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Published 2024-10-11 · Federal Register document 2024-23547

Airworthiness Directives; Columbia Helicopters, Inc., and Restricted Category Model CH-47D Helicopters

Publication summary

The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Columbia Helicopters, Inc., Model 234 helicopters and restricted category Model CH-47D helicopters. This AD was prompted by two reports of a flight control rigid connecting link (link) failure, due to a manufacturing defect. This AD requires removing certain links from service and prohibits installing those links. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

Why this record is shown

Source: Federal Register annual FAA metadata. Acquired 2026-09-03T22:24:17.530091+00:00. The title, summary and date are source facts.

Source revision
federal_register_ad_metadata_2024-766a4e72ab891edd
Source row
results[230]
Raw source SHA-256
766a4e72ab891edde7194caaae181bc9ea3fd0d54e65313e290f97067e3b7c5a

Final-rule publication

Recorded publication clauses

AD identifier printed in this edition
2024-20-05
Effective date printed in this edition
2024-10-28
Read 12 complete recorded clauses
Effective Date
(a) Effective Date

    This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective October 28, 2024.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11415–11505, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 5b5eb5d00bec67da8fd175b3ac45ca7f90d357821edef6779442b492610bcf8d

Affected ADs
(b) Affected ADs

    None.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11505–11534, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 871a4afc60ceeae06e8010585055188633d616078500c45937092bfe892239c0

Applicability wording · Applicability
(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to the helicopters identified in paragraphs 
(c)(1) and (2) of this AD with a flight control rigid connecting 
link (link) part number (P/N) 145C3340-10 having manufacturing CAGE 
code 59213, a link P/N 145C3340-10 having an unknown manufacturing 
CAGE code, a link with an unknown P/N having manufacturing CAGE code 
59213, or a link with an unknown P/N and unknown manufacturing CAGE 
code, installed.
    (1) Columbia Helicopters, Inc., Model 234 helicopters, 
certificated in any category; and
    (2) Restricted category Model CH-47D helicopters; current type 
certificate holders include, but are not limited to, Billings Flying 
Service, Inc., Columbia Helicopters, Inc, Tandem Rotor, LLC, and 
Unical Air Inc.
    Note 1 to paragraph (c): A flight control rigid connecting link 
is also referred to as a rigid connecting link in related material.
    Note 2 to paragraph (c): The P/N and manufacturing CAGE code 
information may be located on the tube of the link assembly. 
Information about the location of the P/N and manufacturing CAGE 
code is available in Boeing Service Bulletin CH-47, No. 145-67-1047, 
dated May 22, 2024.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 11534–12713, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 71a7fb2687c7f37bcdb7c7b699664868b6640f71a7fcd3e67780b9619fdb0414

Subject
(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code: 2700, Flight 
control systems.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12713–12807, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 7a052c51069e11eccc341e15035810e6e4d788c937407b4dd602da1cc362d8c7

Unsafe Condition
(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by two reports of a link failure, due to a 
manufacturing defect. The FAA is issuing this AD to address non-
conforming links. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could 
result in a link failure within the flight control system due to 
fatigue and subsequent immediate loss of control of the helicopter.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12807–13163, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 7e8432ba07d2a81b1a940d94083a4dd028c2f60510fd63b743e473f1db5c7fff

Compliance
(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13163–13265, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 00fbfa31932483f627d0ce0a11cbd2e35e15d9231842b91ac85623ce533912d3

Required Actions
(g) Required Actions

    Within 5 days after the effective date of this AD, remove the 
link from service and replace it with an airworthy link.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13265–13412, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 6edf77f2262f78091337d645c9534d316057f055af3006fc05fbe3f763038151

Parts Installation Prohibition
(h) Parts Installation Prohibition

    As of the effective date of this AD, do not install a link 
identified in the introductory text of paragraph (c) of this AD on 
any helicopter.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13412–13597, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 7d9a635e08671b7a3bd42c8d51dc32c9c1a2cdb650267151aee6ef03dba79dcf

Special Flight Permit
(i) Special Flight Permit

    Special flight permits are prohibited.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13597–13668, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 4102205157b9d9eeca134a15fa46a0bb83517b9838cd5bb034b8249143569fc1

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, West Certification Branch, FAA, has the 
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight 
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information 
directly to the manager of the West Certification Branch, send it to 
the attention of the person identified in paragraph (k)(1) of this 
AD. Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13668–14449, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 9e48675b465816a5dd24ff8a22ba5da42bae82cd099a855231cbdf1716ecf14b

Additional Information
(k) Additional Information

    (1) For more information about this AD, contact David Herron, 
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, 
CA 90712; phone: (206) 231-3544; email: [email protected].
    (2) For Boeing material identified in this AD that is not 
incorporated by reference, contact Billings Flying Service, Inc., 
309 Jellison Road, Billings, MT 59101; phone: (406) 252-6937; email: 
jed@flybfscom.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 14449–14887, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: b5016ec2bba8e0f8adefde2aa7afd82f1ac3ba17950a7267b965cb9f832fdbec

Material Incorporated by Reference
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

    None.

Exact source excerpt. Text positions 14887–14938, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 33b5654a42b7710d6e34eeb5d6f69110405cc721191b2e466fa582ff6e507325

No replacement link has been established from this edition. The complete historical rule chain and current legal effect remain unknown.

Find all recorded historical references to AD 2024-20-05 · 0 printed reference observations in this pinned collection.

These are observations from one dated publication. Current legal status is unknown; aircraft applicability, installed configuration, compliance and burden require separate evidence. Missing or unparsed conditions remain unknown.

Why these observations are shown

They were extracted offline from the same immutable official HTML source as the complete recorded text. The dated source wording, original text coordinates and exact quote digests are retained. PDF/text agreement and current regulatory effect have not been qualified.

Observation revision: whole-ad-publication-clause-observations-1.0.1. Text SHA-256: f6391b8970e5cb15a4c5cad0aef4bd1adae13bd894232bc99c9628daf913c82f. Source manifest: 860eef42babc40f966eadd2e0e3f039e1c6f4a46dc0beb63690c24221c32c475.

Official source · 2024-10-11

Publication text

This is the complete recorded text of this dated publication.

Current legal effect is unknown. Aircraft applicability, installed configuration and compliance require separate evidence. PDF/text agreement has not been evaluated.

Read the complete official publication text
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 198 (Friday, October 11, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 82496-82498]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-23547]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2024-2329; Project Identifier AD-2024-00451-R; 
Amendment 39-22864; AD 2024-20-05]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Columbia Helicopters, Inc., and 
Restricted Category Model CH-47D Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
Columbia Helicopters, Inc., Model 234 helicopters and restricted 
category Model CH-47D helicopters. This AD was prompted by two reports 
of a flight control rigid connecting link (link) failure, due to a 
manufacturing defect.

[[Page 82497]]

This AD requires removing certain links from service and prohibits 
installing those links. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the 
unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective October 28, 2024.
    The FAA must receive comments on this AD by November 25, 2024.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
    <bullet> Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to regulations.gov. Follow 
the instructions for submitting comments.
    <bullet> Fax: 202-493-2251.
    <bullet> Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
    <bullet> Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under 
Docket No. FAA-2024-2329; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 
docket contains this final rule, any comments received, and other 
information. The street address for Docket Operations is listed above.
    Related Material: For Boeing material identified in this AD, 
contact Billings Flying Service, Inc., 309 Jellison Road, Billings, MT 
59101; phone: (406) 252-6937; email: jed@flybfscom.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Herron, Aviation Safety 
Engineer, FAA, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, CA 90712; phone: 
(206) 231-3544; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to send any written data, views, or arguments 
about this final rule. Send your comments to an address listed under 
the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2024-2329; Project 
Identifier AD-2024-00451-R'' at the beginning of your comments. The 
most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the final rule, 
explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting 
data. The FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date 
and may amend this final rule because of those comments.
    Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in 
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to 
regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The 
agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal 
contact received about this final rule.

Confidential Business Information

    CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily 
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public 
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this AD contain commercial 
or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that 
you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to 
this AD, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted 
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing 
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as 
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public 
docket of this AD. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to David 
Herron, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 
Lakewood, CA 90712; phone: (206) 231-3544; email: [email protected]. 
Any commentary that the FAA receives which is not specifically 
designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for this 
rulemaking.

Background

    The FAA received two reports of a link part number (P/N) 145C3340-
10 failure involving a Model CH-47D helicopter. In both reports, it was 
determined that the failed link was manufactured by Aero Components 
Inc., which was not an approved supplier for these links. Boeing 
advised that failure of one link was caused by an eccentricity of the 
threaded bore in the end of the tube associated with the rod-end 
installation, which was determined to be a manufacturing defect; this 
resulted in a thin wall condition on one-side. Failure of the other 
link showed the same contributor, but on the opposite end of the tube.
    Boeing advised some links having P/N 145C3340 have been found to 
have missing or illegible markings; however, both failed links involve 
clear Aero Components Inc. CAGE code markings. Columbia Helicopters, 
Inc., Model 234 helicopters are also affected by the unsafe condition 
since the affected links may also be installed on that model 
helicopter.
    This condition, if not addressed, could result in link failure 
within the flight control system due to fatigue. The FAA is issuing 
this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products and 
subsequent immediate loss of control of the helicopter.

FAA's Determination

    The FAA is issuing this AD because the agency determined the unsafe 
condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other 
products of the same type design.

Related Material

    The FAA reviewed Boeing CH-47 Service Bulletin No. 145-67-1047, 
dated May 22, 2024. This material specifies procedures for inspecting 
link P/N 145C3340-10 to determine its manufacturing code and, depending 
on the results, contacting Boeing for additional assistance or 
replacing the link.

AD Requirements

    This AD requires removing links P/N 145C3340-10 with manufacturing 
CAGE code 59213 from service and prohibits installing those links on 
any helicopter.

Justification for Immediate Adoption and Determination of the Effective 
Date

    Section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 
551 et seq.) authorizes agencies to dispense with notice and comment 
procedures for rules when the agency, for ``good cause,'' finds that 
those procedures are ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest.'' Under this section, an agency, upon finding good 
cause, may issue a final rule without providing notice and seeking 
comment prior to issuance. Further, section 553(d) of the APA 
authorizes agencies to make rules effective in less than thirty days, 
upon a finding of good cause.
    An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of 
this AD without providing an opportunity for public comments prior to 
adoption. The FAA has found that the risk to the flying public 
justifies forgoing notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule 
because the affected component is part of an assembly that is critical 
to the flight control of a helicopter, such that if failure occurs in 
the affected component subsequent immediate loss of control of a 
helicopter will occur. As the FAA has no information pertaining to the 
extent of fatigue of the affected component that may currently exist in 
helicopters or how quickly the condition may propagate to failure, the 
actions required by this AD must be accomplished within 5 days. The 
compliance time in this AD is shorter than the time necessary for the 
public to comment and for publication of the final

[[Page 82498]]

rule. Accordingly, notice and opportunity for prior public comment are 
impracticable and contrary to the public interest pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 
553(b).
    In addition, the FAA finds that good cause exists pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. 553(d) for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days, 
for the same reasons the FAA found good cause to forgo notice and 
comment.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) do not 
apply when an agency finds good cause pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553 to adopt 
a rule without prior notice and comment. Because FAA has determined 
that it has good cause to adopt this rule without prior notice and 
comment, RFA analysis is not required.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD affects 36 helicopters of U.S. 
registry. Labor costs are estimated at $85 per work-hour. Based on 
these numbers, the FAA estimates the following costs to comply with 
this AD.
    Replacing a link will take 8 work-hours and parts will cost $1,963 
for an estimated cost of $2,643 per helicopter.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. 
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight 
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for 
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary 
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that 
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to 
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866, and
    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive:

2024-20-05 Columbia Helicopters, Inc., and Restricted Category Model 
CH-47D Helicopters: Amendment 39-22864; Docket No. FAA-2024-2329; 
Project Identifier AD-2024-00451-R.

(a) Effective Date

    This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective October 28, 2024.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to the helicopters identified in paragraphs 
(c)(1) and (2) of this AD with a flight control rigid connecting 
link (link) part number (P/N) 145C3340-10 having manufacturing CAGE 
code 59213, a link P/N 145C3340-10 having an unknown manufacturing 
CAGE code, a link with an unknown P/N having manufacturing CAGE code 
59213, or a link with an unknown P/N and unknown manufacturing CAGE 
code, installed.
    (1) Columbia Helicopters, Inc., Model 234 helicopters, 
certificated in any category; and
    (2) Restricted category Model CH-47D helicopters; current type 
certificate holders include, but are not limited to, Billings Flying 
Service, Inc., Columbia Helicopters, Inc, Tandem Rotor, LLC, and 
Unical Air Inc.
    Note 1 to paragraph (c): A flight control rigid connecting link 
is also referred to as a rigid connecting link in related material.
    Note 2 to paragraph (c): The P/N and manufacturing CAGE code 
information may be located on the tube of the link assembly. 
Information about the location of the P/N and manufacturing CAGE 
code is available in Boeing Service Bulletin CH-47, No. 145-67-1047, 
dated May 22, 2024.

(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code: 2700, Flight 
control systems.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by two reports of a link failure, due to a 
manufacturing defect. The FAA is issuing this AD to address non-
conforming links. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could 
result in a link failure within the flight control system due to 
fatigue and subsequent immediate loss of control of the helicopter.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Required Actions

    Within 5 days after the effective date of this AD, remove the 
link from service and replace it with an airworthy link.

(h) Parts Installation Prohibition

    As of the effective date of this AD, do not install a link 
identified in the introductory text of paragraph (c) of this AD on 
any helicopter.

(i) Special Flight Permit

    Special flight permits are prohibited.

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, West Certification Branch, FAA, has the 
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight 
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information 
directly to the manager of the West Certification Branch, send it to 
the attention of the person identified in paragraph (k)(1) of this 
AD. Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.

(k) Additional Information

    (1) For more information about this AD, contact David Herron, 
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, 
CA 90712; phone: (206) 231-3544; email: [email protected].
    (2) For Boeing material identified in this AD that is not 
incorporated by reference, contact Billings Flying Service, Inc., 
309 Jellison Road, Billings, MT 59101; phone: (406) 252-6937; email: 
jed@flybfscom.

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

    None.

    Issued on October 3, 2024.
Steven W. Thompson,
Acting Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft 
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2024-23547 Filed 10-8-24; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


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These are dated publication metadata, recorded clauses and literal source observations. Word, model-label, header and reference matches do not establish current legal effect, manufacturer/model identity, aircraft applicability, installed configuration or compliance.

The collection uses 33 explicit annual source snapshots. Source captures and operative-text qualifications have separate states. Missing information remains unknown.