Airworthiness Directives; CFM International, S.A. Engines

[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 14 (Thursday, January 22, 2026)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 2684-2687]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-01152]



[[Page 2684]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2025-1115; Project Identifier AD-2024-00797-E; 
Amendment 39-23240; AD 2026-02-04]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; CFM International, S.A. Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
certain CFM International, S.A. (CFM) Model LEAP-1A23, LEAP-1A24, LEAP-
1A24E1, LEAP-1A26, LEAP-1A26CJ, LEAP-1A26E1, LEAP-1A29, LEAP-1A29CJ, 
LEAP-1A30, LEAP-1A32, LEAP-1A33, LEAP-1A33B2, and LEAP-1A35A engines. 
This AD was prompted by a report of multiple aborted takeoffs and air 
turn-backs (ATBs) caused by high-pressure compressor (HPC) stall, which 
was induced by high levels of non-synchronous vibration (NSV). 
Additional manufacturer investigation revealed that wear on the No. 3 
bearing spring finger housing can lead to high levels of NSV. This AD 
requires initial and repetitive calculations of the levels of NSV, 
inspection of the stage 2 high-pressure turbine (HPT) nozzle assembly 
honeycomb and HPT stator stationary seal honeycomb and, depending on 
the results of the calculations and inspections, replacement of certain 
parts. This AD also requires replacement of certain No. 3 bearing 
spring finger housings at the next shop visit. The FAA is issuing this 
AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective February 26, 2026.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of February 26, 
2026.

ADDRESSES: 
    AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under 
Docket No. FAA-2025-1115; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 
docket contains this final rule, any comments received, and other 
information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, 
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
    Material Incorporated by Reference:
    <bullet> For CFM material identified in this AD, contact CFM, GE 
Aviation Fleet Support, 1 Neumann Way, M/D Room 285, Cincinnati, OH 
45215; phone: (877) 432-3272; email: [email protected].
    <bullet> You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness 
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 1200 District Avenue, 
Burlington, MA 01803. For information on the availability of this 
material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110. It is also available at 
regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2025-1115.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mehdi Lamnyi, Aviation Safety 
Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 
(781) 238-7743; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain CFM Model LEAP-
1A23, LEAP-1A24, LEAP-1A24E1, LEAP-1A26, LEAP-1A26CJ, LEAP-1A26E1, 
LEAP-1A29, LEAP-1A29CJ, LEAP-1A30, LEAP-1A32, LEAP-1A33, LEAP-1A33B2, 
and LEAP-1A35A engines. The NPRM was published in the Federal Register 
on June 25, 2025 (90 FR 26947). The NPRM was prompted by a notification 
from the engine manufacturer of three aborted takeoffs and two ATBs 
caused by HPC stall on CFM Model LEAP-1A engines. Additional 
manufacturer investigation revealed that wear on the No. 3 bearing 
spring finger housing can lead to high levels of NSV, which could 
induce HPC stall. As a result of its investigation, the manufacturer 
published service material that specifies procedures for addressing 
this situation. The FAA previously published AD 2024-07-06, Amendment 
39-22727 (89 FR 33211, April 29, 2024), to address this condition for 
parts from one specific supplier whose parts have shown increased 
susceptibility to premature wear. Since the publication of that AD, the 
manufacturer has identified another supplier whose parts are also 
susceptible to the same type of premature wear.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require initial and repetitive 
calculations of the levels of NSV, inspection of the stage 2 HPT nozzle 
assembly honeycomb and HPT stator stationary seal honeycomb and, 
depending on the results of the calculations and inspections, 
replacement of certain parts. This AD also requires replacement of 
certain No. 3 bearing spring finger housings at the next shop visit. 
The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these 
products.

Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive

Comments

    The FAA received comments from four commenters. The commenters were 
the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), American 
Airlines (AAL), CFM, and the Foundation for Aviation Safety. ALPA 
supported the NPRM without change. The following presents the comments 
received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Allow Automated Alerts for NSV Calculations

    AAL requested that the FAA allow for the use of automated CFM-
provided alerts for NSV calculations as an alternative to the 
instructions in paragraph (g)(1) of the proposed AD. AAL noted that 
automated Customer Notification Reports for exceedance of NSV 
thresholds are already in use to provide continuous evaluation of NSV 
data and reduce the risk of errors created in manual inspection or 
calculation of NSV data.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request to add automated CFM 
provided alerts as an additional method of compliance in the final rule 
because automated CNRs are dependent on continuous data transmission 
from the aircraft to CFM. If data transmission is interrupted, CNRs 
cannot be generated, potentially leaving unsafe conditions undetected. 
CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00, dated September 24, 
2025, specifies that operators verify every 50 cycles that at least 100 
cycles of post-flight data exist within each 125-cycle period to ensure 
the monitoring system is functioning, as specified in paragraph 
5.A.(1). This AD requires this action. However, if any operator prefers 
to address the unsafe condition by means other than those specified in 
the referenced service information, they may request approval for an 
AMOC in accordance with paragraph (k) of this AD and, if approved, may 
use it instead of the procedures specified in the service information 
and the final rule. The FAA did not change this AD as a result of this 
comment.

[[Page 2685]]

Request To Refer to New Service Material

    CFM requested that the FAA revise the ``Material Incorporated by 
Reference under 1 CFR part 51'' paragraph and paragraphs (c), (g), (h), 
(i), and (l) of the proposed AD to refer to CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-
01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00, dated September 24, 2025, rather than CFM SB 
LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 001-00, dated April 30, 2025. CFM 
also requested that the FAA revise the ``Material Incorporated by 
Reference under 1 CFR part 51'' paragraph of the proposed AD to the 
following: ``The FAA also reviewed CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-
D, Issue 002-00, dated September 24, 2025. This service material 
identifies the affected No. 3 bearing spring finger housings and 
specifies procedures for monitoring NSV during engine operation, 
replacing the affected No. 3 bearing spring finger housing, inspecting 
the stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb, and inspecting the HPT 
stator stationary seal honeycomb.'' CFM noted that CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-
00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00, dated September 24, 2025, specifies 
to inspect the stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly and HPT stator stationary 
seal, but does not state to replace them, and includes the updated 
method for accessing CFM diagnostics.
    The FAA agrees with the content in the requested language and has 
revised this final rule in all areas to refer to CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-
0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00, dated September 24, 2025, rather than 
CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 001-00, dated April 30, 
2025. These changes will not increase the economic burden on any 
operator.

Request To Specify Replacement Threshold

    CFM requested that the FAA update the language in the ``Summary'' 
paragraph of the proposed AD to the following: ``This AD also requires 
replacement of certain No. 3 bearing spring finger housings at next 
shop visit.'' CFM also requested that the FAA update the language in 
the ``Proposed AD Requirements in this NPRM'' paragraph of the proposed 
AD to the following: ``This proposed AD would also require replacement 
of the No. 3 bearing spring finger housing at next shop visit, 
regardless of calculated level of NSV.''
    The FAA agrees with the content in the requested language and has 
revised the ``Summary'' paragraph of this AD as requested. However, the 
``Proposed AD Requirements in this NPRM'' paragraph is not included in 
the final rule, therefore the FAA did not change that paragraph as a 
result of this comment.

Request for Root Cause of Unsafe Condition

    The Foundation for Aviation Safety requested that the FAA provide 
the root cause of the unsafe condition, clarify the reason that it was 
not addressed during engine certification, and explain what 
certification steps have been put in place to prevent this for new 
engines being built.
    The FAA refers the commentor to the ``Background'' paragraph of 
this AD for additional information. The FAA notes that the premature 
wear was not anticipated during initial certification and is limited to 
specific suppliers, and improvements to the production controls have 
been implemented to prevent future occurrences. The FAA did not change 
this AD as a result of this comment.

Conclusion

    The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered any comments 
received, and determined that air safety requires adopting this AD as 
proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe 
condition on these products. Except for minor editorial changes, and 
any other changes described previously, this AD is adopted as proposed 
in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic burden on 
any operator.

Material Incorporated by Reference Under 1 CFR Part 51

    The FAA reviewed CFM Service Bulletin (SB) LEAP-1A-72-00-0536-01A-
930A-D, Issue 001-00, dated July 22, 2024. This service material 
specifies procedures for replacing the No. 3 bearing spring finger 
housings, inspecting the stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb, and 
inspecting the HPT stator stationary seal honeycomb.
    The FAA also reviewed CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 
002-00, dated September 24, 2025. This service material identifies the 
affected No. 3 bearing spring finger housings and specifies procedures 
for monitoring NSV during engine operation, inspecting the stage 2 HPT 
nozzle assembly honeycomb, and inspecting the HPT stator stationary 
seal honeycomb.
    This material is reasonably available because the interested 
parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by 
the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD affects three engines installed on 
airplanes of U.S. registry.
    The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                       Cost per    Cost on U.S.
                  Action                            Labor cost           Parts cost    product       operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calculate NSV data.......................  1 work-hour x $85 per hour            $0          $85            $255
                                            = $85.
Inspect stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly        4 work-hours x $85 per hour            0          340           1,020
 honeycomb and HPT stator stationary seal   = $340.
 honeycomb.
Replace No. 3 bearing spring finger        17 work-hours x $85 per           64,590       66,035         198,105
 housing.                                   hour = $1,445.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary 
replacements and inspections that would be required based on the 
results of the proposed calculation. The agency has no way of 
determining the number of engines that might need these replacements 
and inspections:

[[Page 2686]]



                                               On-Condition Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                     Cost per
                    Action                                 Labor cost               Parts cost        product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Replace stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb.  8 work-hours x $85 per hour =            $58,536         $59,216
                                                 $680.
Replace HPT stator stationary seal............  8 work-hours x $85 per hour =              6,855           7,535
                                                 $680.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. 
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight 
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for 
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary 
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that 
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to 
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive:

2026-02-04 CFM International, S.A.: Amendment 39-23240; Docket No. 
FAA-2025-1115; Project Identifier AD-2024-00797-E.

(a) Effective Date

    This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective February 26, 
2026.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to CFM International, S.A. (CFM) Model LEAP-
1A23, LEAP-1A24, LEAP-1A24E1, LEAP-1A26, LEAP-1A26CJ, LEAP-1A26E1, 
LEAP-1A29, LEAP-1A29CJ, LEAP-1A30, LEAP-1A32, LEAP-1A33, LEAP-
1A33B2, and LEAP-1A35A engines with an installed No. 3 bearing 
spring finger housing having part number (P/N) 2629M62G01 and a 
serial number identified in Table 1 of CFM Service Bulletin (SB) 
LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00, dated September 24, 
2025 (CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00).

(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 7230, Turbine Engine 
Compressor Section.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by a report of multiple aborted takeoffs 
and air turn-backs caused by high-pressure compressor (HPC) stall, 
which was induced by high levels of non-synchronous vibration (NSV), 
and an additional manufacturer investigation that revealed wear on 
the No. 3 bearing spring finger housing. The FAA is issuing this AD 
to prevent HPC stall. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could 
result in engine power loss at a critical phase of flight such as 
takeoff or climb, loss of engine thrust control, reduced 
controllability of the airplane, and loss of the airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Required Actions

    (1) Within 50 flight cycles (FCs) after the effective date of 
this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 FCs, calculate 
the NSV data in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, 
paragraphs 5.A.(1) and 5.A.(3), or 5.B.(1) and 5.B.(3) of CFM SB 
LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00.
    (2) If, during any calculation required by paragraph (g)(1) of 
this AD, the NSV data exceeds the limits specified in the 
Accomplishment Instructions paragraph 5.A.(4)(a)1, 5.A.(4)(a)2, or 
5.B.(4)(a)1 of CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00, 
discontinue the calculations required by paragraph (g)(1) of this AD 
and within 25 FCs or 5 FCs, as applicable to the threshold exceeded, 
of the flight when these limits are exceeded:
    (i) Remove from service the No. 3 bearing spring finger housing 
having P/N 2629M62G01 and a serial number identified in Table 1 of 
CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00, and replace with 
a part eligible for installation.
    (ii) Inspect the stage 2 high-pressure turbine (HPT) nozzle 
assembly honeycomb for rubs in accordance with the Accomplishment 
Instructions, paragraphs 5.A.(4)(a)4b or 5.B.(4)(a)3b of CFM SB 
LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00.
    (iii) Inspect the HPT stator stationary seal honeycomb for rubs 
in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 
5.A.(4)(a)4b or 5.B.(4)(a)3b of CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-
D, Issue 002-00.
    (3) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (g)(2)(ii) 
of this AD, the stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb fails to meet 
the serviceability criteria referenced in the Accomplishment 
Instructions, paragraphs 5.A.(4)(a)4b or 5.B.(4)(a)3b of CFM SB 
LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00, before further flight, 
replace the stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb.
    (4) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (g)(2)(iii) 
of this AD, the HPT stator stationary seal honeycomb fails to meet 
the serviceability criteria referenced in the Accomplishment 
Instructions, paragraphs 5.A.(4)(a)4b or 5.B.(4)(a)3b of CFM SB 
LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00, before further flight, 
replace the HPT stator stationary seal.
    (5) At the next shop visit after the effective date of this AD, 
perform the following:
    (i) Replace the No. 3 bearing spring finger housing having P/N 
2629M62G01 and a serial number identified in Table 1 of CFM SB LEAP-
1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00, with a part eligible for 
installation in accordance with paragraph 5.A.(1) of CFM SB LEAP-1A-
72-00-0536-01A-930A-D, Issue 001-00, dated July 22, 2024 (CFM SB 
LEAP-1A-72-00-0536-01A-930A-D, Issue 001-00); and,

[[Page 2687]]

    (ii) Inspect the stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb and the 
HPT stator stationary seal honeycomb for rubs and disposition in 
accordance with paragraph 5.B.(4) and 5.B.(5) of CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-
00-0536-01A-930A-D, Issue 001-00.

(h) Terminating Action

    Replacement of the No. 3 bearing spring finger housing having P/
N 2629M62G01 and a serial number identified in Table 1 of CFM SB 
LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00 with a part eligible for 
installation, as specified in paragraph (g)(2)(i) and (g)(5) of this 
AD, constitutes terminating action for the calculations required by 
paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.

(i) Definitions

    (1) For the purpose of this AD, a ``part eligible for 
installation'' is a No. 3 bearing spring finger housing that does 
not have P/N 2629M62G01 and a serial number identified in Table 1 of 
CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00.
    (2) For the purpose of this AD, a ``shop visit'' is the 
induction of an engine into the shop for maintenance involving the 
separation of pairs of major mating engine flanges, except that the 
separation of engine flanges solely for the purposes of 
transportation without subsequent engine maintenance does not 
constitute an engine shop visit.

(j) Credit for Previous Actions

    You may take credit for the actions required by paragraphs 
(g)(1) through (4) and (h) of this AD if you performed these actions 
before the effective date of this AD using CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-
0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 001-00, dated April 30, 2025.

(k) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, AIR-520 Continued Operational Safety Branch, 
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local 
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending 
information directly to the Manager, AIR-520 Continued Operational 
Safety Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in 
paragraph (l) of this AD and email to: [email protected].
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.
    (3) For service material that contains steps that are labeled as 
Required for Compliance (RC), the following provisions apply.
    (i) The steps labeled as RC, including substeps under an RC step 
and any figures identified in an RC step, that are required by 
paragraph (g) of this AD must be done to comply with this AD. An 
AMOC is required for any deviations to RC steps required by 
paragraph (g) of this AD, including substeps and identified figures.
    (ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be deviated from using accepted 
methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection 
program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the RC 
steps, including substeps and identified figures, can still be done 
as specified, and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy 
condition.

(l) Additional Information

    (1) For more information about this AD, contact Mehdi Lamnyi, 
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, 
WA 98198; phone: (781) 238-7743; email: [email protected].
    (2) For CFM material, which is not incorporated by reference in 
this AD, contact CFM, GE Aviation Fleet Support, 1 Neumann Way, M/D 
Room 285, Cincinnati, OH 45215; phone: (877) 432-3272; email: 
[email protected].

(m) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the material listed in this 
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions 
required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) CFM International, S.A. (CFM) Service Bulletin (SB) LEAP-1A-
72-00-0536-01A-930A-D, Issue 001-00, dated July 22, 2024.
    (ii) CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0562-01A-930A-D, Issue 002-00, dated 
September 24, 2025.
    (3) For CFM material identified in this AD, contact CFM, GE 
Aviation Fleet Support, 1 Neumann Way, M/D Room 285, Cincinnati, OH 
45215; phone: (877) 432-3272; email: [email protected].
    (4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness 
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 1200 District Avenue, 
Burlington, MA 01803. For information on the availability of this 
material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110.
    (5) You may view this material at the National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability 
of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations or email [email protected].

    Issued on January 13, 2026.
Peter A. White,
Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate Management Division, Aircraft 
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2026-01152 Filed 1-21-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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