Published 2026-07-30 · Federal Register document 2026-15365
Airworthiness Directives; Bell Textron Canada Limited Helicopters
Publication summary
The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2024-02- 55, which applies to certain Bell Textron Canada Limited (BTCL) Model 505 helicopters. AD 2024-02-55 required initial and recurring inspections of the vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly and corrective action if a crack is found. Since the FAA issued AD 2024-02- 55, the manufacturer introduced a new one- piece vertical stabilizer machined top end cap assembly, which is implemented during production, and designed a new replacement for the vertical stabilizer machined top end cap assembly currently in service. This AD continues to require the inspection requirements of AD 2024-02- 55 and would limit the applicability to exclude certain serial numbered BTCL Model 505 helicopters with an improved design vertical stabilizer top end cap installed at production. This AD also requires replacing the vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly with an improved design top end cap assembly, which constitutes a terminating action for the recurring detailed visual inspections. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
Why this record is shown
Source: Federal Register annual FAA metadata. Acquired 2026-10-11T15:01:38.908778+00:00. The title, summary and date are source facts.
- Source revision
- federal_register_ad_metadata_2026-346456b685abaa6b
- Source row
- results[201]
- Raw source SHA-256
- 346456b685abaa6b551902467a6384e655145a0a63f9cc15222fde6cb778bdfc
Final-rule publication
Recorded publication clauses
- AD identifier printed in this edition
- 2026-15-06
- Effective date printed in this edition
- 2026-09-03
Read 13 complete recorded clauses
Effective Date
(a) Effective Date
This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective September 3,
2026.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12090–12182, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: b7951386aeea1f18624f2c9efbb22385d6c200ff2fe436b6c8dd56b7055fe8c9
Affected ADs
(b) Affected ADs
This AD replaces AD 2024-02-55, Amendment 39-22674 (89 FR 14576,
February 28, 2024).
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12182–12291, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 4d01ab7adbe458f72d9d7867b8787ba71ab4fa959c79a6ae154ffd39e2dc3af4
Applicability wording · Applicability
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to Bell Textron Canada Limited Model 505
helicopters, certificated in any category, as identified in
Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32, dated July 2, 2025 (Transport Canada
AD CF-2025-32).
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12291–12520, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: eb72838a5edbe92c6894d136201e39249c98a2f6758c258ca08b52f53d815c46
Subject
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code: 5530, Vertical
stabilizer structure.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12520–12621, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 1e4c9899053b92a942119dd245ce0c1424fca80659bdbf6046696acfead15d6f
Unsafe Condition
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by multiple occurrences of the vertical
stabilizer top end cap assembly being found cracked, with some cases
including the departure of the navigation/very high frequency omni-
directional range/glide slope antenna and tuning weight from the
helicopter during flight. The FAA is issuing this AD to address
cracking in the vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly. The unsafe
condition, if not addressed, could result in the antenna or tuning
weight departing from the helicopter and impacting and damaging the
tail rotor, which could result in the loss of directional control of
the helicopter.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 12621–13272, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: cb1ca30143bf96e196d7e8f22a9a006c32e6e8e2e3d933fabb06e2fa7b890b03
Compliance
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13272–13374, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 00fbfa31932483f627d0ce0a11cbd2e35e15d9231842b91ac85623ce533912d3
Requirements
(g) Requirements
Except as specified in paragraphs (h) and (i) of this AD: Comply
with all required actions and compliance times specified in, and in
accordance with, Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13374–13581, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 5f11caa0f03faf123a2e97725fd604c0c69a2b336f1a3693ee000aea409ec262
Exceptions to Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32
(h) Exceptions to Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32
(1) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32 refers to its effective
date, this AD requires using the effective date of this AD.
(2) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32 requires compliance in
terms of hours air time, this AD requires using hours time-in-
service.
(3) Where the material referenced in Transport Canada AD CF-
2025-32 specifies discarding parts, this AD requires removing those
parts from service.
(4) Where the material referenced in Transport Canada AD CF-
2025-32 specifies damage, for the purposes of this AD, damage can be
indicated by, but not limited to, cracking.
(5) Where the material referenced in Transport Canada AD CF-
2025-32 specifies to contact the manufacturer if the drilled holes
can no longer go beyond the allowable dimensions, this AD requires
corrective action in accordance with a method approved by the
Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA; or Transport Canada;
or Bell Textron Canada Limited Transport Canada Design Approval
Organization (DAO). If approved by the DAO,
[[Page 47956]]
the approval must include the DAO-authorized signature.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 13581–14751, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: d90af820ba8977047705c71c1b0a8e35909d9b52f7fca20f256294f92ca4684b
No Reporting Requirement
(i) No Reporting Requirement
Although the material referenced in Transport Canada AD CF-2025-
32 specifies submitting certain information to the manufacturer,
this AD does not include that action.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 14751–14955, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 94a851518ad102cd5c2fc1a4c6a369b2315fca36b132272ca91cf511a3369506
Credit for Previous Actions
(j) Credit for Previous Actions
This paragraph provides credit for the actions required by
paragraph 1. of Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32, if those actions
were performed before the effective date of this AD using Bell
Textron Canada Limited Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 505-24-38, dated
January 24, 2024.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 14955–15271, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: fe163e691f011501497359ced7f1c2e74a732ca3825e0cbe6f5b3f74f357c186
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(k) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information
directly to the manager of the International Validation Branch, send
it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (l)(1) of
this AD and email to: [email protected].
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 15271–16046, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 3531af50f017a617ab8e24c2eac79fe753ca06cc728753100702560f155f7e15
Additional Information
(l) Additional Information
(1) For more information about this AD, contact Promita Dey,
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410,
Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (913) 563-8269; email:
[email protected].
(2) Material identified in this AD that is not incorporated by
reference is available at the address specified in paragraph (m)(3)
of this AD.
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 16046–16424, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: ea99388b4267fd16d097c7b59bf93b5acedb0f81ea4f6e8febc6972179399d67
Material Incorporated by Reference
(m) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the material listed in this paragraph
under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions
required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32, dated July 2, 2025.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For Transport Canada material identified in this AD, contact
Transport Canada National Aircraft Certification, 159 Cleopatra
Drive, Nepean, Ontario, K1A 0N5, Canada; phone 888-663-3639; email
[email protected];
internet tc.canada.ca/en/aviation. You may find the Transport Canada
material on the Transport Canada website at wwwapps.tc.gc.ca/Saf-Sec-Sur/2/cawis-swimn/ad_qs1.aspx.
(4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 10101 Hillwood Parkway,
Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110.
(5) You may view this material at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations or email [email protected].
Exact source excerpt. Text positions 16424–17717, end exclusive, in the original decoded publication. SHA-256: 2ea405f40b92b4cd37ab9705f09393822a706eb7f3ec231fab56ad461320d92b
Explicit historical replacement wording
Find all recorded historical references to AD 2026-15-06 · 0 printed reference observations in this pinned collection.
These are observations from one dated publication. Current legal status is unknown; aircraft applicability, installed configuration, compliance and burden require separate evidence. Missing or unparsed conditions remain unknown.
Why these observations are shown
They were extracted offline from the same immutable official HTML source as the complete recorded text. The dated source wording, original text coordinates and exact quote digests are retained. PDF/text agreement and current regulatory effect have not been qualified.
Observation revision: whole-ad-publication-clause-observations-1.0.1. Text SHA-256: 50fe7832df75615ddfb100c11dbc41141f2676b392d4e45f7d4eae3dd70fe07d. Source manifest: 5ff61c64930b4ee95df0e360262a3f51cd0b8404446ec340dab15046d2a76fec.
Official source · 2026-07-30
Publication text
This is the complete recorded text of this dated publication.
Current legal effect is unknown. Aircraft applicability, installed configuration and compliance require separate evidence. PDF/text agreement has not been evaluated.
Read the complete official publication text
[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 145 (Thursday, July 30, 2026)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 47953-47956]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-15365]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2026-3477; Project Identifier MCAI-2025-01195-R;
Amendment 39-23418; AD 2026-15-06]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Bell Textron Canada Limited Helicopters
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2024-02-
55, which applies to certain Bell Textron Canada Limited (BTCL) Model
505 helicopters. AD 2024-02-55 required initial and recurring
inspections of the vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly and
corrective action if a crack is found. Since the FAA issued AD 2024-02-
55, the manufacturer introduced a new one-
[[Page 47954]]
piece vertical stabilizer machined top end cap assembly, which is
implemented during production, and designed a new replacement for the
vertical stabilizer machined top end cap assembly currently in service.
This AD continues to require the inspection requirements of AD 2024-02-
55 and would limit the applicability to exclude certain serial numbered
BTCL Model 505 helicopters with an improved design vertical stabilizer
top end cap installed at production. This AD also requires replacing
the vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly with an improved design
top end cap assembly, which constitutes a terminating action for the
recurring detailed visual inspections. The FAA is issuing this AD to
address the unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: This AD is effective September 3, 2026.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of September 3,
2026.
ADDRESSES:
AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under
Docket No. FAA-2026-3477; or in person at Docket Operations between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD
docket contains this final rule, the mandatory continuing airworthiness
information (MCAI), any comments received, and other information. The
address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
Material Incorporated by Reference:
<bullet> For Transport Canada material identified in this AD,
contact Transport Canada, Transport Canada National Aircraft
Certification, 159 Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario, K1A 0N5, Canada;
telephone 888-663-3639; email: [email protected]; internet tc.canada.ca/en/aviation.
You may find the Transport Canada material on the Transport Canada
website at wwwapps.tc.gc.ca/Saf-Sec-Sur/2/cawis-swimn/ad_qs1.aspx.
<bullet> You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 10101 Hillwood Parkway,
Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110. It is also available at
regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2026-3477.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Promita Dey, Aviation Safety Engineer,
FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (913)
563-8269; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14
CFR part 39 to supersede AD 2024-02-55, Amendment 39-22674 (89 FR
14576, February 28, 2024) (AD 2024-02-55). AD 2024-02-55 applied to
certain BTCL Model 505 helicopters. AD 2024-02-55 required
accomplishing initial and recurring inspections of the vertical
stabilizer top end cap assembly, and if a crack is found, replacement
of the top end cap. The FAA issued AD 2024-02-55 to address cracking in
the vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly. This condition, if not
addressed, could result in the antenna or tuning weight departing from
the helicopter and impacting and damaging the tail rotor, which could
result in the loss of directional control of the helicopter.
The NPRM was published in the Federal Register on April 8, 2026 (91
FR 17772). The NPRM was prompted by Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32,
dated July 2, 2025 (Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32) (also referred to
as the MCAI), issued by Transport Canada, which is the aviation
authority for Canada. The MCAI states that a new one-piece vertical
stabilizer machined top end cap assembly, having part number (P/N) SLS-
030-701-149, was implemented into the Bell 505 production line, and a
new machined top end cap assembly, P/N SLS-704-701-101, was developed
as a replacement for the top end cap assembly P/N SLS-030-701-125 that
is currently in service. The MCAI requires repetitive inspections of
the vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly until the required
replacement with a new machined top end cap assembly, P/N SLS-704-701-
101, which is considered terminating action for the repetitive
inspections.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to continue to require the inspection
requirements of AD 2024-02-55 and proposed to limit the applicability
to exclude certain serial numbered BTCL Model 505 helicopters with an
improved design vertical stabilizer top end cap installed at
production. In the NPRM, the FAA also proposed to require replacing the
vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly with an improved design top
end cap assembly, which would constitute a terminating action for the
recurring detailed visual inspections.
You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under
Docket No. FAA-2026-3477.
Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive
Comments
The FAA received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of
the costs.
Conclusion
These products have been approved by the civil aviation authority
of another country and are approved for operation in the United States.
Pursuant to the FAA's bilateral agreement with this State of Design
Authority, that authority has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition
described in the MCAI referenced above. The FAA reviewed the relevant
data, considered any comments received, and determined that air safety
requires adopting this AD as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing
this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. Except for
minor editorial changes, this AD is adopted as proposed in the NPRM.
None of the changes will increase the economic burden on any operator.
Material Incorporated by Reference Under 1 CFR Part 51
The FAA reviewed Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32, which specifies
procedures for accomplishing a one-time detailed visual inspection of
the vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly for cracking; replacing
any cracked vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly; repetitively
inspecting vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly P/N SLS-030-701-
125; and replacing vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly P/N SLS-
030-701-125 with vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly P/N SLS-704-
701-101.
This material is reasonably available because the interested
parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by
the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.
Differences Between This AD and the MCAI
Where the material referenced in Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32
specifies to contact the manufacturer if the drilled holes can no
longer go beyond the allowable dimensions, this AD requires corrective
action to be done in accordance with a method approved by the Manager,
International Validation Branch, FAA; or Transport Canada; or Bell
Textron Canada Limited Transport Canada Design Approval Organization
(DAO). If approved by the DAO, the approval must include the DAO-
authorized signature.
[[Page 47955]]
Costs of Compliance
The FAA estimates that this AD affects 150 helicopters of U.S.
registry.
The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial inspection of vertical 2 work-hours x $85 per $0 $170 $25,500
stabilizer top end assembly. hour = $170.
Recurring inspections of vertical 1 work-hour x $85 per 0 85 12,750
stabilizer top end assembly. hour = $85.
Replacement of the vertical 6 work-hours (not 2,000 2,510 376,500
stabilizer top end assembly. including 16 hours to
cure) x $85 per hour =
$510.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA has included all known costs in its cost estimate.
According to the manufacturer, however, some of the costs of this AD
may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on
affected operators.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
The FAA has determined that this AD will not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
The Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by:
0
a. Removing Airworthiness Directive 2024-02-55, Amendment 39-22674 (89
FR 14576, February 28, 2024); and
0
b. Adding the following new airworthiness directive:
2026-15-06 Bell Textron Canada Limited: Amendment 39-23418; Docket
No. FAA-2026-3477; Project Identifier MCAI-2025-01195-R.
(a) Effective Date
This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective September 3,
2026.
(b) Affected ADs
This AD replaces AD 2024-02-55, Amendment 39-22674 (89 FR 14576,
February 28, 2024).
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to Bell Textron Canada Limited Model 505
helicopters, certificated in any category, as identified in
Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32, dated July 2, 2025 (Transport Canada
AD CF-2025-32).
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code: 5530, Vertical
stabilizer structure.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by multiple occurrences of the vertical
stabilizer top end cap assembly being found cracked, with some cases
including the departure of the navigation/very high frequency omni-
directional range/glide slope antenna and tuning weight from the
helicopter during flight. The FAA is issuing this AD to address
cracking in the vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly. The unsafe
condition, if not addressed, could result in the antenna or tuning
weight departing from the helicopter and impacting and damaging the
tail rotor, which could result in the loss of directional control of
the helicopter.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Requirements
Except as specified in paragraphs (h) and (i) of this AD: Comply
with all required actions and compliance times specified in, and in
accordance with, Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32.
(h) Exceptions to Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32
(1) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32 refers to its effective
date, this AD requires using the effective date of this AD.
(2) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32 requires compliance in
terms of hours air time, this AD requires using hours time-in-
service.
(3) Where the material referenced in Transport Canada AD CF-
2025-32 specifies discarding parts, this AD requires removing those
parts from service.
(4) Where the material referenced in Transport Canada AD CF-
2025-32 specifies damage, for the purposes of this AD, damage can be
indicated by, but not limited to, cracking.
(5) Where the material referenced in Transport Canada AD CF-
2025-32 specifies to contact the manufacturer if the drilled holes
can no longer go beyond the allowable dimensions, this AD requires
corrective action in accordance with a method approved by the
Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA; or Transport Canada;
or Bell Textron Canada Limited Transport Canada Design Approval
Organization (DAO). If approved by the DAO,
[[Page 47956]]
the approval must include the DAO-authorized signature.
(i) No Reporting Requirement
Although the material referenced in Transport Canada AD CF-2025-
32 specifies submitting certain information to the manufacturer,
this AD does not include that action.
(j) Credit for Previous Actions
This paragraph provides credit for the actions required by
paragraph 1. of Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32, if those actions
were performed before the effective date of this AD using Bell
Textron Canada Limited Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 505-24-38, dated
January 24, 2024.
(k) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information
directly to the manager of the International Validation Branch, send
it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (l)(1) of
this AD and email to: [email protected].
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(l) Additional Information
(1) For more information about this AD, contact Promita Dey,
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410,
Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (913) 563-8269; email:
[email protected].
(2) Material identified in this AD that is not incorporated by
reference is available at the address specified in paragraph (m)(3)
of this AD.
(m) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the material listed in this paragraph
under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions
required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32, dated July 2, 2025.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For Transport Canada material identified in this AD, contact
Transport Canada National Aircraft Certification, 159 Cleopatra
Drive, Nepean, Ontario, K1A 0N5, Canada; phone 888-663-3639; email
[email protected];
internet tc.canada.ca/en/aviation. You may find the Transport Canada
material on the Transport Canada website at wwwapps.tc.gc.ca/Saf-Sec-Sur/2/cawis-swimn/ad_qs1.aspx.
(4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 10101 Hillwood Parkway,
Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110.
(5) You may view this material at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations or email [email protected].
Issued on July 16, 2026.
Steven W. Thompson,
Acting Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2026-15365 Filed 7-29-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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