Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Airplanes

[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 128 (Tuesday, July 7, 2026)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 41542-41556]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-13655]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2026-7211; Project Identifier MCAI-2026-00665-T; 
Amendment 39-23403; AD 2026-13-52]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type 
Certificate Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership 
(CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all 
Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 
airplanes. The FAA previously sent this AD as an emergency AD to all 
known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. This AD was 
prompted by a report of several missing or broken high pressure valve 
(HPV) butterfly clips found in a repair shop. This AD prohibits 
dispatching an airplane under certain dispatch provisions corresponding 
to master minimum equipment list (MMEL) items for the wing anti-ice 
system, wing anti ice pressure sensor, fan air valve (FAV), bleed air 
systems, engine bleed pressure regulating shutoff valve (PRSOV), HPV, 
and pack bleed air leak and overheat detection loop; and prohibits 
dispatching an airplane if certain crew alerting system (CAS) messages 
and associated info messages are displayed. The FAA is issuing this AD 
to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective July 7, 2026. Emergency AD 2026-13-52, 
issued on June 29, 2026, which contains the requirements of this 
amendment, was effective with actual notice.
    The FAA must receive comments on this AD by August 21, 2026.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
    <bullet> Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to regulations.gov. Follow 
the instructions for submitting comments.
    <bullet> Fax: 202-493-2251.
    <bullet> Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
    <bullet> Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under 
Docket No. FAA-2026-7211; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 
docket contains this final rule, the mandatory continuing airworthiness 
information (MCAI), any comments received, and other information. The 
street address for Docket Operations is listed above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Bumbaugh, Aviation Safety 
Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206-
231-3522; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to send any written data, views, or arguments 
about this final rule. Send your comments using a method listed under 
the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2026-7211; Project 
Identifier MCAI-2026-00665-T'' at the beginning of your comments. The 
most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the final rule, 
explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting 
data. The FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date 
and may amend this final rule because of those comments.
    Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in 
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to 
regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The 
agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal 
contact received about this final rule.

Confidential Business Information

    CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily 
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public 
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this AD contain commercial 
or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that 
you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to 
this AD, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted 
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing 
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as 
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public 
docket of this AD. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to Michael 
Bumbaugh, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des 
Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206-231-3522; email: [email protected]. 
Any commentary that the FAA receives that is not specifically 
designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for this 
rulemaking.

Background

    The FAA issued Emergency AD 2026-13-52, dated June 29, 2026 (the 
emergency AD), to address an unsafe condition on all Airbus Canada 
Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. The 
FAA sent the emergency AD to all known U.S. owners and operators of 
these airplanes. The emergency AD prohibits dispatching an airplane 
under certain dispatch provisions corresponding to MMEL items for the 
wing anti-ice system, wing anti ice pressure sensor; FAV, bleed air 
systems, engine bleed PRSOV, HPV, and pack bleed air leak and overheat 
detection loop; and prohibits dispatching an airplane if certain CAS 
messages and associated info messages are displayed.
    The emergency AD was prompted by Transport Canada Emergency AD CF-
2026-33R1, dated June 24, 2026 (Transport Canada Emergency AD CF-2026-
33R1) (also referred to as the MCAI), issued by Transport Canada, which 
is the aviation authority for Canada, to correct an unsafe condition on 
all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (ACLP) Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-
500-1A11 airplanes. The MCAI states it was reported to ACLP that 
several missing or broken HPV butterfly clips were found in a repair 
shop. An ACLP assessment has determined that failure of the butterfly 
clip may not be readily detected during operation and could remain 
latent until the next scheduled inspection or until secondary effects 
occur (e.g., bleed leak or overheat indications). Failure of the 
butterfly clip may also lead to degradation of the valve sealing 
function. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result 
in the inability to properly isolate the bleed system when required, 
uncontrolled hot

[[Page 41543]]

air leakage, overheating of critical airplane structures and 
components, and degradation of structural integrity.
    The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these 
products.
    You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under 
Docket No. FAA-2026-7211.

Related Material

    Transport Canada Emergency AD CF-2026-33R1 specifies a prohibition 
to dispatch an airplane under the provisions of the minimum equipment 
list (MEL) items corresponding to certain MMEL items and certain CAS 
messages and associated info messages.

FAA's Determination

    These products have been approved by the civil aviation authority 
of another country and are approved for operation in the United States. 
Pursuant to the FAA's bilateral agreement with this State of Design 
Authority, that authority has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition 
described in the MCAI described above. The FAA is issuing this AD after 
determining that the unsafe condition described previously is likely to 
exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

AD Requirements

    This AD prohibits dispatching an airplane under the dispatch 
provisions of the operator's MEL items corresponding to certain 
dispatch provisions of MMEL items 30-11-00, Wing Anti-Ice System; 30-
12-01, Wing Anti Ice Pressure Sensor; 36-11-92, Fan Air Valve (FAV); 
36-12-00, Bleed Air Systems; 36-12-01, Engine Bleed Pressure Regulating 
Shutoff Valve (PRSOV); 36-12-05, HPV; and 36-21-03, Pack Bleed Air Leak 
and Overheat Detection Loop. This AD also prohibits dispatching an 
airplane if certain CAS messages and associated info messages are 
displayed.

Interim Action

    The FAA considers that this AD is an interim action. If final 
action is later identified, the FAA might consider further rulemaking 
then.

Justification for Immediate Adoption and Determination of the Effective 
Date

    Section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 
551 et seq.) authorizes agencies to dispense with notice and comment 
procedures for rules when the agency, for ``good cause,'' finds that 
those procedures are ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest.'' Under this section, an agency, upon finding good 
cause, may issue a final rule without providing notice and seeking 
comment prior to issuance. Further, section 553(d) of the APA 
authorizes agencies to make rules effective in less than thirty days, 
upon a finding of good cause.
    An unsafe condition exists that required the immediate adoption of 
Emergency AD 2026-13-52 issued on June 29, 2026, to all known U.S. 
owners and operators of these airplanes. The FAA found that the risk to 
the flying public justified forgoing notice and comment prior to 
adoption of this rule because failure of the HPV butterfly clip may 
lead to degradation of the valve sealing function and consequent 
inability to properly isolate the bleed system when required, 
uncontrolled hot air leakage, overheating of critical airplane 
structures and components, and degradation of structural integrity. 
This could lead to loss of control of the airplane. These conditions 
still exist, therefore, notice and opportunity for prior public comment 
are impracticable and contrary to the public interest pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. 553(b).
    In addition, the FAA finds that good cause exists pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. 553(d) for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days, 
for the same reasons the FAA found good cause to forgo notice and 
comment.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) do not 
apply when an agency finds good cause pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553 to adopt 
a rule without prior notice and comment. Because the FAA has determined 
that it has good cause to adopt this rule without notice and comment, 
RFA analysis is not required.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD affects 211 airplanes of U.S. 
registry. The FAA has received no definitive data on which to base the 
cost estimate for prohibiting dispatch of an airplane under the 
specified provisions and conditions. This cost may vary significantly 
among operators.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. 
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight 
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for 
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary 
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that 
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to 
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866, and
    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive:

2026-13-52 Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate 
Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); 
Bombardier, Inc.): Amendment 39-23403; Docket No. FAA-2026-7211; 
Project Identifier MCAI-2026-00665-T.

(a) Effective Date

    The FAA issued Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2026-13-52 
on June 29, 2026 (also referred to as the emergency AD), directly to 
affected owners and operators. As a result of such actual notice, 
the emergency AD was effective for those owners and operators on the 
date it was received. This AD contains the same requirements as the 
emergency AD and, for those who did not receive actual notice, is 
effective on July 7, 2026.

[[Page 41544]]

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type 
Certificate previously held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership 
(CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 
airplanes, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 36, Pneumatic.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by a report of several missing or broken 
high pressure valve (HPV) butterfly clips found in a repair shop. 
The FAA is issuing this AD to address failure of an HPV butterfly 
clip, which may remain latent and lead to secondary effects (e.g., 
bleed leak or overheat conditions) and degradation of the valve 
sealing function. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could 
result in the inability to properly isolate the bleed system when 
required, uncontrolled hot air leakage, overheating of critical 
airplane structures and components, and degradation of structural 
integrity.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Dispatch Prohibitions

    (1) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may dispatch 
an airplane under the operational procedures of the operator's 
minimum equipment list items corresponding to the operational 
procedures of the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) items listed 
in tables 1 and 2 to paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.
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    (2) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may dispatch 
an airplane if any crew alerting system (CAS) message and associated 
info message identified in paragraph (g)(2)(i) through (xviii) of 
this AD is displayed.
    (i) L WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 L WING A/ICE LO HEAT--
CTRL TEMP INOP (Info).
    (ii) L WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 L WING A/ICE LO HEAT--L 
HPV FAIL CLSD (Info).
    (iii) L WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 L WING A/ICE LO HEAT--L 
WING A/ICE TEMP SNSR INOP (Info).
    (iv) L WING A/ICE OVHT (Caution): 30 L WING A/ICE OVHT--L WING 
A/ICE TEMP SNSR INOP (Info).

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    (v) R WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 R WING A/ICE LO HEAT--
CTRL TEMP INOP (Info).
    (vi) R WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 R WING A/ICE LO HEAT--R 
HPV FAIL CLSD (Info).
    (vii) R WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 R WING A/ICE LO HEAT--R 
WING A/ICE TEMP SNSR INOP (Info).
    (viii) R WING A/ICE OVHT (Caution): 30 R WING A/ICE OVHT--R 
WING--A/ICE TEMP SNSR INOP (Info).
    (ix) WING A/ICE FAULT (Advisory): 30 WING A/ICE FAULT--L WING A/
ICE VLV LEAK (Info).
    (x) WING A/ICE FAULT (Advisory): 30 WING A/ICE FAULT--R WING A/
ICE VLV LEAK (Info).
    (xi) AIR SYSTEM FAULT (Advisory): 36 AIR SYSTEM FAULT--L BLEED 
MON PRESS SNSR INOP (Info).
    (xii) AIR SYSTEM FAULT (Advisory): 36 AIR SYSTEM FAULT--R BLEED 
MON PRESS SNSR INOP (Info).
    (xiii) L BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 L BLEED FAIL--L BLEED TEMP 
SNSR INOP (Info).
    (xiv) L BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 L BLEED FAIL--L HPV FAIL CLSD 
(Info).
    (xv) L BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 L BLEED FAIL--L PRESS REG SOV 
INOP (Info).
    (xvi) R BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 R BLEED FAIL--R BLEED TEMP SNSR 
INOP (Info).
    (xvii) R BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 R BLEED FAIL--R HPV FAIL CLSD 
(Info).
    (xviii) R BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 R BLEED FAIL--R PRESS REG SOV 
INOP (Info).

(h) Additional AD Provisions

    The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, AIR-
520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA, has the authority to 
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found 
in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request 
to your principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office, 
as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of 
the Continued Operational Safety Branch, send it to the attention of 
the person identified in paragraph (i) of this AD and email to: 
[email protected]. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your 
appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, 
the manager of the responsible Flight Standards Office.
    (2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD 
to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be 
accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, AIR-520, 
Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA; or Transport Canada; or 
Airbus Canada Limited Partnership's Transport Canada Design Approval 
Organization (DAO). If approved by the DAO, the approval must 
include the DAO-authorized signature.

(i) Additional Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Michael Bumbaugh, 
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 
98198; phone: 206-231-3522; email: [email protected].

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference

    None.

    Issued on July 1, 2026.
Brian Knaup,
Acting Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate Management Division, 
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2026-13655 Filed 7-2-26; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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