specified in paragraph (h)(2)(i)
of this AD, terminates the MEL prohibition specified in paragraph
(h)(2)(ii)(B) of this AD, provided both TAWS and TCAS are installed
and operative.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13914–14180, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 69aaf3887190e03848181952de6bae180ad3b639c69a400c6bdd5109fd26664b
Other FAA AD Provisions
(j) Other FAA AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve
AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR
39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your
principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly to the International
Validation Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified
in paragraph (k)(2) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: [email protected]. Before using any approved AMOC, notify
your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal
inspector, the manager of the responsible Flight Standards Office.
(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: As of the effective date of
this AD, for any requirement in this AD to obtain instructions from
a manufacturer, the instructions must be accomplished using a method
approved by the Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA; or
the UK CAA; or BAE Systems (Operations) Limited's UK CAA DOA. If
approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized
signature.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 14180–15400, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 50360f8afd287a6c911eecba0d09bdebe1af7c1880f4c3698e3532ea904d097d
Additional Information
(k) Additional Information
(1) Refer to U.K. CAA AD G-2022-0005, dated February 24, 2022,
for related information. This U.K. CAA AD may be found in the AD
docket at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2022-1152.
(2) For more information about this AD, contact Todd Thompson,
Aerospace Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation
Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone
206-231-3228; email [email protected].
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15400–15866, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: c5b85cfa7b46c6ec8cac5e37ca291c0f856a9a5372f9f3f7d45808baf433b1e7
Material Incorporated by Reference
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
(i) BAE Systems All Operator Message 21-011V-1, Issue 1, dated
September 27, 2021.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For service information identified in this AD, contact BAE
Systems (Operations) Limited, Customer Information Department,
Prestwick International Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 2RW, Scotland, United
Kingdom; telephone +44 1292 675207; fax +44 1292 675704; email
[email protected]; website regional-service.com.
(4) You may view this service information at the FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability
of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, email [email protected], or go to: www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15866–17186, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: ae454fd6af0e8fb70d60a0d77fc7f26e23b1932e328f13dc1a60aab80771ac82
No replacement link has been established from this edition. The complete historical rule chain and current legal effect remain unknown.
Find all recorded historical references to AD 2023-02-16 · 0 printed reference observations in this pinned collection.
These are observations from one dated publication. Current legal status is unknown; aircraft applicability, installed configuration, compliance and burden require separate evidence. Missing or unparsed conditions remain unknown.
Why these observations are shown
They were extracted offline from the same immutable official HTML source as the complete recorded text. The dated source wording, original text coordinates and exact quote digests are retained. PDF/text agreement and current regulatory effect have not been qualified.
Observation revision: whole-ad-publication-clause-observations-1.0.1. Text SHA-256: d60c2ba7147b3a223b515aa02ca5eda31d5501007651a5118d93faaa862e99bd. Source manifest: 23a3d680b165acaa02df3df6e704302bb87944a82b132bb524303fcba74284a1.
Official source · 2023-02-28
Publication text
This is the complete recorded text of this dated publication.
Current legal effect is unknown. Aircraft applicability, installed configuration and compliance require separate evidence. PDF/text agreement has not been evaluated.
Read the complete official publication text
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 39 (Tuesday, February 28, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 12548-12550]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-04030]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2022-1152; Project Identifier MCAI-2022-00260-T;
Amendment 39-22323; AD 2023-02-16]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited
Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model Avro 146-RJ series
airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that certain inertial
reference units (IRUs) have out-of-date magnetic variation (MagVar)
tables. This AD requires assessing the values between the MagVar tables
of the affected IRUs and the most recently published MagVar data
tables, and corrective actions if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD
to address the unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: This AD is effective April 4, 2023.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of April 4,
2023.
ADDRESSES:
AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under
Docket No. FAA-2022-1152; or in person at Docket Operations between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD
docket contains this final rule, the mandatory continuing airworthiness
information (MCAI), any comments received, and other information. The
address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
Material Incorporated by Reference:
<bullet> For service information identified in this final rule,
contact BAE Systems (Operations) Limited, Customer Information
Department, Prestwick International Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 2RW,
Scotland, United Kingdom; telephone +44 1292 675207; fax +44 1292
675704; email [email protected]; website regional-service.com.
<bullet> You may view this service information at the FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South
216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available at
regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2022-1152.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer,
Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA, 2200
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone: 206-231-3228; email
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain BAE Systems
(Operations) Limited Model Avro 146-RJ airplanes. The NPRM published in
the Federal Register on November 16, 2022 (87 FR 68644). The NPRM was
prompted by AD G-2022-0005, dated February 24, 2022, issued by United
Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (U.K. CAA), which is the aviation
authority for the United Kingdom (U.K. CAA AD G-2022-0005) (referred to
after this as the MCAI). The MCAI states that the navigation system for
Model Avro 146-RJ series airplanes has an inertial reference system
(IRS) that uses true
[[Page 12549]]
north to calculate magnetic heading and track. The IRS includes IRUs
with MagVar data tables that correct the heading/track for the effects
of magnetic variation. Due to the change in the location of magnetic
north over time, the level of IRS accuracy diminishes in certain
geographical locations if an IRU's MagVar data table is not kept up to
date with current WMM MagVar data tables. Consequently, certain
airplanes may have IRUs with MagVar tables that are out of date and
which can lead to inaccurate heading, course and bearing calculations.
This condition, if not corrected, may result in an increased risk of
controlled flight into terrain, or collision with another airplane,
possibly resulting in damage to the airplane and injury to occupants.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require assessing the values
between the MagVar tables of the affected IRUs and the most recently
published MagVar data tables, and corrective actions if necessary. The
FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these
products.
You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under
Docket No. FAA-2022-1152.
Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive
Comments
The FAA received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of
the cost to the public.
Conclusion
This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to
the FAA's bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, it
has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI
referenced above. The FAA reviewed the relevant data and determined
that air safety requires adopting this AD as proposed. Accordingly, the
FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on this product.
Except for minor editorial changes, this AD is adopted as proposed in
the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic burden on any
operator.
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
BAE Systems has issued All Operator Message 21-011V-1, Issue 1,
dated September 27, 2021. This service information describes, among
other actions, procedures for assessing the accuracy of an affected
IRU's MagVar data table when compared to the current World Magnetic
Model (WMM) MagVar data tables, and corrective actions if the MagVar is
greater than 2 degrees. The corrective actions include either updating
an affected IRU's MagVar data tables, or operating an airplane only if
the terrain awareness warning system (TAWS) and traffic collision
avoidance system (TCAS) are installed and operative, and revising the
operator's FAA-approved minimum equipment list (MEL) to prohibit
dispatch unless both TAWS and TCAS are installed and operative. BAE
Systems All Operator Message 21-011V-1, Issue 1, dated September 27,
2021, also specifies that updating the data tables would terminate the
MEL prohibition provided the airplane has operative TAWS and TCAS.
This service information is reasonably available because the
interested parties have access to it through their normal course of
business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.
Costs of Compliance
The FAA estimates that this AD affects 10 airplanes of U.S.
registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs for Required Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 work-hour x $85 per hour = $85............................. $0 $85 $850
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA has received no definitive data on which to base the cost
estimates for the on-condition actions specified in this AD.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
The Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:
2023-02-16 BAE Systems (Operations) Limited: Amendment 39-22323;
Docket No. FAA-2022-1152; Project Identifier MCAI-2022-00260-T.
[[Page 12550]]
(a) Effective Date
This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective April 4, 2023.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model Avro
146-RJ70A, 146-RJ85A, and 146-RJ100A airplanes, certificated in any
category, equipped with Honeywell inertial reference unit (IRU) part
number (P/N) HG2001BC02 or P/N HG2001BC04.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 34, Navigation.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by a report that certain IRUs have out-of-
date magnetic variation (MagVar) tables. The FAA is issuing this AD
to address IRUs having outdated MagVar lookup tables, which could
lead to inaccurate inertial reference system calculations, possibly
resulting in increased risk of controlled flight into terrain, or
collision with another airplane and injury to occupants.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Definitions
For the purpose of this AD, the following definitions apply:
(1) Affected IRU: A Honeywell IRU having P/N HG2001BC02 using a
MagVar lookup table from 1990, or P/N HG2001BC04 using a MagVar
lookup table from 1995.
(2) WMM: World Magnetic Model, which is the standard model for
navigation, altitude, and heading referencing systems using the
geomagnetic field. The WMM is produced at 5-year intervals. The
existing WMM as of November 16, 2022 was released December 10, 2019.
(h) Magnetic Variation Assessment
Within 3 months after the effective date of this AD, and
thereafter at intervals not to exceed 5 years, assess the accuracy
of an affected IRU's MagVar data table, in accordance with the
Recommendations of BAE Systems All Operator Message 21-011V-1, Issue
1, dated September 27, 2021.
(1) If the difference between an affected IRU's MagVar data
table and the existing WMM MagVar data tables is less than or equal
to 2 degrees for the routes that the airplane may operate, no
further action is required until the assessment is repeated, as
required by the introductory text to paragraph (h) of this AD.
(2) If the difference between an affected IRU's MagVar data
table and the existing WMM MagVar data tables is greater than 2
degrees for the routes that the airplane may operate: Do the actions
required by paragraph (h)(2)(i) or (ii) of this AD.
(i) Within three months after the effective date of this AD or
before further flight after the assessment in the introductory text
to paragraph (h) of this AD, whichever occurs later: Update the
airplane's affected IRU MagVar data tables in accordance with the
Recommendations of BAE Systems All Operator Message 21-011V-1, Issue
1, dated September 27, 2021.
(ii) Comply with the provisions specified in, and at the times
specified in, paragraphs (h)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) of this AD.
(A) Further flight is prohibited in areas where the difference
between the installed and the existing MagVar values exceeds the 2
degree tolerance unless both terrain awareness warning system (TAWS)
and traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) are installed and
operative.
(B) Before further flight, revise the operator's existing FAA-
approved minimum equipment list (MEL) to prohibit dispatch unless
both TAWS and TCAS are installed and operative.
(3) If an affected IRU's MagVar data table cannot be determined,
follow the procedures specified in the Recommendations of BAE
Systems All Operator Message 21-011V-1, Issue 1, dated September 27,
2021.
(4) This AD does not require operators to provide flightcrews
with certain operating procedures as those actions are already
required by existing FAA operating regulations (see 14 CFR part 91).
(i) Terminating Action for MEL Prohibition
Updating both affected IRUs, as specified in paragraph (h)(2)(i)
of this AD, terminates the MEL prohibition specified in paragraph
(h)(2)(ii)(B) of this AD, provided both TAWS and TCAS are installed
and operative.
(j) Other FAA AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve
AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR
39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your
principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly to the International
Validation Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified
in paragraph (k)(2) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: [email protected]. Before using any approved AMOC, notify
your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal
inspector, the manager of the responsible Flight Standards Office.
(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: As of the effective date of
this AD, for any requirement in this AD to obtain instructions from
a manufacturer, the instructions must be accomplished using a method
approved by the Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA; or
the UK CAA; or BAE Systems (Operations) Limited's UK CAA DOA. If
approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized
signature.
(k) Additional Information
(1) Refer to U.K. CAA AD G-2022-0005, dated February 24, 2022,
for related information. This U.K. CAA AD may be found in the AD
docket at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2022-1152.
(2) For more information about this AD, contact Todd Thompson,
Aerospace Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation
Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone
206-231-3228; email [email protected].
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
(i) BAE Systems All Operator Message 21-011V-1, Issue 1, dated
September 27, 2021.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For service information identified in this AD, contact BAE
Systems (Operations) Limited, Customer Information Department,
Prestwick International Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 2RW, Scotland, United
Kingdom; telephone +44 1292 675207; fax +44 1292 675704; email
[email protected]; website regional-service.com.
(4) You may view this service information at the FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability
of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, email [email protected], or go to: www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Issued on January 27, 2023.
Christina Underwood,
Acting Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2023-04030 Filed 2-27-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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